Passages similar to: Stromata (Miscellanies) — Chapter III: Demonstration Defined.
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Christian Mysticism
Stromata (Miscellanies)
Chapter III: Demonstration Defined. (6)
And to conclude, as is evident from the word, is to bring to the conclusion. And in every train of reasoning, the point sought to be determined is the end, which is also called the conclusion. But no simple and primary statement is termed a syllogism, although true; but it is compounded of three such, at the least, - of two as premisses, and one as conclusion.
Thou hast obtained it now; thou art truly a man of true resolve. May we have always an inquirer like thee!'...
(9) 'That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another, then, O dearest, it is easy to understand. Thou hast obtained it now; thou art truly a man of true resolve. May we have always an inquirer like thee!'
5. “Whoever, therefore, is able to analyze all the genera which are contained under one and the same principle, and again to compose and con-numerate...
(7) 5. “Whoever, therefore, is able to analyze all the genera which are contained under one and the same principle, and again to compose and con-numerate them, he appears to me to be the wisest of men, and to possess the most perfect veracity. Farther still, he will also have discovered a beautiful place of survey, from which it will be possible to behold divinity, and all things that are in co-ordination with, and successive to him, subsisting separately, or distinct from each other. Having likewise entered this most ample road, being impelled in a right direction by intellect, and having arrived at the end of his course, he will have conjoined beginnings with ends, and will know that God is the principle, middle, and end, of all things which are accomplished according to justice and right reason.”
And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not reason, as being intermedi...
(511) they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason. You have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to these four divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul—reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last—and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth. I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.
"Knowledge of the great One, of the great Negative, of the great Nomenclature, of the great Uniformity, of the great Space, of the great Truth, of...
(19) "Knowledge of the great One, of the great Negative, of the great Nomenclature, of the great Uniformity, of the great Space, of the great Truth, of the great Law,—this is perfection. "The great One is omnipresent. The great Negative is omnipotent. The great Nomenclature is all-inclusive. The great Uniformity is all-assimilative. The great Space is all-receptive. The great Truth is all-exacting. The great Law is all-binding. "The ultimate end is God. He is manifested in the laws of nature. He is the hidden spring. At the beginning, he was. This, however, is inexplicable. It is unknowable. But from the unknowable we reach the known. "Investigation must not be limited, nor must it be unlimited. In this vague undefinedness there is an actuality. Time does not change it. It cannot suffer diminution. May we not then call it our great Guide? "Why not bring our doubting hearts to investigation thereof? And then, using certainty to dispel doubt, revert to a state without doubt, in which doubt is doubly dead?"
One who does not understand it, does not declare the True 2. Only he who understands it, declares the True. This understanding, however, we must desir...
(1) 'When one understands the True, then one declares the True. One who does not understand it, does not declare the True 2. Only he who understands it, declares the True. This understanding, however, we must desire to understand.' 'Sir, I desire to understand it.'
Yes, he said, I know. And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these,...
(510) but they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion? Yes, he said, I know. And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on—the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind? That is true. And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.
PYTHAGORIC SENTENCES, FROM THE PROTREPTICS OF IAMBLICHUS. [96] (6)
The theorems of philosophy are to be enjoyed as much as possible, as if they were ambrosia and nectar . For the pleasure arising from them is...
(6) The theorems of philosophy are to be enjoyed as much as possible, as if they were ambrosia and nectar . For the pleasure arising from them is genuine, incorruptible, and divine. They are also capable of producing magnanimity; and though they cannot make us eternal beings, yet they enable us to obtain a scientific knowledge of eternal natures.
And, we may add the concluding words of the quotation: "To him who truly understands this truth, hath come great knowledge."
(19) But, remember, that whatever be the answer to this problem, if indeed there be an answer the truth remains that: "While All is in THE ALL, it is equally true that THE ALL is in All." The Teaching on this point is emphatic. And, we may add the concluding words of the quotation: "To him who truly understands this truth, hath come great knowledge."
To the wise, whose hearts are enlightened, The mere sound of that voice proves its truth." "When you say to a thirsty man, 'Come quickly; This is...
(51) To the wise, whose hearts are enlightened, The mere sound of that voice proves its truth." "When you say to a thirsty man, 'Come quickly; This is water in the cup, take and drink it,' Does the thirsty man say, 'This is a vain pretension; Go, remove yourself from me, O vain pretender, Or proceed to give proofs and evidence That this is generic water, and concrete water thereof'? Or when a mother cries to her sucking babe,
Timaeus: ourselves we must also invoke so to proceed, that you may most easily learn and I may most clearly expound my views regarding the subject...
(27) Timaeus: ourselves we must also invoke so to proceed, that you may most easily learn and I may most clearly expound my views regarding the subject before us. Now first of all we must, in my judgement, make the following distinction. What is that which is Existent always
On the Integral Omnipresence of the Authentic Existent (2) (2)
Now the reasoning faculty which undertakes this problem is not a unity but a thing of parts; it brings the bodily nature into the enquiry, borrowing...
(2) Now the reasoning faculty which undertakes this problem is not a unity but a thing of parts; it brings the bodily nature into the enquiry, borrowing its principles from the corporeal: thus it thinks of the Essential Existence as corporeal and as a thing of parts; it baulks at the unity because it does not start from the appropriate principles. We, however, must be careful to bring the appropriately convincing principles to the discussion of the Unity, of perfect Being: we must hold to the Intellectual principles which alone apply to the Intellectual Order and to Real Being.
On the one hand there is the unstable, exposed to all sorts of change, distributed in place, not so much Being as Becoming: on the other, there is that which exists eternally, not divided, subject to no change of state, neither coming into being nor falling from it, set in no region or place or support, emerging from nowhere, entering into nothing, fast within itself.
In dealing with that lower order we would reason from its own nature and the characteristics it exhibits; thus, on a plausible foundation, we achieve plausible results by a plausible system of deduction: similarly, in dealing with the Intellectual, the only way is to grasp the nature of the essence concerned and so lay the sure foundations of the argument, not forgetfully straying over into that other order but basing our treatment on what is essential to the Nature with which we deal.
In every entity the essential nature is the governing principle and, as we are told, a sound definition brings to light many even of the concomitants: where the essential nature is the entire being, we must be all the more careful to keep to that, to look to that, to refer all to that.
Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the absolute...
(533) Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Whether what I told you would or would not have been a reality I cannot venture to say; but you would have seen something like reality; of that I am confident. Doubtless, he replied. But I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences. Of that assertion you may be as confident as of the last. And assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature; for the arts in general are concerned with the desires or opinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction, or for the preservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a fabric of convention can ever become science? Impossible, he said. Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of
In case the opposite of a thing is not known to us, because it has not as yet been discovered by or made known to us, nevertheless in such case we...
(42) In case the opposite of a thing is not known to us, because it has not as yet been discovered by or made known to us, nevertheless in such case we are fully justified in ascribing to the unknown opposite the qualities and characteristics diametrically opposed to the known opposite. The rule is this: "Whatever is affirmed of one of a pair of opposites must be denied to the other"; and " whatever is denied to the one, must be affirmed of the other." So true and infallible is this rule that it may be applied and employed as the basis of logical reasoning from the known to the unknown, for the purpose of discovering the latter.
It is the Method, or Discipline, that brings with it the power of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things- what each is, h...
(4) But this science, this Dialectic essential to all the three classes alike, what, in sum, is it?
It is the Method, or Discipline, that brings with it the power of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things- what each is, how it differs from others, what common quality all have, to what Kind each belongs and in what rank each stands in its Kind and whether its Being is Real-Being, and how many Beings there are, and how many non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings.
Dialectic treats also of the Good and the not-Good, and of the particulars that fall under each, and of what is the Eternal and what the not Eternal- and of these, it must be understood, not by seeming-knowledge but with authentic science.
All this accomplished, it gives up its touring of the realm of sense and settles down in the Intellectual Kosmos and there plies its own peculiar Act: it has abandoned all the realm of deceit and falsity, and pastures the Soul in the "Meadows of Truth": it employs the Platonic division to the discernment of the Ideal-Forms, of the Authentic-Existence and of the First-Kinds : it establishes, in the light of Intellection, the unity there is in all that issues from these Firsts, until it has traversed the entire Intellectual Realm: then, resolving the unity into the particulars once more, it returns to the point from which it starts.
Now rests: instructed and satisfied as to the Being in that sphere, it is no longer busy about many things: it has arrived at Unity and it contemplates: it leaves to another science all that coil of premisses and conclusions called the art of reasoning, much as it leaves the art of writing: some of the matter of logic, no doubt, it considers necessary- to clear the ground- but it makes itself the judge, here as in everything else; where it sees use, it uses; anything it finds superfluous, it leaves to whatever department of learning or practice may turn that matter to account.
'Twas red, and it went towards this pasture." Another says, "Its ear was cropped." Another says, "Its cloth was embroidered." Another that it had...
(34) 'Twas red, and it went towards this pasture." Another says, "Its ear was cropped." Another says, "Its cloth was embroidered." Another that it had only one eye, To gain the reward every base fellow Just so every one in matters of doctrine A philosopher expounds it in one way, A third censures both of them; Every one mentions indications of this road, This truth and that truth cannot be all true,
Timaeus: If, however, it were possible to disclose briefly some main determining principle, that would best serve our purpose. This, then, is the...
(51) Timaeus: If, however, it were possible to disclose briefly some main determining principle, that would best serve our purpose. This, then, is the view for which I, for my part, cast my vote. If Reason and True Opinion are two distinct Kinds, most certainly these self-subsisting Forms do exist, imperceptible by our senses, and objects of Reason only; whereas if, as appears to some, True Opinion differs in naught from Reason, then, on the contrary, all the things which we perceive by our bodily senses must be judged to be most stable.
Chapter 24: Of the Incorporating or Compaction of the Stars. (30)
The wise Heathen also came to this [conclusion], who, indeed, in their sharp or acute understandings, far excelled our philosophers; but the right...
(30) The wise Heathen also came to this [conclusion], who, indeed, in their sharp or acute understandings, far excelled our philosophers; but the right door of knowledge has yet remained hidden from them.