Passages similar to: The Six Enneads — On the Kinds of Being (2)
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Neoplatonic
The Six Enneads
On the Kinds of Being (2) (3)
We assert, then, a plurality of Existents, but a plurality not fortuitous and therefore a plurality deriving from a unity. But even admitting this derivation from a unity- a unity however not predicated of them in respect of their essential being- there is, surely, no reason why each of these Existents, distinct in character from every other, should not in itself stand as a separate genus. Is, then, this unity external to the genera thus produced, this unity which is their source though it cannot be predicated of them in respect of their essence? it is indeed external; the One is beyond; it cannot, therefore, be included among the genera: it is the source, while they stand side by side as genera. Yet surely the one must somehow be included ? No: it is the Existents we are investigating, not that which is beyond Existence. We pass on, then, to consider that which is included, and find to our surprise the cause included with the things it causes: it is surely strange that causes and effects should be brought into the same genus. But if the cause is included with its effects only in the sense in which a genus is included with its subordinates, the subordinates being of a different order, so that it cannot be predicated of them whether as their genus or in any other relation, these subordinates are obviously themselves genera with subordinates of their own: you may, for example, be the cause of the operation of walking, but the walking is not subordinate to you in the relation of species to genus; and if walking had nothing prior to it as its genus, but had posteriors, then it would be a genus and rank among the Existents. Perhaps, however, it must be utterly denied that unity is even the cause of other things; they should be considered rather as its parts or elements- if the terms may be allowed,- their totality constituting a single entity which our thinking divides. All unity though it be, it goes by a wonderful power out into everything; it appears as many and becomes many when there is a motion; the fecundity of its nature causes the One to be no longer one, and we, displaying what we call its parts, consider them each as a unity and make them into "genera," unaware of our failure to see the whole at once. We display it, then, in parts, though, unable to restrain their natural tendency to coalesce, we bring these parts together again, resign them to the whole and allow them to become a unity, or rather to be a unity. All this will become clearer in the light of further consideration- when, that is to say, we have ascertained the number of the genera; for thus we shall also discover their causes. It is not enough to deny; we must advance by dint of thought and comprehension. The way is clear:
The genera of all things company with their own species; so that the genus is a class in its entirety, the species is part of a genus. The genus of th...
(1) And all dependent from Above are subdivided into species in the fashion which I am to tell. The genera of all things company with their own species; so that the genus is a class in its entirety, the species is part of a genus. The genus of the Gods will, therefore, make the species of the Gods out of itself. In like way, too, the genus of the daimons, and of men, likewise of birds, and of all [animals] the Cosmos doth contain within itself, brings into being species like itself. There is besides a genus other than the animal,—a genus, or indeed a soul, in that it’s not without sensation,—in consequence of which it both finds happiness in suitable conditions, and pines and spoils in adverse ones;—I mean [the class] of all things on the earth which owe their life to the sound state of roots and shoots, of which the various kinds are scattered through the length and breadth of Earth.
Chapter VI: Definitions, Genera, and Species. (11)
We divide, therefore, the genus of what is proposed for consideration into the species contained in it; as, in the case of man, we divide animal,...
(11) We divide, therefore, the genus of what is proposed for consideration into the species contained in it; as, in the case of man, we divide animal, which is the genus, into the species that appear in it, the mortal, and the immortal. And thus, by continually dividing those genera that seem to be compound into the simpler species, we arrive at the point which is the subject of investigation, and which is incapable of further division.
To which may be added, that it is dreadfully absurd to ascribe to bodies a principal power of giving a specific distinction to the first causes of the...
(1) But neither must we admit that cause of the distinction of these genera which you subjoin, viz. “ that it is an arrangement with reference to different bodies; as, for instance, of Gods to etherial bodies, but of dæmons to aerial bodies, and of souls to such as are terrene .” For such an arrangement as this, which resembles that of Socrates to a tribe, when he is a senator, is unworthy of the divine genera, because all of them are essentially unrestrained and free. To which may be added, that it is dreadfully absurd to ascribe to bodies a principal power of giving a specific distinction to the first causes of themselves. For bodies are in servile subjection to these causes, and are ministrant to generation. And farther still, the genera of the more excellent natures are not in bodies, but the former externally rule over the latter. Hence they are not changed in conjunction with bodies. Again, they impart from themselves to bodies every such good as they are able to receive, but they themselves receive nothing from bodies; so that neither will they derive from them certain peculiarities.
With respect to your inquiry, “ what the peculiarities are in each of the more excellent genera, by which they are separated from each other? ” if...
(1) With respect to your inquiry, “ what the peculiarities are in each of the more excellent genera, by which they are separated from each other? ” if you understand by peculiarities the specific differences under the same genus, which are distinguished by opposite qualities, as the rational and irrational under animal; we by no means admit peculiarities of this kind, in things which neither have one common essence, nor an equal contradistinction, nor receive a composition from something common, which is indefinite, and defines the peculiarity. But if you apprehend the peculiarity to be, as in prior and secondary natures, differing in their whole essence and whole genus, a certain simple condition of being, definite in itself; in this case, your conception of peculiarities will be reasonable. For these peculiarities of things, which have an eternal subsistence, are simple, and entirely exempt. The inquiry, however, proceeds imperfectly. For it was necessary, in the first place, to inquire what the peculiarities are of the more excellent genera, according to essence; in the next place, what they are according to power; and thus afterwards, what they are according to energy.
The latter, then, which are being made,—either by Gods, or daimons, or by men,—are species all most closely like to their own several genera. For that...
(1) And yet the species of all genera are interblended with all genera; some which have previously been made, some which are made from these. The latter, then, which are being made,—either by Gods, or daimons, or by men,—are species all most closely like to their own several genera. For that it is impossible that bodies should be formed without the will of God; or species be configured without the help of daimons; or animals be taught and trained without the help of men.
In short, whether you think that there is one genus of the Gods, one of dæmons, and in a similar manner of heroes, and souls essentially incorporeal;...
(5) In short, whether you think that there is one genus of the Gods, one of dæmons, and in a similar manner of heroes, and souls essentially incorporeal; or whether you admit that these are severally many, you inquire what the difference of them is according to peculiarities. For if you apprehend that each of these is one [and the same genus] the whole arrangement of scientific theology is confounded. But if, as truth requires, you admit that they are genetically distinguished, and that there is not in them one common essential definition, but that those of them which are prior, are exempt from those that are inferior, it is not possible to discover their common boundaries. And even if this were possible, this very thing would destroy their peculiarities. In this way, therefore, the object of investigation cannot be found. He, however, he who directs his attention to the analogous sameness which exists in superior natures, as, for instance, in the many genera of the Gods, and again in dæmons and heroes, and, in the last place, in souls, will be able to define their peculiarities. Hence through this, it is demonstrated by us what the rectitude is of the present inquiry, and what its [accurate] distinction, and also in what manner it is impossible, and in what manner it is possible, for it to subsist.
For there is no single existing being, which does not participate in the one, but as every number participates in an unit, and one dual and one decade...
(2) But One, because He is uniquely all, as beseems an excess of unique Oneness, and is Cause of all without departing from the One. For there is no single existing being, which does not participate in the one, but as every number participates in an unit, and one dual and one decade is spoken of, and one half, and one third and tenth, so everything, and part of everything participates in the one, and by the fact that the One is, all existing things are. And the Cause of all is not One, as one of many, but before every one and multitude, and determinative of every one and multitude. For there is no multitude which does not partake in some way or other of the one. Yea, that which is many by parts, is one in the whole; and the many by the accidents, is one by the subject; and the many by the number or the powers, is one by the species, and the many by the species, is one by the genus; and the many by the progressions, is one by the source. And there is no single thing which does not participate in some way in the one, which uniformly pre-held in the uniqueness throughout all, all and whole, all, even the things opposed. And indeed, without the one there will not be a multitude, but without the multitude there will be the one, even as the unit previous to every multiplied number; and, if any one should suppose, that all things are united to all, the All will be one in the whole.
That also which is added by you, “ or of accidents ,” is foreign from these genera. For in composites, and things which exist together with, or in...
(3) That also which is added by you, “ or of accidents ,” is foreign from these genera. For in composites, and things which exist together with, or in others, or are comprehended by others, some things are conceived to be precedaneous, but others consequent; and some as essences, but others, as afterwards acceding to essences. For there is a certain coarrangement of them, and incongruity and interval intervenes. But, in the more excellent genera, all things must be conceived in τῳ ειναι , i. e. in merely existing ; and wholes have a precedaneous subsistence, are separate by themselves, and have not their hypostasis from, or in others; so that there is not any thing in them which is accidental. Hence the peculiarity of them is not characterized from accidents.
Chapter VI: Definitions, Genera, and Species. (19)
The species is always contemplated in a part. On the other hand, however, if a thing is part of another, it will not be also a species. For the hand...
(19) The species is always contemplated in a part. On the other hand, however, if a thing is part of another, it will not be also a species. For the hand is a part of a man, but it is not a species. And the genus exists in the species. For [the genus] is both in man and the ox. But the whole is not in the parts. For the man is not in his feet. Wherefore also the species is more important than the part; and whatever things are predicated of the genus will be all predicated of the species.
Chapter VI: Definitions, Genera, and Species. (24)
Now in definitions, difference is assumed, which, in the definition, occupies the place of sign. The faculty of laughing, accordingly, being added to...
(24) Now in definitions, difference is assumed, which, in the definition, occupies the place of sign. The faculty of laughing, accordingly, being added to the definition of man, makes the whole - a rational, mortal, terrestrial, walking, laughing animal. For the things added by way of difference to the definition are the signs of the properties of things; but do not show the nature of the things themselves. Now they say that the difference is the assigning of what is peculiar; and as that which has the difference differs from all the rest, that which belongs to it alone, and is predicated conversely of the thing, must in definitions be assumed by the first genus as principal and fundamental.
Will not, therefore, he who surveys this conspicuous statue of the Gods, thus united to itself, be ashamed to have a different opinion of the Gods,...
(4) Will not, therefore, he who surveys this conspicuous statue of the Gods, thus united to itself, be ashamed to have a different opinion of the Gods, who are the causes of it, so as to introduce among them sections, and separations, and corporeal-formed circumscriptions? I, indeed, should think, that every one would be thus disposed. For if there is no ratio, no habitude of symmetry, no communion of essence, nor a connexion either in capacity or in energy, between that which is adorned and the adorning cause; if this be the case, there will neither be found in the world a certain extension according to interval, nor local comprehension, nor partible interception, nor any other such like connascent equalization in the presence of the Gods [with mundane natures]. For in things which are of a kindred nature, according to essence and power, or which are, in a certain respect, of the same species, or homogeneous, a certain comprehension, or conservation, may be discovered. But in such things as are entirely exempt from all mundane wholes, what opposing circumstance, or transition through all things, or partible circumscription, or local comprehension, or any thing else of this kind can justly be perceived? I think, therefore, that the several participants of the divinities are of such a nature, that some partake of them etherially, others aerially, and others aquatically; which also, the art of divine works perceiving, employs adaptations and invocations, conformable to such a division. And thus much concerning the distribution of the more excellent genera into the world.
But, when we have conceded even this, to be correctly said, we must call to mind the Word of God, which says, "I have not shewn thee these things for ...
(9) But, if the Philosopher Clemens thinks good, that the higher amongst beings should be called exemplars in relation to something, his statement advances, not through correct and perfect and simple names. But, when we have conceded even this, to be correctly said, we must call to mind the Word of God, which says, "I have not shewn thee these things for the purpose of going after them, but that through the proportionate knowledge of these we may be led up to the Cause of all, as we are capable." We must attribute, then, all existing things to It, as beseems One Union pre-eminent above all, since by starting from Being, the essentiating Progression and Goodness, both penetrating all, and filling all things with Its own being, and rejoicing over all things being, pre-holds all things in Itself, rejecting all duplicity by an one superfluity of simplicity. But It grasps all things in the same way, as beseems its super-simplified Infinity, and is participated in by all uniquely, even as a voice, whilst being one and the same, is participated in by many ears as one.
It is necessary, therefore, to admit a thing of this kind in partial souls. For such as is the life which the soul received, prior to its insertion...
(3) It is necessary, therefore, to admit a thing of this kind in partial souls. For such as is the life which the soul received, prior to its insertion in a human body, and such as the form which it readily exerted; such also is the organical body which it has suspended from itself, and such the consequent corresponding nature, which receives the more perfect life of the soul. But with respect to more excellent natures, and which, as wholes, comprehend the principle [of parts] in these, inferior are produced in superior natures; bodies, in incorporeal essences; things fabricated, in the fabricators; and, being circularly comprehended in, are directed and governed by, them. Hence, the circulations of the celestial bodies, being primarily inserted in the celestial circulations of the etherial soul, are perpetually inherent in them; and the souls of the worlds [ i. e. of the spheres], being extended to their intellect, are perfectly comprehended by it, and are primarily generated in it. Intellect, also, both that which is partial and that which is universal, is in a similar manner comprehended in the genera that are more excellent than intellect. Since, therefore, second are always converted to first natures, and superior are the leaders of inferior essences, as being the paradigms of them, hence essence and form accede to subordinate from superior natures, and things posterior are primarily produced in such as are more excellent; so that order and measure are derived from primary to secondary beings, and the latter possess that which they are from the former. But the contrary must not be admitted, viz. that peculiarities emanate from things less excellent to the natures which precede them.
Now every single class of living thing, Asclepius, of whatsoever kind, or it be mortal or be rational, whether it be endowed with soul, or be without...
(1) Now every single class of living thing, Asclepius, of whatsoever kind, or it be mortal or be rational, whether it be endowed with soul, or be without one, just as each has its class, so does each several [class] have images of its own class. And though each separate class of animal has in it every form of its own class, still in the selfsame [kind of] form the units differ from each other. And so although the class of men is of one kind, so that a man can be distinguished by his [general] look, still individual men within the sameness of their [common] form do differ from each other.
Accordingly we must first take the genus, in which are the points that are nearest those above; and after this the next difference. And the...
(9) Accordingly we must first take the genus, in which are the points that are nearest those above; and after this the next difference. And the succession of differences, when cut and divided, completes the "What it is." There is no necessity for expressing all the differences of each thing, but those which form the species.
Chapter VI: Definitions, Genera, and Species. (12)
For, after dividing "the animal" into mortal and immortal, then into terrestrial and aquatic; and the terrestrial again into those who fly and those w...
(12) For, after dividing "the animal" into mortal and immortal, then into terrestrial and aquatic; and the terrestrial again into those who fly and those who walk; and so dividing the species which is nearest to what is sought, which also contains what is sought, we arrive by division at the simplest species, which contains nothing else, but what is sought alone.
Chapter IV: To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition. (14)
And then the name animal was reduced to definition, for the sake of perspicuity. But having discovered that it is distinguished from what is not an an...
(14) But the question was, whether the embryo is already an animal, or still a plant. And then the name animal was reduced to definition, for the sake of perspicuity. But having discovered that it is distinguished from what is not an animal by sensation and motion from appetency; we again separated this from its adjuncts; asserting that it was one thing for that to be such potentially, which is not yet possessed of the power of sensation and motion, but will some time be so, and another thing to be already so actually; and in the case of such, it is one thing to exert its powers, another to be able to exert them, but to be at rest or asleep. And this is the question.
Chapter 1: Of the first Principle of the Divine Essence. (13)
These four Forms are in the Originality of Nature, and from thence the Mobility exists, as also the Life in the Seed, and in all the Creatures, has...
(13) These four Forms are in the Originality of Nature, and from thence the Mobility exists, as also the Life in the Seed, and in all the Creatures, has its Original from thence; and there is no Comprehensibility in the Originality, but such a Virtue or Power and Spirit. For it is a poisonous or venomous, hostile or enemicitious a Thing: And it must be so, or else there would be no Mobility, but all [would be as] nothing, and the Source of Wrath or Anger is the first Original of Nature.
Chapter IV: To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition. (4)
Now, on the man who proposes the question denying that plants are animals, we shall show that he affirms what contradicts himself. For, having...
(4) Now, on the man who proposes the question denying that plants are animals, we shall show that he affirms what contradicts himself. For, having defined the animal by the fact of its nourishment and growth, but having asserted that a plant is not an animal, it appears that he says nothing else than that what is nourished and grows is both an animal and not an animal.
Since, however, the order of all the Gods is profoundly united, and the first and second genera of them, and all the multitude which is spontaneously...
(5) Since, however, the order of all the Gods is profoundly united, and the first and second genera of them, and all the multitude which is spontaneously produced about them, are consubsistent in unity, and also every thing which is in them is one,—hence the beginning, middles, and ends in them are consubsistent according to the one itself ; so that in these, it is not proper to inquire, whence the one accedes to all of them. For the very existence in them, whatever it may be, is this one of their nature. And secondary genera, indeed, remain with invariable sameness in the one of such as are primary; but the primary impart from themselves union to the secondary genera, and all of them possess in each other the communion of an indissoluble connexion.