Passages similar to: Stromata (Miscellanies) — Chapter VIII: The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things.
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Christian Mysticism
Stromata (Miscellanies)
Chapter VIII: The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things. (8)
When, then, we hear, "Honour the Lord, and be strong: but fear not another besides Him," we understand it to be meant fearing to sin, and following the commandments given by God, which is the honour that cometh from God. For the fear of God is Deos [in Greek]. But if fear is perturbation of mind, as some will have it that fear is perturbation of mind, yet all fear is not perturbation. Superstition is indeed perturbation of mind; being the fear of demons, that produce and are subject to the excitement of passion. On the other hand, consequently, the fear of God, who is not subject to perturbation, is free of perturbation. For it is not God, but failing away from God, that the man is terrified for. And he who fears this - that is, falling into evils - fears and dreads those evils. And he who fears a fall, wishes himself to be free of corruption and perturbation. "The wise man, fearing, avoids evil: but the foolish, trusting, mixes himself with it," says the Scripture; and again it says, "In the fear of the Lord is the hope of strength."
This, therefore, is nearly the cause of our aberration to a multitude of conceptions. For men being in reality unable to apprehend the reasons of...
(2) This, therefore, is nearly the cause of our aberration to a multitude of conceptions. For men being in reality unable to apprehend the reasons of sacred institutions, but conceiving that they are able, are wholly hurried away by their own human passions, and form a conjecture of divine concerns from things pertaining to themselves. In so doing, however, they err in a twofold respect; because they fall from divine natures; and because, being frustrated of these, they draw them down to human passions. But it is requisite not to apprehend after the same manner, things which are performed both to Gods and men, such as genuflexions, adorations, gifts, and first fruits, but to establish the one apart from the other, conformably to the difference between things more and things less honourable; and to reverence the former, indeed, as divine, but to despise the latter as human, and as performed to men. It is proper, likewise, to consider, that the latter produce passions, both in the performer and those to whom they are performed; for they are human and corporeal-formed; but to honour the energy of the former in a very high degree, as being performed through immutable admiration, and a venerable condition of mind, because they are referred to the Gods.
A: What say'st thou ever, then, God is? H: God, therefore, is not Mind, but Cause that the Mind is; God is not Spirit, but Cause that Spirit is; God...
(14) A: What say'st thou ever, then, God is? H: God, therefore, is not Mind, but Cause that the Mind is; God is not Spirit, but Cause that Spirit is; God is not Light, but Cause that the Light is. Hence one should honor God with these two names [the Good and Father] - names which pertain to Him alone and no one else. For no one of the other so-called gods, no one of men, or daimones, can be in any measure Good, but God alone; and He is Good alone and nothing else. The rest of things are separable all from the Good's nature; for [all the rest] are soul and body, which have no place that can contain the Good.
The rational man is he who fears God. He who fears God does nothing insolent. And he who guards himself against doing anything insolent is one who kee...
(59) But the man who does nothing is unworthy of (being called) rational man. The rational man is he who fears God. He who fears God does nothing insolent. And he who guards himself against doing anything insolent is one who keeps his guiding principle. Although he is a man who exists on earth, he makes himself like God.
God is equally near in all creatures. The wise man saith, "God hath spread out His net over all creatures, so that whosoever wishes to discover Him...
(3) God is equally near in all creatures. The wise man saith, "God hath spread out His net over all creatures, so that whosoever wishes to discover Him may find and recognize Him in each one." Another saith, "He knows God rightly who recognizes Him alike in all things." To serve God with fear is good; to serve Him out of love is better; but to fear and love Him together is best of all. To have a restful or peaceful life in God is good; to bear a life of pain in patience is better; but to have peace in the midst of pain is the best of all.
Farther still, he apprehended that the dominion of the Gods was most efficacious to the establishment of justice, and supernally from this he...
(5) Farther still, he apprehended that the dominion of the Gods was most efficacious to the establishment of justice, and supernally from this he constituted a polity and laws, and also justice. It will not however be foreign to the purpose, to add particularly the manner in which he thought we ought to conceive of divinity; viz. that we should conceive that he exists, and that he is so disposed towards the human race, that be inspects and does not neglect it. And this conception which the Pythagoreans derived from Pythagoras, they apprehended to be of great utility. For we require an inspection of this kind, which we do not in any thing think fit to resist. But such as this is the inspective government of divinity.
Fop if a divine nature is a thing of this kind, it deserves to have the empire of the universe. For it was rightly said by the Pythagoreans, that man is an animal [so far as pertains to his irrational part,] naturally insolent, and various, according to impulses, desires, and the rest of the passions. He requires therefore transcendent inspection and government of this kind, from which a certain castigation and order may be derived. Hence they thought that every one being conscious of the variety of his nature, should never he forgetful of piety towards, and the worship of divinity; but should always place him before the eye of the mind, as inspecting and diligently observing the conduct of mankind.
But after divinity and the dæmoniacal nature, they thought that every one should pay the greatest attention to his parents and the laws, and should be obedient to them, not feignedly, but faithfully. And universally, they thought it necessary to believe, that nothing is a greater evil than anarchy; since the human race is not naturally adapted to be saved, when no one rules over it.
In all this there is no sin- there is only matter of discipline- but our concern is not merely to be sinless but to be God. As long as there is any...
(6) In all this there is no sin- there is only matter of discipline- but our concern is not merely to be sinless but to be God.
As long as there is any such involuntary action, the nature is twofold, God and Demi-God, or rather God in association with a nature of a lower power: when all the involuntary is suppressed, there is God unmingled, a Divine Being of those that follow upon The First.
For, at this height, the man is the very being that came from the Supreme. The primal excellence restored, the essential man is There: entering this sphere, he has associated himself with the reasoning phase of his nature and this he will lead up into likeness with his highest self, as far as earthly mind is capable, so that if possible it shall never be inclined to, and at the least never adopt, any course displeasing to its overlord.
What form, then, does virtue take in one so lofty?
It appears as Wisdom, which consists in the contemplation of all that exists in the Intellectual-Principle, and as the immediate presence of the Intellectual-Principle itself.
And each of these has two modes or aspects: there is Wisdom as it is in the Intellectual-Principle and as in the Soul; and there is the Intellectual-Principle as it is present to itself and as it is present to the Soul: this gives what in the Soul is Virtue, in the Supreme not Virtue.
In the Supreme, then, what is it?
Its proper Act and Its Essence.
That Act and Essence of the Supreme, manifested in a new form, constitute the virtue of this sphere. For the Supreme is not self-existent justice, or the Absolute of any defined virtue: it is, so to speak, an exemplar, the source of what in the soul becomes virtue: for virtue is dependent, seated in something not itself; the Supreme is self-standing, independent.
But taking Rectitude to be the due ordering of faculty, does it not always imply the existence of diverse parts?
No: There is a Rectitude of Diversity appropriate to what has parts, but there is another, not less Rectitude than the former though it resides in a Unity. And the authentic Absolute-Rectitude is the Act of a Unity upon itself, of a Unity in which there is no this and that and the other.
On this principle, the supreme Rectitude of the Soul is that it direct its Act towards the Intellectual-Principle: its Restraint (Sophrosyne) is its inward bending towards the Intellectual-Principle; its Fortitude is its being impassive in the likeness of That towards which its gaze is set, Whose nature comports an impassivity which the Soul acquires by virtue and must acquire if it is not to be at the mercy of every state arising in its less noble companion.