With regard to States: It may seem strange that States should be set up as a third class- or whatever class it is- since all States are referable to Matter. We shall be told that there is a difference among States, and that a State as in Matter has definite characteristics distinguishing it from all other States and further that, whereas Qualities are States of Matter, States properly so-called belong to Qualities. But if Qualities are nothing but States of Matter, States are ultimately reducible to Matter, and under Matter they must be classed. Further, how can States constitute a single genus, when there is such manifold diversity among them? How can we group together three yards long" and "white"- Quantity and Quality respectively? Or again Time and Place? How can "yesterday," "last year," "in the Lyceum," "in the Academy," be States at all? How can Time be in any sense a State? Neither is Time a State nor the events in Time, neither the objects in Space nor Space itself. And how can Action be a State? One acting is not in a state of being but in a state of Action, or rather in Action simply: no state is involved. Similarly, what is predicated of the patient is not a state of being but a state of Passion, or strictly, Passion unqualified by state. But it would seem that State was the right category at least for cases of Situation and Possession: yet Possession does not imply possession of some particular state, but is Possession absolute. As for the Relative State, if the theory does not include it in the same genus as the other States, another question arises: we must enquire whether any actuality is attributed to this particular type of relation, for to many types actuality is denied. It is, moreover, absurd that an entity which depends upon the prior existence of other entities should be classed in the same genus with those priors: one and two must, clearly, exist, before half and double can. The various speculations on the subject of the Existents and the principles of the Existents, whether they have entailed an infinite or a finite number, bodily or bodiless, or even supposed the Composite to be the Authentic Existent, may well be considered separately with the help of the criticisms made by the ancients upon them.

Of things stated, some are stated without connection; as, for example, "man" and "runs," and whatever does not complete a sentence, which is either...

Yes. And does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the objec...

The paths of material things and of states of consciousness are distinct, as is manifest from the fact that the same object may produce different...

Hence you inquire concerning the difference in the last things pertaining to them; but you leave uninvestigated such things as are first, and most hon...

For each of the species is either an essence; as when we say, Some substances are corporeal and some incorporeal; or how much, or what relation, or wh...

These divisions are more or less artificial and arbitrary, for the truth is that all of the three divisions are but ascending degrees of the great...

Some, then, say that causes are properties of bodies; and others of incorporeal substances; others say that the body is properly speaking cause, and...

Hence, through these things such a corporeal-formed division as you introduce, is demonstrated to be false. It is, indeed, especially necessary not...

These frame atoms, sensible forms, corporeal bodies, and things destined to matter.

Now in definitions, difference is assumed, which, in the definition, occupies the place of sign. The faculty of laughing, accordingly, being added to...

There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said. What are they? The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be...

And of those things that are classed under the ten Categories, some are predicated by themselves (as the nine Categories), and others in relation to s...

These, also, may now be divided according to the difference of commixture. For mundane vapours are mingled with dæmons, and are unstably borne along,...

The division, then, of a whole into the parts, is, for the most part, conceived with reference to magnitude; that into the accidents can never be...

Every object has its characteristics which are already quiescent, those which are active, and those which are not yet definable.

But if they are separate from bodies, and essentially preexist unmingled with them, what reasonable distinction, produced from bodies, can be transfer...

Accordingly, while the definition is explanatory of the essence of the thing, it is incapable of accurately comprehending its nature. By means of the...

And the knowledge pre-existing of each object of investigation is sometimes merely of the essence, while its functions are unknown (as of stones, and ...

It is necessary, therefore, to admit a thing of this kind in partial souls. For such as is the life which the soul received, prior to its insertion...

One of the most surprising features of this discovery is that we finally perceive that the two contrasting sets of qualities are really but two...