But if these considerations are sound, why has Quality more than one species? What is the ground for distinguishing between habit and disposition, seeing that no differentia of Quality is involved in permanence and non-permanence? A disposition of any kind is sufficient to constitute a quality; permanence is a mere external addition. It might however be urged that dispositions are but incomplete "forms"- if the term may pass- habits being complete ones. But incomplete, they are not qualities; if already qualities, the permanence is an external addition. How do physical powers form a distinct species? If they are classed as qualities in virtue of being powers, power, we have seen, is not a necessary concomitant of qualities. If, however, we hold that the natural boxer owes his quality to a particular disposition, power is something added and does not contribute to the quality, since power is found in habits also. Another point: why is natural ability to be distinguished from that acquired by learning? Surely, if both are qualities, they cannot be differentiae of Quality: gained by practice or given in nature, it is the same ability; the differentia will be external to Quality; it cannot be deduced from the Ideal Form of boxing. Whether some qualities as distinguished from others are derived from experience is immaterial; the source of the quality makes no difference- none, I mean, pointing to variations and differences of Quality. A further question would seem to be involved: If certain qualities are derived from experience but here is a discrepancy in the manner and source of the experience, how are they to be included in the same species? And again, if some create the experience, others are created by it, the term Quality as applied to both classes will be equivocal. And what part is played by the individual form? If it constitutes the individual's specific character, it is not a quality; if, however, it is what makes an object beautiful or ugly after the specific form has been determined, then it involves a Reason-Principle. Rough and smooth, tenuous and dense may rightly be classed as qualities. It is true that they are not determined by distances and approximations, or in general by even or uneven dispositions, of parts; though, were they so determined, they might well even then be qualities. Knowledge of the meaning of "light" and "heavy" will reveal their place in the classification. An ambiguity will however be latent in the term "light," unless it be determined by comparative weight: it would then implicate leanness and fineness, and involve another species distinct from the four .

With respect to your inquiry, “ what the peculiarities are in each of the more excellent genera, by which they are separated from each other? ” if...

The species however, and the parts of it, may be surveyed as follows: Since there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational; the...

Accordingly, while the definition is explanatory of the essence of the thing, it is incapable of accurately comprehending its nature. By means of the...

The virtue of man is the perfection of the nature of man. For every being becomes perfect, and arrives at the summit of excellence according to the...

In this consideration are found two qualities, a good one and an evil one, which are in each other as one thing in this world, in all powers, in the...

Now in definitions, difference is assumed, which, in the definition, occupies the place of sign. The faculty of laughing, accordingly, being added to...

In this ascending scale of animal life the student will perceive countless varieties and species, subspecies and variations among species. And in...

Now every single class of living thing, Asclepius, of whatsoever kind, or it be mortal or be rational, whether it be endowed with soul, or be without...

But if they are separate from bodies, and essentially preexist unmingled with them, what reasonable distinction, produced from bodies, can be transfer...

In these three species or qualities stands the corporeal being, or the creatural being of all creatures in heaven and in this world, whether it be...

ALL whatsoever that has been mentioned above is called quality, because it qualifieth, operateth or frameth all in the deep above the earth, also...

Hence you inquire concerning the difference in the last things pertaining to them; but you leave uninvestigated such things as are first, and most hon...

Hence comes discernment between things which are of like nature, not distinguished by difference of kind, character or position.

We divide, therefore, the genus of what is proposed for consideration into the species contained in it; as, in the case of man, we divide animal,...

From these things, therefore, it is easy to answer your next question. For the peculiar dæmon does not rule over one of the parts in us, but, in...

Now here a man must consider what the word quality meaneth or is. A quality is the mobility, boiling, springing and driving of a thing. Of Heat.

The readiness acquired by previous training conduces much to the perception of such things as are requisite; but those things which can be perceived...

The Birth of the eternal Nature is like the [Thoughts or] Senses in Man, as when a [Thought or] Sense is generated by something, and afterwards...

Through this, the inherent character, distinctive marks and conditions of being and powers, according to their development, are made clear.

These four Forms are in the Originality of Nature, and from thence the Mobility exists, as also the Life in the Seed, and in all the Creatures, has...