O F the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry. To what do you refer? To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be received; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been distinguished. What do you mean? Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe—but I do not mind saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to them. Explain the purport of your remark. Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the truth, and therefore I will speak out. Very good, he said. Listen to me then, or rather, answer me. Put your question. Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know. A likely thing, then, that I should know.

Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener. Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire yourself? Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a corresponding idea or form:—do you understand me? I do. Let us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the world—plenty of them, are there not? Yes. But there are only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the other of a table. True. And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea—that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances—but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could he? Impossible. And there is another artist,—I should like to know what you would say of him. Who is he? One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen. What an extraordinary man! Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things—the earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.

He must be a wizard and no mistake. Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all yourself? What way? An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round—you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the mirror. Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only. Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too is, as I conceive, just such another—a creator of appearances, is he not? Of course. But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed? Yes, he said, but not a real bed. And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed? Yes, I did. Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth. At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth. No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.

No wonder. Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who this imitator is? If you please. Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by God, as I think that we may say—for no one else can be the maker? No. There is another which is the work of the carpenter? Yes. And the work of the painter is a third? Yes. Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter? Yes, there are three of them. God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made by God. Why is that? Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the ideal bed and not the two others. Very true, he said. God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed which is essentially and by nature one only. So we believe. Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed? Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the author of this and of all other things. And what shall we say of the carpenter—is not he also the maker of the bed? Yes. But would you call the painter a creator and maker? Certainly not. Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?

I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make. Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator? Certainly, he said. And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth? That appears to be so. Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter?—I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists? The latter. As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this. What do you mean? I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all things. Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent. Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting designed to be—an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear—of appearance or of reality? Of appearance. Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he

knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter. Certainly. And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man—whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation. Most true. And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their works that

these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak so well? The question, he said, should by all means be considered. Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he had nothing higher in him? I should say not. The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them. Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and profit. Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second-hand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest

and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. ‘Friend Homer,’ then we say to him, ‘if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third—not an image maker or imitator—and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?’ Is there any city which he might name? I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he was a legislator. Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive? There is not. Or is there any invention 1 of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him? There is absolutely nothing of the kind. But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends

who loved to associate with him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such as was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the order which was named after him? Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive? Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind—if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator—can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others, have only to whisper to their contemporaries: ‘You will never be able to manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers of education’—and this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay

at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough? Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true. Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colours and figures. Quite so. In like manner the poet with his words and phrases 2 may be said to lay on the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well—such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose. Yes, he said. They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them? Exactly. Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only.

Am I not right? Yes. Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an explanation. Proceed. Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit? Yes. And the worker in leather and brass will make them? Certainly. But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who knows how to use them—he knows their right form. Most true. And may we not say the same of all things? What? That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them? Yes. And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them. True. Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions? Of course. The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told by him? True. The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him

and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge? True. But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about what he should draw? Neither. Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations? I suppose not. The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations? Nay, very much the reverse. And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude? Just so. Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic verse, are imitators in the highest degree? Very true. And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth? Certainly. And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed? What do you mean? I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance? True. And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of confusion is revealed within us;

and this is that weakness of the human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic. True. And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty of them—and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight? Most true. And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul? To be sure. And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction? True. But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible—the same faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing? Very true. Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure? True. And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation? Certainly. And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul? No doubt. This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and associates of

a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim. Exactly. The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring. Very true. And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also, relating in fact to what we term poetry? Probably the same would be true of poetry. Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad. By all means. We may state the question thus:—Imitation imitates the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more? No, there is nothing else. But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself—or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment? And we were right, he said. Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an

omission which must now be supplied. What was the omission? Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than another? Yes. But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow? The latter, he said, is the truer statement. Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone? It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not. When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do? True. There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as well as a feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his sorrow? True. But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him? Certainly. One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law? How do you mean? The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, because no human

thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required. What is most required? he asked. That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art. Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune. Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason? Clearly. And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, useless, and cowardly? Indeed, we may. And does not the latter—I mean the rebellious principle—furnish a great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers.

Certainly. Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated? Clearly. And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior degree of truth—in this, I say, he is like him; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small—he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth 3 . Exactly. But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation:—the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing? Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say. Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in

which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his breast—the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most. Yes, of course I know. But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality—we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman. Very true, he said. Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person? No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable. Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view. What point of view? If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic

element to break loose because the sorrow is another’s; and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own. How very true! And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness;—the case of pity is repeated;—there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home. Quite true, he said. And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue. I cannot deny it.

Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you should take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour those who say these things—they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State. That is most true, he said. And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of ‘the yelping hound howling at her lord,’ or of one ‘mighty in

the vain talk of fools,’ and ‘the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,’ and the ‘subtle thinkers who are beggars after all’; and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer? Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed. Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this condition only—that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre? Certainly. And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers—I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight? Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers. If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education

of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are well aware 4 that poetry being such as we have described is not to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law. Yes, he said, I quite agree with you. Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue? Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any one else would have been. And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await virtue. What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness. Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity? Say rather ‘nothing,’ he replied. And should an immortal being seriously think of this little

space rather than of the whole? Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask? Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable? He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to maintain this? Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too—there is no difficulty in proving it. I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light. Listen then. I am attending. There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil? Yes, he replied. Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good? Yes. And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease? Yes, he said. And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies? True. The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will;

for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil. Certainly not. If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction? That may be assumed. Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul? Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. But does any of these dissolve or destroy her?—and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true? Yes. Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the soul and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body? Certainly not. And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from within by a corruption of its own? It is, he replied.

Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is disease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which is another, and which does not engender any natural infection—this we shall absolutely deny? Very true. And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another? Yes, he said, there is reason in that. Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed

by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man. And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death. But if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds? Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive—aye, and well awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of death. True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was appointed to be the destruction. Yes, that can hardly be. But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether

inherent or external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal? Certainly. That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality. Very true. But this we cannot believe—reason will not allow us—any more than we can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity. What do you mean? he said. The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements? Certainly not. Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to

that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look. Where then? At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good things of this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is, and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I think that we have now said enough. True, he replied. And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument 5 ;

we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades. Very true. And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death. Certainly not, he said. Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument? What did I borrow? The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember? I should be much to blame if I had forgotten. Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us 6 ; since she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own.

The demand, he said, is just. In the first place, I said—and this is the first thing which you will have to give back—the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known to the gods. Granted. And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning? True. And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins? Certainly. Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue? Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him. And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed? Certainly. Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just? That is my conviction. And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal: they go off at a great pace,

but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow. True. And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were attributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these things are true? Certainly, he said, what you say is true.

These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which justice of herself provides. Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting. And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them. Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear. Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth; they were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near,

and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell; but the sum was this:— He said that for every wrong which they had done to any one they suffered tenfold; or once in a hundred years—such being reckoned to be the length

of man’s life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behaviour, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. /I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers 7 , there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, ‘Where is Ardiaeus the Great?’ (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: ‘He comes not hither and will never come. And this,’ said he, ‘was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals

who had been great criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the passers-by what were their crimes, and that 8 they were being taken away to be cast into hell.’ And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great. Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day’s journey brought them to the place, and there, in the

midst of the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the under-girders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; and the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions—the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest [or fixed stars] is spangled, and the seventh [or sun] is brightest; the eighth [or moon]

coloured by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth [Saturn and Mercury] are in colour like one another, and yellower than the preceding; the third [Venus] has the whitest light; the fourth [Mars] is reddish; the sixth [Jupiter] is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this reversed motion the fourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight together form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens—Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying

hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other. When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: ‘Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser—God is justified.’ When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant’s life, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games,

or, again, for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was every other quality, and the all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name

of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take with him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness. And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time: ‘Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair.’ And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he

was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle—sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls

was in most cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth 9 lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else;

and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations. All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things.

Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre. And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing. INDEX. A. A BDERA , Protagoras of, 10. 600 C . Abortion, allowed in certain cases, 5. 461 C . Absolute beauty, 5. 476 , 479 ; 6. 494 A , 501 B , 507 B ; —absolute good, 6. 507 B ; 7. 540 A ; —absolute justice, 5. 479 ; 6. 501 B ; 7. 517 E ; —absolute swiftness and slowness, 7. 529 D ; —absolute temperance, 6. 501 B ; —absolute unity, 7. 524 E , 525 E ; —the absolute and the many, 6. 507 . Abstract ideas, origin of, 7. 523 . Cp. Idea . Achaeans, 3. 389 E , 390 E , 393 A , D , 394 A . Achilles, the son of Peleus, third in descent from Zeus, 3. 391 C ; his grief, ib. 388 A ; his avarice, cruelty, and insolence, ib. 390 E , 391 A , B ; his master Phoenix, ib. 390 E . Active life, age for, 7. 539 , 540 . Actors, cannot perform both tragic and comic parts, 3. 395 A . Adeimantus, son of Ariston, a person in the dialogue, 1. 327 C ; his genius, 2. 368 A ; distinguished at the battle of Megara, ibid. ; takes up the discourse, ib. 362 D , 368 E , 376 D ; 4. 419 A ; 6. 487 A ; 8. 548 E ; urges Socrates to speak in detail about the community of women and children, 5. 449 . Adrasteia, prayed to, 5. 451 A . Adultery, 5. 461 A . Aeschylus, quoted:— S. c. T. 451, 8. 550 C ; ″ 592, 2. 361 B , E ; ″ 593 ib. 362 A ; Niobe, fr. 146, 3. 391 E ; ″ fr. 151, 2. 380 A ; Xanthians, fr. 159, ib. 381 D ; Fab. incert. 266, ib. 383 B ; ″ ″ 326, 8. 563 C . Aesculapius, see Asclepius . Affinity, degrees of, 5. 461 . Agamemnon, his dream, 2. 383 A ; his gifts to Achilles, 3. 390 E ; his anger against Chryses, ib. 392 E foll.; shown by Palamedes in the play to be a ridiculous general, 7. 522 D ; his soul becomes an eagle, 10. 620 B . Age, for active life, 7. 539 , 540 ; —for marriage, 5. 460 ; —for philosophy, 7. 539 . Agent and patient have the same qualities, 4. 437 . Aglaion , father of Leontius, 4. 439 E . Agriculture, tools required for, 2. 370 C . Ajax, the son of Telamon, 10. 620 B ; the reward of his bravery, 5. 468 D ; his soul turns into a lion, 10. 620 B . Alcinous, ‘tales of,’ 10. 614 B . Allegory, cannot be understood by the young, 2. 378 E . Ambition, disgraceful, 1. 347 B ( cp. 7. 520 D ); characteristic of the timocratic state and man, 8. 545 , 548 , 550 B , 553 E ; easily passes into avarice, ib. 553 E ; assigned to the passionate element of the soul, 9. 581 A ; —ambitious men, 5. 475 A ; 6. 485 B . Ameles, the river ( = Lethe), 10. 621 A , C . Amusement, a means of education, 4. 425 A ; 7. 537 A . Anacharsis, the Scythian, his inventions, 10. 600 A . Analogy of the arts applied to rulers, 1. 341 ; of the arts and justice, ib. 349 ; of men and animals, 2. 375 ; 5. 459 . Anapaestic rhythms, 3. 400 B . Anarchy, begins in music, 4. 424 E [ cp. Laws 3. 701 B]; in democracies, 8. 562 D . Anger, stirred by injustice, 4. 440 . Animals, liberty enjoyed by, in a democracy, 8. 562 E , 563 C ; choose their destiny in the next world, 10. 620 D [ cp. Phaedr. 249 B]. Anticipations of pleasure and pain, 9. 584 D . Aphroditè, bound by Hephaestus, 3. 390 C . Apollo, song of, at the nuptials of Thetis, 2. 383 A ; Apollo and Achilles, 3. 391 A ; Chryses’ prayer to, ib. 394 A ; lord of the lyre, ib. 399 E ; father of Asclepius, ib. 408 C ; the God of Delphi, 4. 427 A. Appearance, power of, 2. 365 B , 366 C . Appetite, good and bad, 5. 475 C . Appetites, the, 8. 559 ; 9. 571 ( cp. 4. 439 ). Appetitive element of the soul, 4. 439 [ cp. Tim. 70 E]; must be subordinate to reason and passion, 4. 442 A ; 9. 571 D ; may be described as the love of gain, 9. 581 A . Arcadia, temple of Lycaean Zeus in, 8. 565 D . Archilochus, quoted, 2. 365 C . Architecture, 4. 438 C ; necessity of pure taste in, 3. 401 . Ardiaeus, tyrant of Pamphylia, his eternal punishment, 10. 615 C , E . Ares and Aphroditè, 3. 390 C . Argos, Agamemnon, king of, 3. 393 E . Argument, the longer and the shorter method of, 4. 435 ; 6. 504 ; misleading nature of (Adeimantus), 6. 487 ; youthful love of, 7. 539 [ cp. Phil. 15 E]. For the personification of the argument, see Personification . Arion, 5. 453 E . Aristocracy (i.e. the ideal state or government of the best), 4. 445 C ( cp. 8. 544 E , 545 D , and see State ); mode of its decline, 8. 546 ; —the aristocratical man, 7. 541 B ; 8. 544 E ( see Guardians , Philosopher , Ruler ): —(in the ordinary sense of the word), 1. 338 D . Cp. Constitution . Ariston, father of Glaucon, 1. 327 A ( cp. 2. 368 A ). Aristonymus, father of Cleitophon, 1. 328 B . Arithmetic , must be learnt by the rulers, 7. 522 –526; use of, in forming ideas, ib. 524 foll. ( cp. 10. 602 ); spirit in which it should be pursued, 7. 525 D ; common notions about, mistaken, ib. E ; an excellent instrument of education, ib. 526 [ cp. Laws 5. 747]; employed in order to express the interval between the king and the tyrant, 9. 587 . Cp. Mathematics . Armenius, father of Er, the Pamphylian, 10. 614 B . Arms, throwing away of, disgraceful, 5. 468 A ; arms of Hellenes not to be offered as trophies in the temples, ib. 470 A . Army needed in a state, 2. 374 . Art , influence of, on character, 3. 400 foll.; —art of building, ib. 401 A ; 4. 438 C ; carpentry, 4. 428 C ; calculation, 7. 524 , 526 B ; 10. 602 ; cookery, 1. 332 C ; dyeing, 4. 429 D ; embroidery, 3. 401 A ; exchange, 2. 369 C ; measurement, 10. 602 ; money-making, 1. 330 ; 8. 556 ; payment, 1. 346 ; tactics, 7. 522 E , 525 B ; weaving, 3. 401 A ; 5. 455 D ; weighing, 10. 602 D ; —the arts exercised for the good of their subject, 1. 342 , 345 –347 [ cp. Euthyph. 13]; interested in their own perfection, 1. 342 ; differ according to their functions, ib. 346 ; full of grace, 3. 401 A ; must be subject to a censorship, ib. B; causes of the deterioration of, 4. 421 ; employment of children in, 5. 467 A; ideals in, ib. 472 D ; chiefly useful for practical purposes, 7. 533 A ; —the arts and philosophy, 6. 495 E , 496 C (cp. supra 5. 475 D , 476 A ); —the handicraft arts a reproach, 9. 590 C ; —the lesser arts ( τεχνύδρια ), 5. 475 D ; ( τέχνια ), 6. 495 D ; —three arts concerned with all things, 10. 601 . Art. [ Art, according to the conception of Plato, is not a collection of canons of criticism, but a subtle influence which pervades all things animate as well as inanimate (3. 400 , 401 ). He knows nothing of ‘schools’ or of the history of art, nor does he select any building or statue for condemnation or admiration. [ Cp. Protag. 311 C, where Pheidias is casually mentioned as the typical sculptor, and Meno 91 D, where Socrates says that Pheidias, ‘although he wrought such exceedingly noble works,’ did not make nearly so much money by them as Protagoras did by his wisdom. ] Plato judges art by one test, ‘simplicity,’ but under this he includes moderation, purity, and harmony of proportion; and he would extend to sculpture and architecture the same rigid censorship which he has already applied to poetry and music (3. 401 A ). He dislikes the ‘illusions’ of painting (10. 602 ) and the ‘false proportions’ given by sculptors to their subjects (Soph. 234 E), both of which he classes as a species of magic. With more justice he points out the danger of an excessive devotion to art; (cp. the ludicrous pictures of the unmanly musician (3. 411 ), and of the dilettanti who run about to every chorus (5. 475 )). But he hopes to save his guardians from effeminacy by the severe discipline and training of their early years. Sparta and Athens are to be combined [ cp. Introduction, p. clxx ]: the citizens will live, as Adeimantus complains, ‘like a garrison of mercenaries’ (4. 419 ); but they will be surrounded by an atmosphere of grace and beauty, which will insensibly instil noble and true ideas into their minds. ] Artisans, necessary in the state, 2. 370 ; have no time to be ill, 3. 406 D . Artist, the Great, 10. 596 [ cp. Laws 10. 902 E]; —the true artist does not work for his own benefit, 1. 346 , 347 ; —artists must imitate the good only, 3. 401 C . Asclepiadae, 3. 405 D , 408 B ; 10. 599 C . Asclepius , son of Apollo, 3. 408 C ; not ignorant of the lingering treatment, ib. 406 D ; a statesman, ib. 407 E ; said by the poets to have been bribed to restore a rich man to life, ib. 408 B ; left disciples, 10. 599 C ; —descendants of, 3. 406 A ; —his sons at Troy, ibid. Assaults, trials for, will be unknown in the best state, 5. 464 E . Astronomy, must be studied by the rulers, 7. 527 –530; spirit in which it should be pursued, ib. 529 , 530 . Atalanta, chose the life of an athlete, 10. 620 B . Athené, not to be considered author of the strife between Trojans and Achaeans , 2. 379 E . Athenian confectionery, 3. 404 E . Athens, corpses exposed outside the northern wall of, 4. 439 E . Athlete, Atalanta chooses the soul of an, 10. 620 B ; athletes, obliged to pay excessive attention to diet, 3. 404 A ; sleep away their lives, ibid. ; are apt to become brutalized, ib. 410 , 411 (cp. 7. 535 D ); —the guardians athletes of war, 3. 403 E , 404 B ; 4. 422 ; 7. 521 E ; 8. 543 [ cp. Laws 8. 830]. Atridae, 3. 393 A . Atropos (one of the Fates), her song, 10. 617 C ; spins the threads of destiny, and makes them irreversible, ib. 620 E . Attic confections, 3. 404 E . Audience, see Spectator . Autolycus, praised by Homer, 1. 334 A . Auxiliaries , the young warriors of the state, 3. 414 ; compared to dogs, 2. 376 ; 4. 440 D ; 5. 451 D ; have silver mingled in their veins, 3. 415 A . Cp. Guardians . Avarice, disgraceful, 1. 347 B ; forbidden in the guardians, 3. 390 E ; falsely imputed to Achilles and Asclepius by the poets, ib. 391 B , 408 C ; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, 8. 548 A , 553 . B. Barbarians, regard nakedness as improper, 5. 452 ; the natural enemies of the Hellenes, ib. 469 D , 470 C [ cp. Pol. 262 D]; peculiar forms of government among, 8. 544 D . Beast, the great, 6. 493 ; the many-headed, 9. 588 , 589 ; ‘the wild beast within us,’ ib. 571 , 572 . Beautiful, the, and the good are one, 5. 452 ; —the many beautiful contrasted with absolute beauty, 6. 507 B . Beauty as a means of education, 3. 401 foll.; absolute beauty, 5. 476 , 479 ; 6. 494 A , 501 B , 507 B [ cp. Laws 2. 655 C]. Becoming, the passage from, to being, 7. 518 D , 521 D , 525 D . Beds, the figure of the three, 10. 596 . Bee-masters, 8. 564 C . Being and not being, 5. 477 ; true being the object of the philosopher’s desire, 6. 484 , 485 , 486 E , 490 , 500 C ; 7. 521 , 537 D ; 9. 581 , 582 C (cp. 5. 475 E ; 7. 520 B , 525 ; and Phaedo 82; Phaedr. 249; Theaet. 173 E; Soph. 249 D, 254); concerned with the invariable, 9. 585 C . Belief, see Faith . Bendidea, a feast of Artemis, 1. 354 A (cp. 327 A , B ). Bendis, a title of Artemis, 1. 327 A . Bias of Priene, 1. 335 E . Birds, breeding of, at Athens, 5. 459 . Blest, Islands of the, 7. 519 C , 540 B . Body, the, not self-sufficing, 1. 341 E ; excessive care of, inimical to virtue, 3. 407 (cp. 9. 591 D ); has less truth and essence than the soul, 9. 585 D ; —harmony of body and soul, 3. 402 D . Body, the, and the members, comparison of the state to, 5. 462 D , 464 B . Boxing, 4. 422 . Brass (and iron) mingled by the God in the husbandmen and craftsmen, 3. 415 A (cp. 8. 547 A ). Breeding of animals, 5. 459 . Building, art of, 3. 401 A ; 4. 438 C . Burial of the guardians, 3. 414 A ; 5. 465 E , 469 A ; 7. 540 B [ cp. Laws 12. 947]. C. Calculation, art of, corrects the illusions of sight, 10. 602 (cp. 7. 524 ); the talent for, accompanied by general quickness, 7. 526 B . Cp. Arithmetic . Captain, parable of the deaf, 6. 488 . Carpentry, 4. 428 C . Causes, final, argument from, applied to justice, 1. 352 : 6. 491 E , 495 B ; —of crimes, 8. 552 D ; 9. 575 A . Cave, the image of the, 7. 514 foll., 532 (cp. 539 E ). Censorship of fiction, 2. 377 ; 3. 386 –391, 401 A , 408 C ; 10. 595 foll. [ cp. Laws 7. 801, 811]; of the arts, 3. 401 . Ceos, Prodicus of, 10. 600 C . Cephalus, father of Polemarchus, 1. 327 B ; offers sacrifice, ib. 328 B , 331 D ; his views on old age, ib. 328 E ; his views on wealth, ib. 330 A foll. Cephalus [of Clazomenae], 1. 330 B . Cerberus, two natures in one, 9. 588 C . Chance in war, 5. 467 E ; blamed by men for their misfortunes, 10. 619 C . Change in music, not to be allowed, 4. 424 [ cp. Laws 7. 799]. Character, differences of, in men, 1. 329 D [ cp. Pol. 307]; in women, 5. 456 ; —affected by the imitation of unworthy objects, 3. 395 ; —national character, 4. 435 [ cp. Laws 5. 747]: —great characters may be ruined by bad education, 6. 491 E , 495 B ; 7. 519 : —faults of character, 6. 503 [ cp. Theaet. 144 B]. Charmantides, the Paeanian, present at the dialogue, 1. 328 B . Charondas, lawgiver of Italy and Sicily, 10. 599 E . Cheese, 2. 372 C ; 3. 405 E . Cheiron, teacher of Achilles, 3. 391 C . Children have spirit, but not reason, 4. 441 A ; why under authority, 9. 590 E ; —in the state, 3. 415 ; 5. 450 E , 457 foll.; 8. 543 ; must not hear improper stories, 2. 377 ; 3. 391 C ; must be reared amid fair sights and sounds, 3. 401 ; must receive education even in their plays, 4. 425 A ; 7. 537 A [ cp. Laws 1. 643 B]; must learn to ride, 5. 467 [ cp. Laws 7. 804 C]; must go with their fathers and mothers into war, 5. 467 ; 7. 537 A : —transfer of children from one class to another, 3. 415 ; 4. 423 D : —exposure of children allowed, 5. 460 C , 461 C : —illegitimate children, ib. 461 A . Chimaera, two natures in one, 9. 588 C . Chines, presented to the brave warrior, 5. 468 D . Chryses, the priest of Apollo (Iliad i. 11 foll.), 3. 392 E foll. Cithara, see Harp . Citizens, the, of the best state, compared to a garrison of mercenaries (Adeimantus), 4. 419 (cp. 8. 543 ); will form one family, 5. 462 foll. See Guardians . City , situation of the, 3. 415 : —the ‘city of pigs,’ 2. 372 : —the heavenly city, 9. 592 : —Cities, most, divided between rich and poor, 4. 422 E ; 8. 551 E [ cp. Laws 12. 945 E]: —the game of cities, 4. 422 E . Cp. Constitution , State . Classes, in the state, should be kept distinct, 2. 374 ; 3. 397 E , 415 A ; 4. 421 , 433 A , 434 , 441 E , 443 ; 5. 453 (cp. 8. 552 A , and Laws 8. 846 E). Cleitophon, the son of Aristonymus, present at the dialogue, 1. 328 B ; interposes on behalf of Thrasymachus, ib. 340 A . Cleverness, no match for honesty, 3. 409 C (cp. 10. 613 C ); not often united with a steady character, 6. 503 [ cp. Theaet. 144 B]; needs an ideal direction, 7. 519 [ cp. Laws 7. 819 A]. Clotho, second of the fates, 10. 617 C , 620 E ; sings of the present, ib. 617 C ; the souls brought to her, ib. 620 E . Colours, comparison of, 9. 585 A ; contrast of, ib. 586 C ; —indelible colours, 4. 429 : —‘colours’ of poetry, 10. 601 A . Comedy, cannot be allowed in the state, 3. 394 [ cp. Laws 7. 816 D]; accustoms the mind to vulgarity, 10. 606 ; —same actors cannot act both tragedy and comedy, 3. 395 . Common life in the state, 5. 458 , 464 foll.; —common meals of the guardians, 3. 416 ; common meals for women, 5. 458 D [ cp. Laws 6. 781; 7. 806 E; 8. 839 D]; —common property among the guardians, 3. 416 E ; 4. 420 A , 422 D ; 5. 464 ; 8. 543 . Community of women and children , 3. 416 ; 5. 450 E , 457 foll., 462 , 464 ; 8. 543 A [ cp. Laws 5. 739 C]; —of property, 3. 416 E ; 4. 420 A , 422 D ; 5. 464 ; 8. 543 ; —of feeling, 5. 464 . Community. [ The communism of the Republic seems to have been suggested by Plato’s desire for the unity of the state (cp. 5. 462 foll.). If those ‘two small pestilent words, “meum” and “tuum,” which have engendered so much strife among men and created so much mischief in the world,’ could be banished from the lips and thoughts of mankind, the ideal state would soon be realized. The citizens would have parents, wives, children, and property in common; they would rejoice in each other’s prosperity, and sorrow at each other’s misfortune; they would call their rulers not ‘lords’ and ‘masters,’ but ‘friends’ and ‘saviours.’ Plato is aware that such a conception could hardly be carried out in this world; and he evades or adjourns, rather than solves, the difficulty by the famous assertion that only when the philosopher rules in the city will the ills of human life find an end [ cp. Introduction, p. clxxiii ]. In the Critias, where the ideal state, as Plato himself hints to us (110 D), is to some extent reproduced in an imaginary description of ancient Attica, property is common, but there is no mention of a community of wives and children. Finally in the Laws (5. 739), Plato while still maintaining the blessings of communism, recognizes the impossibility of its realization, and sets about the construction of a ‘second-best state’ in which the rights of property are conceded; although, according to Aristotle (Pol. ii. 6, § 4), he gradually reverts to the ideal polity in all except a few unimportant particulars. ] Conception, the, of truth by the philosopher, 6. 490 A . Confidence and courage, 4. 430 B . Confiscation of the property of the rich in democracies, 8. 565 . Constitution , the aristocratic, is the ideal state sketched in bk. iv (cp. 8. 544 E , 545 D ); —defective forms of constitution, 4. 445 B ; 8. 544 [ cp. Pol. 291 E foll.]; aristocracy (in the ordinary sense), 1. 338 D ; timocracy or ‘Spartan polity,’ 8. 545 foll.; oligarchy, ib. 550 foll., 554 E ; democracy, ib. 555 foll., 557 D ; tyranny, ib. 544 C , 562 . Cp. Government , State . Contentiousness, a characteristic of timocracy, 8. 548 . Contracts, in some states not protected by law, 8. 556 A . Contradiction , nature of, 4. 436 ; 10. 602 E ; power of, 5. 454 A . Convention, justice a matter of, 2. 359 A . Conversation, should not be personal, 6. 500 B . Conversion of the soul, 7. 518 , 521 , 525 [ cp. Laws 12. 957 E]. Cookery, art of, employed in the definition of justice, 1. 332 C . Corinthian courtesans, 3. 404 D . Corpses, not to be spoiled, 5. 469 . Correlative and relative, qualifications of, 4. 437 foll. [ cp. Gorg. 476]; how corrected, 7. 524 . Corruptio optimi pessima , 6. 491 . Corruption, the, of youth, not to be attributed to the Sophists, but to public opinion, 6. 492 A . Courage , required in the guardians, 2. 375 ; 3. 386 , 413 E , 416 E ; 4. 429 ; 6. 503 E ; inconsistent with the fear of death, 3. 386 ; 6. 486 A ; = the preservation of a right opinion about objects of fear, 4. 429 , 442 B (cp. 2. 376 , and Laches 193, 195); distinguished from fearlessness, 4. 430 B ; one of the philosopher’s virtues, 6. 486 A , 490 E , 494 A : —the courageous temper averse to intellectual toil, ib. 503 D [ cp. Pol. 306, 307]. Courtesans, 3. 404 D . Covetousness, not found in the philosopher, 6. 485 E ; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, 8. 548 , 553 ; = the appetitive element of the soul, 9. 581 A . Cowardice in war, to be punished, 5. 468 A ; not found in the philosopher, 6. 486 B . Creophylus, ‘the child of flesh,’ companion of Homer, 10. 600 B . Crete, government of, generally applauded, 8. 544 C ; a timocracy, ib. 545 B ; —Cretans, naked exercises among, 5. 452 C ; call their country ‘mother-land,’ 9. 575 E ; —Cretic rhythm, 3. 400 B . Crimes, great and small, differently estimated by mankind, 1. 344 (cp. 348 D ); causes of, 6. 491 E , 495 B ; 8. 552 D ; 9. 575 A . Criminals, are usually men of great character spoiled by bad education, 6. 491 E , 495 B ; numerous in oligarchies, 8. 552 D . Croesus, 2. 359 C ; ‘as the oracle said to Croesus,’ 8. 566 C . Cronos, ill treated by Zeus, 2. 377 E ; his behaviour to Uranus, ibid. Cunning man, the, no match for the virtuous, 3. 409 D . Cycles , recurrence of, in nature, 8. 546 A [ cp. Tim. 22 C; Crit. 109 D; Pol. 269 foll.; Laws 3. 677]. D. Dactylic metre, 3. 400 C . Daedalus, beauty of his works, 7. 529 E . Damon, an authority on rhythm, 3. 400 B (cp. 4. 424 C ). Dancing (in education), 3. 412 B . Day-dreams, 5. 458 A , 476 C . Dead (in battle) not to be stripped, 5. 469 ; judgment of the dead, 10. 615 . Death, the approach of, brings no terror to the aged, 1. 330 E ; the guardians must have no fear of, 3. 386 , 387 (cp. 6. 486 C ); preferable to slavery, 3. 387 A . Debts, abolition of, proclaimed by demagogues, 8. 565 E , 566 E . Delphi, religion left to the god at, 4. 427 A (cp. 5. 461 E , 469 A ; 7. 540 B ). Demagogues, 8. 564 , 565 . Democracy, 1. 338 D ; spoken of under the parable of the captain and the mutinous crew, 6. 488 ; democracy and philosophy, ib. 494 , 500 ; the third form of imperfect state, 8. 544 [ cp. Pol. 291, 292]; detailed account of, ib. 555 foll.; characterised by freedom, ib. 557 B , 561 –563; a ‘bazaar of constitutions,’ ib. 557 D ; the humours of democracy, ib. E, 561 ; elements contained in, ib. 564 . —democracy in animals, ib. 563 : —the democratical man, ib. 558 , 559 foll., 561 , 562 ; 9. 572 ; his place in regard to pleasure, 9. 587 . Desire, has a relaxing effect on the soul, 4. 430 A ; the conflict of desire and reason, 4. 440 [ cp. Phaedr. 253 foll.; Tim. 70 A]; —the desires divided into simple and qualified, 4. 437 foll.; into necessary and unnecessary, 8. 559 . Despots (masters), 5. 463 A . See Tyrant . Destiny, the, of man in his own power, 10. 617 E . Dialectic , the most difficult branch of philosophy, 6. 498 ; objects of, ib. 511 ; 7. 537 D ; proceeds by a double method, 6. 511 ; compared to sight, 7. 532 A ; capable of attaining to the idea of good, ibid. ; gives firmness to hypotheses, ib. 533 ; the coping stone of the sciences, ib. 534 [ cp. Phil. 57]; must be studied by the rulers, ib. 537 ; dangers of the study, ibid. ; years to be spent in, ib. 539 ; distinguished from eristic, ib. D (cp. 5. 454 A ; 6. 499 A ): —the dialectician has a conception of essence, 7. 534 [ cp. Phaedo 75 D]. Dialectic. [ Dialectic, the ‘coping stone of knowledge,’ is everywhere distinguished by Plato from eristic, i.e., argument for argument’s sake [ cp. Euthyd. 275 foll., 293; Meno 75 D; Phaedo 101; Phil. 17; Theaet. 167 E]. It is that ‘gift of heaven’ (Phil. 16) which teaches men to employ the hypotheses of science, not as final results, but as points from which the mind may rise into the higher heaven of ideas and behold truth and being. This vague and magnificent conception was probably hardly clearer to Plato himself when he wrote the Republic than it is to us [ cp. Introduction, p. xcii. ]; but in the Sophist and Statesman it appears in a more definite form as a combination of analysis and synthesis by which we arrive at a true notion of things. [ Cp. the ὑφηγημένη μεθόδος of Aristotle (Pol. i. 1, § 3; 8, § 1), which is an analogous mode of proceeding from the parts to the whole. ] In the Laws dialectic no longer occupies a prominent place; it is the ‘old man’s harmless amusement’ (7. 820 C), or, regarded more seriously, the method of discussion by question and answer, which is abused by the natural philosophers to disprove the existence of the Gods (10. 891).] Dice ( κύβοι ), 10. 604 C ; skill required in dice-playing, 2. 374 C . Diet, 3. 404 ; 8. 559 C [ cp. Tim. 89]. Differences, accidental and essential, 5. 454 . Diomede, his command to the Greeks (Iliad iv. 412), 3. 389 E ; ‘necessity of,’ (proverb), 6. 493 D . Dionysiac festival (at Athens), 5. 475 D . Discord, causes of, 5. 462 ; 8. 547 A , 556 E ; the ruin of states, 5. 462 ; distinguished from war, ib. 470 [ cp. Laws 1. 628, 629]. Discourse, love of, 1. 328 A ; 5. 450 B ; increases in old age, 1. 328 D ; pleasure of, in the other world, 6. 498 D [ cp. Apol. 41]. Disease, origin of, 3. 404 ; the right treatment of, ib. 405 foll.; the physician must have experience of, in his own person, ib. 408 ; disease and vice compared, 4. 444 ; 10. 609 foll. [ cp. Soph. 228; Pol. 296; Laws 10. 906]; inherent in everything, 10. 609 . Dishonesty, thought by men to be more profitable than honesty, 2. 364 A . Dithyrambic poetry, nature of, 3. 394 B . Diversities of natural gifts, 2. 370 ; 5. 455 ; 7. 535 A . Division of labour, 2. 370 , 374 A ; 3. 394 E , 395 B , 397 E ; 4. 423 E , 433 A , 435 A , 441 E , 443 , 453 B ; a part of justice, 4. 433 , 435 A , 441 E (cp. supra 1. 332 , 349 , 350 , and Laws 8. 846 C); —of lands, proclaimed by the would-be tyrant, 8. 565 E , 566 E . Doctors, flourish when luxury increases in the state, 2. 373 C ; 3. 405 A ; two kinds of, 5. 459 C [ cp. Laws 4. 720; 9. 857 D]. Cp. Physician . Dog, Socrates’ oath by the, 3. 399 E ; 8. 567 E ; 9. 592 ; —dogs are philosophers, 2. 376 ; the guardians the watch-dogs of the state, ibid. ; 4. 440 D ; 5. 451 D ; breeding of dogs, 5. 459 . Dolphin, Arion’s, 5. 453 E . Dorian harmony, allowed, with the Phrygian, in the state, 3. 399 A . Draughts, 1. 333 A ; skill required in, 2. 374 C ; —comparison of an argument to a game of draughts, 6. 487 C . Dreams, an indication of the bestial element in human nature, 9. 571 , 572 , 574 E . Drones, the, 8. 552 , 554 C , 555 E , 559 C , 564 B , 567 E ; 9. 573 A [ cp. Laws 10. 901 A]. Drunkenness , in heaven, 2. 363 D ; forbidden in the guardians, 3. 398 E , 403 E ; —the drunken man apt to be tyrannical, 8. 573 C . Cp. Intoxication . Dyeing, 4. 429 D . E. Early society, 2. 359 . Eating, pleasure accompanying, 8. 559 . Education , commonly divided into gymnastic for the body and music for the soul, 2. 376 E , 403 ( see Gymnastic , Music , and cp. Laws 7. 795 E); both music and gymnastic really designed for the soul, 3. 410 : —use of fiction in, 2. 377 foll.; 3. 391 ; the poets bad educators, 2. 377 ; 3. 391 , 392 , 408 B ; 10. 600 , 606 E , 607 B [ cp. Laws 10. 886 C, 890 A]; must be simple, 3. 397 , 404 E ; melody in, ib. 398 foll.; mimetic art in, ib. 399 ; importance of good surroundings, ib. 401 ; influence of, on manners, 4. 424 , 425 ; innovation in, dangerous, ibid. ; early, should be given through amusement, ib. 425 A ; 7. 536 E [ cp. Laws 1. 643 B]; ought to be the same for men and women, 5. 451 foll., 466 ; dangerous when ill-directed, 6. 491 ; not a process of acquisition, but the use of powers already existing in us, 7. 518 ; not to be compulsory, ib. 537 A ; —education of the guardians, 2. 376 foll.; 4. 429 , 430 ; 7. 521 (cp. Guardians , Ruler ); —the higher or philosophic education, 6. 498 , 503 E , 504 ; 7. 514 –537; age at which it should commence, 6. 498 ; 7. 537 ; ‘the longer way,’ 6. 504 (cp. 4. 435 ); ‘the prelude or preamble,’ 7. 532 E . Education. [ Education in the Republic is divided into two parts, (i) the common education of the citizens; (ii) the special education of the rulers. (i) The first, beginning with childhood in the plays of the children [ cp. Laws 1. 643 B], is the old Hellenic education, [ the καταβεβλημένα παιδεύματα of Aristotle , Pol. viii. 2, § 6], — ‘music for the mind and gymnastic for the body’ [ cp. Laws 7. 795 E]. But Plato soon discovers that both are really intended for the benefit of the soul [ cp. Laws 5. 743 D]; and under ‘music’ he includes literature ( λόγοι ), i.e. humane culture as distinguished from scientific knowledge. Music precedes gymnastic; both are not to be learned together; only the simpler kinds of either are tolerated [ cp. Laws Book VII, passim ]. Boys and girls share equally in both [ cp. Laws 7. 794 D]. The greatest attention must be paid to good surroundings; nothing mean or vile must meet the eye or strike the ear of the young scholar. The fairy tales of childhood and the fictions of the poets are alike placed under censorship [ cp. Laws Book X, and see s. v. Poetry ]. Gentleness is to be united with manliness; beauty of form and activity of mind are to mingle in perfect and harmonious accord. —(ii) The special education commences at twenty by the selection of the most promising students. These spend ten years in the acquisition of the higher branches of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, harmony [ cp. Laws 7. 817 E], which are not to be pursued in a scientific spirit or for utility only, but rather with a view to their combination by means of dialectic into an ideal of all knowledge ( see s. v. Dialectic ). At thirty a further selection is made: those selected spend five years in the study of philosophy, are then sent into active life for fifteen years, and finally after fifty return to philosophy, which for the remainder of their days is to form their chief occupation ( see s. v. Rulers ).] Egyptians, characterised by love of money, 4. 435 E . Elder, the, to bear rule in the state, 3. 412 B [ cp. Laws 3. 690 A; 4. 714 E]; to be over the younger, 5. 465 A [ cp. Laws 4. 721 D; 9. 879 C; 11. 917 A]. Embroidery, art of, 3. 401 A . Enchantments, used by mendicant prophets, 2. 364 B ; —enchantments, i.e. tests to which the guardians are to be subjected, 3. 413 (cp. 6. 503 A ; 7. 539 E ). End, the, and use of the soul, 1. 353 : —ends and excellencies ( ἀρεταὶ ) of things, ibid. ; things distinguished by their ends, 5. 478 . Endurance, must be inculcated on the young, 3. 390 C (cp. 10. 605 E ). Enemies, treatment of, 5. 469 . Enquiry, roused by some objects of sense, 7. 523 . Epeus, soul of, turns into a woman, 10. 620 C . Epic poetry, a combination of imitation and narration, 3. 394 B , 396 E ; —epic poets, imitators in the highest degree, 10. 602 C . Er, myth of, 10. 614 B foll. Eriphyle, 9. 590 A . Eristic, distinguished from dialectic, 5. 454 A ; 6. 499 A ; 7. 539 D . Error, not possible in the skilled person (Thrasymachus), 1. 340 D . Essence and the good, 6. 509 ; essence of the invariable, 9. 585 ; —essence of things, 6. 507 B ; apprehended by the dialectician, 7. 534 B . Eternity, contrasted with human life, 10. 608 D . Eumolpus, son of Musaeus, 2. 363 D . Eunuch, the riddle of the, 5. 479 . Euripides, a great tragedian, 8. 568 A ; his maxims about tyrants, ibid. : —quoted, Troades, l. 1169, ibid. Eurypylus, treatment of the wounded, 3. 405 E , 408 A . Euthydemus, brother of Polemarchus, 1. 328 B . Evil, God not the author of, 2. 364 , 379 , 380 A ; 3. 391 E [ cp. Laws 2. 672 B]; the destructive element in the soul, 10. 609 foll. (cp. 4. 444 ): —justice must exist even among the evil, 1. 351 foll.; their supposed prosperity, 2. 364 [ cp. Gorg. 470 foll.; Laws 2. 66 1; 10. 899, 905]; more numerous than the good, 3. 409 D . Cp. Injustice . Excellence relative to use, 10. 601 ; excellences ( ἀρεταὶ ) and ends of things, 1. 353 . Exchange, the art of, necessary in the formation of the state, 2. 369 C . Exercises, naked, in Greece, 5. 452 . Existence, a participation in essence, 9. 585 [ cp. Phaedo 101]. Experience, the criterion of true and false pleasures, 9. 582 . Expiation of guilt, 2. 364 . Eye of the soul, 7. 518 D , 527 E , 533 D , 540 A ; —the soul like the eye, 6. 508 ; 7. 518 : —Eyes, the, in relation to sight, 6. 507 (cp. Sight ). F. Fact and ideal, 5. 472 , 473 . Faculties, how different, 5. 477 ; —faculties of the soul, 6. 511 E ; 7. 533 E . Faith [or Persuasion], one of the faculties of the soul, 6. 511 D ; 7. 533 E . Falsehood, alien to the nature of God, 2. 382 [ cp. Laws 11. 917 A]; a medicine, only to be used by the state, ibid. ; 3. 389 A , 414 C ; 5. 459 D [ cp. Laws 2. 663]; hateful to the philosopher, 6. 486 , 490 . Family life in the state, 5. 449 ; —families in the state, ib. 461 ; —family and state, ib. 463 ; —cares of family life, ib. 465 C . Fates, the, 10. 617 , 620 E . Fear, a solvent of the soul, 4. 430 A ; fear and shame, 5. 465 A . Fearlessness, distinguished from courage, 4. 430 B [ cp. Laches 197 B; Protag. 349 C, 359 foll.]. Feeling, community of, in the state, 5. 464 . Festival of the Bendidea (at the Piraeus), 1. 327 A , 354 A ; of Dionysus (at Athens), 5. 475 D . Fiction in education, 2. 377 foll.; 3. 391 ; censorship of, necessary, 2. 377 foll.; 3. 386 –391, 401 A , 408 C ; 10. 595 foll.; not to represent sorrow, 3. 387 foll. (cp. 10. 604 ); representing intemperance to be discarded, 3. 390 ; —stories about the gods, not to be received, 2. 378 foll.; 3. 388 foll., 408 C [ cp. Euthyph. 6, 8; Crit. 109 B; Laws 2. 672 B; 10. 886 C; 12. 941]; —stories of the world below, objectionable, 3. 386 foll. (cp. Hades , World below ). Final causes, argument from, applied to justice, 1. 352 . Fire, obtained by friction, 4. 434 E . Flattery, of the multitude by their leaders, in ill-ordered states, 4. 426 (cp. 9. 590 B ). Flute, the, to be rejected, 3. 399 ; —flute players and flute makers, ib. D ; 10. 601 . Folly, an inanition ( κένωσις ) of the soul, 9. 585 A . Food, the condition of life and existence, 2. 369 C . Forgetfulness, a mark of an unphilosophical nature, 6. 486 D , 490 E : —the plain of Forgetfulness (Lethe), 10. 621 A . Fox, the emblem of subtlety, 2. 365 C . Fractions, 7. 525 E . Freedom, the characteristic of democracy, 8. 557 B , 561 –563. Friend, the, must be as well as seem good, 1. 334 , 335 ; —the friends of the tyrant, 8. 567 E ; 9. 576 . Friendship, implies justice, 1. 351 foll.; in the state, 5. 462 , 463 . Funeral of the guardians, 5. 465 E , 468 E ; 7. 540 B ; —corpses placed on the pyre on the twelfth day, 10. 614 . Future life, 3. 387 ; 10. 614 foll.; punishment of the wicked in, 2. 363 ; 10. 615 [ cp. Phaedo 108; Gorg. 523 E , 525; Laws 9. 870 E, 881 B; 10. 904 C]. See Hades , World below . G. Games, as a means of education, 4. 425 A (cp. 7. 537 A ); —dice ( κύβοι ), 10. 604 C ; —draughts ( πεττεία ), 1. 333 A ; 2. 374 C ; 6. 487 C ; —city ( πόλις ), 4. 422 E : —[the Olympic, &c.] glory gained by success in, 5. 465 D , 466 A ; 10. 618 A (cp. 620 B ). General, the, ought to know arithmetic and geometry, 7. 522 D , 525 B , 526 D , 527 C . Gentleness, characteristic of the philosopher, 2. 375 , 376 ; 3. 410 ; 6. 486 C ; usually inconsistent with spirit, 2. 375 . Geometry, must be learnt by the rulers, 7. 526 foll.; erroneously thought to serve for practical purposes only, ib. 527 ; —geometry of solids, ib. 528 ; —geometrical necessity, 5. 458 D ; —geometrical notions apprehended by a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 C . Giants, battles of the, 2. 378 B . Gifts, given to victors, 3. 414 ; 5. 460 , 468 ; —gifts of nature, 2. 370 A; 5. 455 ; 7. 535 A ; may be perverted, 6. 491 E , 495 A ; 7. 519 [ cp. Laws 7. 819 A; 10. 908 C]. Glaucon, son of Ariston, 1. 327 A ; 2. 368 A ; takes up the discourse, 1. 347 A ; 2. 372 C ; 3. 398 B ; 4. 427 D ; 5. 450 A ; 6. 506 D ; 9. 576 B ; anxious to contribute money for Socrates, 1. 337 E ; the boldest of men, 2. 357 A ; his genius, ib. 368 A ; distinguished at the battle of Megara, ibid. ; a musician, 3. 398 D ; 7. 531 A ; desirous that Socrates should discuss the subject of women and children, 5. 450 A ; breeds dogs and birds, ib. 459 A ; a lover, ib. 474 D (cp. 3. 402 E ; 5. 458 E ); not a dialectician, 7. 533 ; his contentiousness, 8. 548 E ; not acquainted with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, 10. 608 . Glaucus, the sea-god, 10. 611 C . Gluttony, 9. 586 A . God , not the author of evil, 2. 364 , 379 , 380 A ; 3. 391 E [ cp. Laws 2. 672 B]; never changes, 2. 380 ; will not lie, ib. 382 ; the maker of all things, 10. 598 : —Gods, the, thought to favour the unjust, 2. 362 B , 364 ; supposed to accept the gifts of the wicked, ib. 365 [ cp. Laws 4. 716 E; 10. 905 foll.; 12. 948]; believed to take no heed of human affairs, 2. 365 [ cp. Laws 10. 889 foll.; 12. 948]; human ignorance of, 2. 365 [ cp. Crat 400 E; Crit. 107; Parm. 134 E]; disbelief in, 2. 365 [ cp. Laws 10. 885 foll., 909; 12. 948]; stories of, not to be repeated, 2. 378 foll.; 3. 388 foll., 408 C [ cp. Euthyph. 6, 8; Crit. 109 B; Laws 2. 672 B; 10. 886 C; 12. 941]; not to be represented grieving or laughing, 3. 388 ; —‘gods who wander about at night in the disguise of strangers,’ 2. 381 D ; —the war of the gods and the giants, ib. 378 B . God. [ The theology of Plato is summed up by himself in the second book of the Republic under two heads, ‘God is perfect and unchangeable,’ and ‘God is true and the author of truth.’ These canons are also the test by which he tries poetry and the poets ( see s. v. Poetry ):— Homer and the tragedians represent the Gods as changing their forms or as deceiving men by lying dreams, and therefore they must be expelled from the state. But Plato has not yet acquired the austere temper of his later years. He does not threaten the impenitent unbeliever with bonds and death (Laws 10. 908, 910), but is content to show by argument the superiority of justice over injustice. In other respects the theology of the Republic is repeated and amplified in the Laws; the theses that God is not the author of evil and will not accept the gifts of the wicked or favour the unjust, are maintained with equal earnestness in both. The Republic is less pessimistic in tone than the Laws; but the thought of the insignificance of man and the briefness of human life is already familiar to Plato’s mind [ cp. 6. 486 A ; 10. 604 ; and see s. v. Man ]. The conception of God as the Demiurgus or Creator of the universe, which is prominent in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Statesman, hardly appears either in the Republic or the Laws ( cp. Rep. 10. 596 foll.; Laws 10. 886 foll.).] Gold, mingled by the God in the auxiliaries, 3. 415 A (cp. 416 E ; 8. 547 A ); —[and silver] not allowed to the guardians, 3. 416 E ; 4. 419 , 422 D ; 5. 464 D (cp. 8. 543 ). Good, the saving element, 10. 609 : —the good = the beautiful, 5. 452 [ cp. Lys. 216; Symp. 201 B, 204 E foll.]; the good and pleasure, 6. 505 , 509 A [ cp. Gorg. 497; Phil. 11, 60 A]; the good superior to essence, ib. 509 ; the brightest and best of being, 7. 518 D ; —absolute good, 6. 507 B ; 7. 540 A ; —the idea of good, 6. 505 , 508 ; 7. 517 , 534 ; is the highest knowledge, 6. 505 ; 7. 526 E ; nature of, 6. 505 , 506 ; —the child of the good, ib. 506 E , 508 : —good things least liable to change, 2. 381 ; —goods classified, ib. 357 , 367 D [ cp. Protag. 334; Gorg. 451 E ; Phil. 66; Laws 1. 631; 3. 697]; —the goods of life often a temptation, 6. 491 E , 495 A . Good man, the, will disdain to imitate ignoble actions, 3. 396 : —Good men, why they take office, 1. 347 ; = the wise, ib. 350 [ cp. 1 Alcib. 124, 125]; unfortunate (Adeimantus), 2. 364 ; self-sufficient, 3. 387 [ cp. Lys. 215 A]; will not give way to sorrow, ibid. ; 10. 603 E [ cp. Laws 5. 732; 7. 792 B, 800 D]; appear simple from their inexperience of evil, 3. 409 A ; hate the tyrant, 8. 568 A ; the friends of God and like Him, 10. 613 [ cp. Phil. 39 E; Laws 4. 716]. Goods, community of, 3. 416 ; 5. 464 ; 8. 543 . See Community . Government , forms of, are they administered in the interest of the rulers? 1. 338 D , 343 , 346 ; are all based on a principle of justice, ib. 338 E [ cp. Laws 12. 945]; present forms in an evil condition, 6. 492 E , 496 ; none of the existing forms adapted to philosophy, ib. 497 ; —the four imperfect forms, 4. 445 B ; 8. 544 [ cp. Pol. 291 foll., 301 foll.]; succession of changes in states, 8. 545 foll.; —peculiar barbarian forms, ib. 544 D . Cp. Constitution , State . Government, forms of. [ The classification of forms of government which Plato adopts in the Republic is not exactly the same with that given in the Statesman or the Laws. Both in the Republic and the Statesman the series commences with the perfect state, which may be either monarchy or aristocracy, accordingly as the ‘one best man’ bears rule or many who are all ‘perfect in virtue’ [ cp. Arist. Pol. iv. 2, § 1]. But in the Republic the further succession is somewhat fancifully connected with the divisions of the soul. The rule of reason [ i.e. the perfect state ] passes into timocracy, in which the ‘spirited element’ is predominant (8. 548 ), timocracy into three governments in turn, which represent the ‘appetitive principle,’—first, oligarchy, in which the desire of wealth is supreme (8. 533 D ; 9. 581 ); secondly, democracy, characterised by an unbounded lust for freedom (9. 561 ); thirdly, tyranny, in which all evil desires grow unchecked, and the tyrant becomes ‘the waking reality of what he once was in his dreams only’ (9. 574 E ). Each of these inferior forms is illustrated in the individual who corresponds to the state and ‘is set over against it’ (8. 550 C ). In the Statesman, after the government of the one or many good has been separated, the remaining forms are classified accordingly as the government has or has not regard to law, and democracy is said to be (303 A) ‘the worst of lawful and the best of lawless governments’ ( an expression criticised by Aristotle, Pol. iv. 2, § 3). In the Laws again the subject is differently treated: monarchy and democracy are described as ‘the two mother forms,’ which must be combined in order to produce a good state (3. 693), and the Spartan and Cretan constitutions are therefore praised as polities in which every form of government is represented (4. 712). But the majority of existing states are mere class governments and have no regard to virtue (12. 962 E). These various ideas are nearly all reproduced or criticised in the Politics of Aristotle, who, however, does not employ the term ‘timocracy,’ and adds one great original conception,—the μεσὴ πολιτεία , or government of the middle class. ] Governments, sometimes bought and sold, 8. 544 D . Grace ( εὐσχημοσύνη ), the effect of good rhythm accompanying good style, 3. 400 D ; all life and every art full of grace, ib. 401 A . Greatness and smallness, 4. 438 B ; 5. 479 B ; 7. 523 , 524 ; 9. 575 C ; 10. 602 D , 605 C . Grief, not to be indulged, 3. 387 ; 10. 603 –606. Cp. Sorrow . Guard, the tyrant’s request for a, 8. 566 B , 567 E . Guardians of the state, must be philosophers, 2. 376 ; 6. 484 , 498 , 501 , 503 B ; 7. 520 , 521 , 525 B , 540 ; 8. 543 ; must be both spirited and gentle, 2. 375 ; 3. 410 ; 6. 503 [ cp. Laws 5. 731 B]; must be tested by pleasures and pains, 3. 413 (cp. 6. 503 A ; 7. 539 E ); have gold and silver mingled in their veins, 3. 415 A (cp. 416 E ; 8. 547 A ); their happiness, 4. 419 foll.; 5. 465 E foll.; 6. 498 C ; 7. 519 E ; will be the class in the state which possesses wisdom, 4. 428 [ cp. Laws 12. 965 A]; will form one family with the citizens, 5. 462 –466; must preserve moderation, ib. 466 B ; divided into auxiliaries and guardians proper, 3. 414 (cp. 8. 545 E ; and see Auxiliaries , Rulers ): —the guardians [i.e. the auxiliaries] must be courageous, 2. 375 ; 3. 386 , 413 E , 416 E ; 4. 429 ; 6. 503 E ; must have no fear of death, 3. 386 (cp. 6. 486 C ); not to weep, 3. 387 (cp. 10. 603 E ); nor to be given to laughter, 3. 388 [ cp. Laws 5. 732; 11. 935]; must be temperate, ib. 389 D ; must not be avaricious, ib. 390 E ; must only imitate noble characters and actions, ib. 395 foll., 402 E ; must only learn the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies, and play on the lyre and harp, ib. 398 , 399 ; must be sober, ib. 398 E , 403 E ; must be reared amid fair surroundings, ib. 401 ; athletes of war, ib. 403 , 404 B ; 4. 422 ; 7. 521 E ; 8. 543 [ cp. Laws 8. 830]; must live according to rule, 3. 404 ; will not go to law or have resort to medicine, ib. 410 A ; must have common meals and live a soldier’s life, ib. 416 ; will not require gold or silver or property of any kind, ib. 417 ; 4. 419 , 420 A , 422 D ; 5. 464 C ; compared to a garrison of mercenaries (Adeimantus), 4. 419 (cp. 8. 543 ); must go to war on horseback in their childhood, 5. 467 ; 7. 537 A ; regulations for their conduct in war, 5. 467 –471: —female guardians, ib. , 456 , 458 , 468 ; 7. 540 C (cp. Women ). Gyges, 2. 359 C ; 10. 612 B . Gymnastic , supposed to be intended only for the body, 2. 376 E ; 3. 403 ; 7. 521 [ cp. Laws 7. 795 E]; really designed for the improvement of the soul, 3. 410 ; like music, should be continued throughout life, ib. 403 C ; effect of excessive, ib. 404 , 410 ; 7. 537 B ; should be of a simple character, 3. 404 , 410 A ; the ancient forms of, to be retained, 4. 424 ; must co-operate with music in creating a harmony of the soul, ib. 441 E ; suitable to women, 5. 452 –457 [ cp. Laws 7. 804, 813, 833]; ought to be combined with intellectual pursuits, 7. 535 D [ cp. Tim. 88]; time to be spent in, ib. 537 . H. Habit and virtue, 7. 518 E ; 10. 619 D . Hades , tales about the terrors of, 1. 330 D ; 2. 366 A ; such tales not to be heeded, 3. 386 B [ cp. Crat. 403]; —the place of punishment, 2. 363 ; 10. 614 foll.; Musaeus’ account of the good and bad in, 2. 363 ; —the journey to, 10. 614 [ cp. Phaedo 108 A]: —(Pluto) helmet of, 10. 612 B . Cp. World below . Half, the, better than the whole, 5. 466 B . Handicraft arts, a reproach, 9. 590 [ cp. Gorg. 512]. Happiness of the unjust, 1. 354 ; 2. 364 ; 3. 392 B (cp. 8. 545 A , and Gorg. 470 foll.; Laws 2. 661; 10. 899 E, 905 A); —of the guardians, 4. 576 foll.; 5. 465 E foll.; 6. 498 C ; 7. 519 E ; —of Olympic victors, 5. 465 D , 466 A ; 10. 618 A ; —of the tyrant, 9. 576 foll., 587 ; —the greatest happiness awarded to the most just, ib. 580 foll. Harmonies, the more complex to be rejected, 3. 397 foll.; —the Lydian harmony, ib. 398 ; the Ionian, ib. E; the Dorian and Phrygian alone to be accepted, ib. 399 . Harmony, akin to virtue, 3. 401 A (cp. 7. 522 A ); —science of, must be acquired by the rulers, 7. 531 (cp. Music ); —harmony of soul and body, 3. 402 D ; —harmony of the soul, effected by temperance, 4. 430 , 441 E , 442 D , 443 (cp. 9. 591 D , and Laws 2. 653 B); —harmony in the acquisition of wealth, 9. 591 E . Harp , the, ( κιθάρα ), allowed in the best state, 3. 399 . Hatred, between the despot and his subjects, 8. 567 E ; 9. 576 A . Health and justice compared, 4. 444 ; pleasure of health, 9. 583 C ; secondary to virtue, ib. 591 D . Hearing, classed among faculties, 5. 477 E ; composed of two elements, speech and hearing, and not requiring, like sight, a third intermediate nature, 6. 507 C . Heaven, the starry, the fairest of visible things, 7. 529 D ; the motions of, not eternal, ib. 530 A . Heaviness, 5. 479 ; 7. 524 A . Hector, dragged by Achilles round the tomb of Patroclus, 3. 391 B . Helen, never went to Troy, 9. 586 C . Hellas, not to be devastated in civil war, 5. 470 A foll., 471 A : —Hellenes characterised by the love of knowledge, 4. 435 E ; did not originally strip in the gymnasia, 5. 452 D ; not to be enslaved by Hellenes, ib. 469 B , C ; united by ties of blood, ib. 470 C ; not to devastate Hellas, ib. 471 A foll.; Hellenes and barbarians are strangers, ib. 469 D , 470 C [ cp. Pol. 262 D]. Hellespont, 3. 404 C . Hephaestus, binds Herè, 2. 378 D ; thrown from heaven by Zeus, ibid. ; improperly delineated by Homer, 3. 389 A ; chains Ares and Aphroditè, ib. 390 C . Heracleitus, the ‘sun of,’ 6. 498 B . Herè, bound by Hephaestus, 2. 378 D ; Herè and Zeus, ibid. ; 3. 390 B ; begged alms for the daughters of Inachus, 2. 381 D . Hermes, the star sacred to (Mercury), 10. 617 A . Hermus, 8. 566 C . Herodicus of Selymbria, the inventor of valetudinarianism, 3. 406 A foll. Heroes, not to lament, 3. 387 , 388 ; 10. 603 –606; to be rewarded, 5. 468 ; after death, ibid. Heroic rhythm, 3. 400 C . Hesiod, his rewards of justice, 2. 363 B ; 10. 612 A ; his stories improper for youth, 2. 377 D ; his classification of the races, 8. 547 A ; a wandering rhapsode, 10. 600 D :— Quoted:— Theogony, l. 154, 459, 2. 377 E . Works and Days, l. 40, 5. 466 B . l. 109, 8. 546 E . l. 122, 5. 468 E . l. 233, 2. 363 B . l. 287, ib. 364 D . Fragm. 117, 3. 390 E . Hirelings, required in the state, 2. 371 E . Holiness of marriage, 5. 458 E , 459 [ cp. Laws 6. 776]. See Marriage . Homer , supports the theory that justice is a thief, 1. 334 B ; his rewards of justice, 2. 363 B ; 10. 612 A ; his stories not approved for youth, 2. 377 D foll. (cp. 10. 595 ); his mode of narration, 3. 393 A foll.; feeds his heroes on campaigners’ fare, ib. 404 C ; Socrates’ feeling of reverence for him, 10. 595 C , 607 (cp. 3. 391 A ); the captain and teacher of the tragic poets, 10. 595 B , 598 D , E; not a legislator, ib. 599 E ; or a general, ib. 600 A [ cp. Ion 537 foll.]; or inventor, ibid. ; or teacher, ibid. ; no educator, ib. 600 , 606 E , 607 B ; not much esteemed in his lifetime, ib. 600 B foll.; went about as a rhapsode, ibid. Passages quoted or referred to:— Iliad i. l. 11 foll., 3. 392 E foll. l. 131, 6. 501 B . l. 225, 3. 389 E . l. 590 foll., 2. 378 D . l. 599 foll., 3. 389 A . Iliad ii. l. 623, 6. 501 C . Iliad iii. l. 8, 3. 389 E . Iliad iv. l. 69 foll., 2. 379 E . l. 218, 3. 408 A . l. 412, ib. 389 E . l. 431, ibid. Iliad v. l. 845, 10. 612 B . Iliad vii. l. 321, 5. 468 D . Iliad viii. l. 162, ibid. Iliad ix. l. 497 foll., 2. 364 D . l. 513 foll., 3. 390 E . Iliad xi. l. 576, ib. 405 E . l. 624, ibid. l. 844, ib. 408 A . Iliad xii. l. 311, 5. 468 E . Iliad xiv. l. 294 foll., 3. 390 C . Iliad xvi. l. 433, ib. 388 C . l. 776, 8. 566 D . l. 856 foll., 3. 386 E . Iliad xviii. l. 23 foll., ib. 388 A . l. 54, ib. B . Iliad xix. l. 278 foll., ib. 390 E . Iliad xx. l. 4 foll., 2. 379 E . l. 64 foll., 3. 386 C . Iliad xxi. l. 222 foll., ib. 391 B . Iliad xxii. ll. 15, 20, ib. A . l. 168 foll., ib. 388 C . l. 362 foll., ib. 386 E . l. 414, ib. 388 B . Iliad xxiii. l. 100 foll., ib. 387 A . l. 103 foll., ib. 386 D . l. 151 ib. 391 B . l. 175 ibid. Iliad xxiv. l. 10 foll., ib. 388 A . l. 527, 2. 379 D . Odyssey i. l. 351 foll., 4. 424 D . Odyssey viii. l. 266 foll., 3. 390 D . Odyssey ix. l. 9. foll., ib. B . l. 91 foll., 8. 560 C . Odyssey x. l. 495, 3. 386 E . Odyssey xi. l. 489 foll., ib. C ; 7. 516 D . Odyssey xii. l. 342, 3. 390 B . Odyssey xvii. l. 383 foll., ib. 389 D . l. 485 foll., 2. 381 D . Odyssey xix. l. 109 foll., ib. 363 B . l. 395, 1. 334 B . Odyssey xx. l. 17, 3. 390 D ; 4. 441 B . Odyssey xxiv. l. 6, 3. 387 A . l. 40, 8. 566 D . Homer, allusions to, 1. 328 E ; 2. 381 D ; 3. 390 E ; 8. 544 D . Homeridae, 10. 599 E . Honest man, the, a match for the rogue, 3. 409 C (cp. 10. 613 C ). Honesty, fostered by the possession of wealth, 1. 331 A ; thought by mankind to be unprofitable, 2. 364 A ; 3. 392 B . Honour, pleasures enjoyed by the lover of, 9. 581 C , 586 E : —the ‘government of honour,’ see Timocracy . Hope, the comfort of the righteous in old age (Pindar), 1. 331 A . Household cares, 5. 465 C . Human interests, unimportance of, 10. 604 B (cp. 6. 486 A , and Theaet. 173; Laws 1. 644 E; 7. 803); —life, full of evils, 2. 379 C ; shortness of, 10. 608 D ; —nature, incapable of doing many things well, 3. 395 B ; —sacrifices, 8. 565 D . Hunger, 4. 437 E , 439 ; an inanition ( κένωσις ) of the body, 9. 585 A . Hymns, to the gods, may be allowed in the State, 10: 607 A [ cp. Laws 3. 700 A; 7. 801 E]; —marriage hymns, 5. 459 E . Hypothesis, in mathematics and in the intellectual world, 6. 510 ; in the sciences, 7. 533 . I. Iambic measure, 3. 400 C . Ida, altar of the gods on, 3. 391 E . Idea of good, the source of truth, 6. 508 (cp. 505 ); a cause like the sun, ib. 508 ; 7. 516 , 517 ; must be apprehended by the lover of knowledge, 7. 534 ; —ideas and phenomena, 5. 476 ; 6. 507 ; —ideas and hypotheses, 6. 510 ; —absolute ideas, 5. 476 [ cp. Phaedo 65, 74; Parm. 133]; origin of abstract ideas, 7. 523 ; nature of, 10. 596 ; singleness of, ib. 597 [ cp. Tim. 28, 51]. Idea. [ The Idea of Good is an abstraction, which, under that name at least, does not elsewhere occur in Plato’s writings. But it is probably not essentially different from another abstraction, ‘the true being of things,’ which is mentioned in many of his Dialogues [ cp. passages cited s. v. Being ]. He has nowhere given an explanation of his meaning, not because he was ‘regardless whether we understood him or not,’ but rather, perhaps, because he was himself unable to state in precise terms the ideal which floated before his mind. He belonged to an age in which men felt too strongly the first pleasure of metaphysical speculation to be able to estimate the true value of the ideas which they conceived ( cp. his own picture of the effect of dialectic on the youthful mind, 7. 539 ). To him, as to the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, an abstraction seemed truer than a fact: he was impatient to shake off the shackles of sense and rise into the purer atmosphere of ideas. Yet in the allegory of the cave ( Book VII ), whose inhabitants must go up to the light of perfect knowledge but descend again into the obscurity of opinion, he has shown that he was not unaware of the necessity of finding a firm starting-point for these flights of metaphysical imagination ( cp. 6. 510 ). A passage in the Philebus (65 A) gives perhaps the best insight into his meaning: ‘If we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may take our prey,—Beauty, Symmetry, Truth.’ The three were inseparable to the Greek mind, and no conception of perfection could be formed in which they did not unite. (Cp. Introduction, pp. lxix , xcvii ).] Ideal state, is it possible? 5. 471 , 473 ; 6. 499 ; 7. 540 (cp. 7. 520 , and Laws 4. 711 E; 5. 739); how to be commenced, 6. 501 ; 7. 540 : —ideals, value of, 5. 472 . For the ideal state, see City , Constitution , Education , Guardians , Rulers , etc. Ignorance, nature of, 5. 477 , 478 ; an inanition ( κένωσις ) of the soul, 9. 585 . Iliad , the style of, illustrated, 3. 392 E foll.; mentioned, ib. 393 A . Cp. Homer , Odyssey . Ilion, see Troy . Illegitimate children, 5. 461 A . Illusions of sight, 7. 523 ; 10. 602 [ cp. Phaedo 65 A; Phil. 380, 42 D; Theaet. 157 E]. Images, (i.e. reflections of visible objects), 6. 510 ; 10. 596 ( cp. Tim. 52 D). Imitation in style, 3. 393 , 394 ; 10. 596 foll., 600 foll.; affects the character, 3. 395 ; thrice removed from the truth, 10. 596 , 597 , 598 , 602 B ; concerned with the weaker part of the soul, ib. 604 . Imitative poetry, 10. 595 ; arts, inferior, ib. 605 . Imitators, ignorant, 10. 602 . Immortality, proof of, 10. 608 foll., (cp. 6. 498 C , and see Soul ). Impatience, uselessness of, 10. 604 C . Impetuosity, 6. 503 E . Inachus, Herè asks alms for the daughters of, 2. 381 D . Inanitions ( κένωσεις ) of body and soul, 9. 585 A . Incantations used by mendicant prophets, 2. 364 B ; in medicine, 4. 426 A . Income Tax, 1. 343 D . Indifference to money, characteristic of those who inherit a fortune, 1. 330 B . Individual, inferior types of the, 8. 545 ; individual and state, 2. 368 ; 4. 434 , 441 ; 5. 462 ; 8. 544 ; 9. 577 B [ cp. Laws 3. 689; 5. 739; 9. 875, 877 C; 11. 923]. Infants have spirit, but not reason, 4. 441 [ cp. Laws 12. 963 E]. Informers, 9. 575 B . Injustice , advantage of, 1. 343 ; defined by Thrasymachus as discretion, ib. 348 D ; injustice and vice, ibid. ; suicidal to states and individuals, ib. 351 E [ cp. Laws 10. 906 A]; in perfection, 2. 360 ; eulogists of, ib. 361 , 366 , 367 ; 3. 392 B ( cp. 8. 545 A ; 9. 588 ); only blamed by those who have not the power to be unjust, 2. 366 C ; in the state, 4. 434 ; = anarchy in the soul, ib. 444 B [ cp. Soph. 228]; brings no profit, 9. 589 , 590 ; 10. 613 . Innovation in education dangerous, 4. 424 [ cp. Laws 2. 656, 660 A]. See Gymnastic , Music . Intellect, objects of, classified, 7. 534 (cp. 5. 476 ); relation of the intellect and the good, 6. 508 . Intellectual world, divisions of, 6. 510 foll.; 7. 517 ; compared to the visible, 6. 508 , 509 ; 7. 532 A . Intercourse between the sexes, 5. 458 foll. [ cp. Laws 8. 839 foll.]; in a democracy, 8. 563 B . Interest, sometimes irrecoverable by law, 8. 556 A [ cp. Laws 5. 742 C]. Intermediates, 9. 583 . Intimations, the, given by the senses imperfect, 7. 523 foll.; 10. 602 . Intoxication , not allowed in the state, 3. 398 E , 403 E . Cp. Drinking . Invalids, 3. 406 , 407 ; 4. 425 , 426 . Ionian harmony, must be rejected, 3. 399 A . Iron (and brass) mingled by the God in the husbandmen and craftsmen, 3. 415 A (cp. 8. 547 A ). Ismenias, the Theban, ‘a rich and mighty man,’ 1. 336 A . Italy, ‘can tell of Charondas as a lawgiver,’ 10. 599 E . J. Judge, the good, must himself be virtuous, 3. 409 [ cp. Pol. 305]. Judgement, the final, 10. 614 foll. Cp. Hades . Juggling, 10. 602 D . Just man, the, is at a disadvantage compared with the unjust (Thrasymachus), 1. 343 ; is happy, ib. 354 [ cp. Laws 1. 660 E]; attains harmony in his soul, 4. 443 E ; proclaimed the happiest, 9. 580 foll.; —just men the friends of the gods, 10. 613 [ cp. Phil. 39 E; Laws 4. 716 D]; —just and unjust are at heart the same (Glaucon), 3. 360 . Justice , = to speak the truth and pay one’s debts, 1. 331 foll.; = the interest of the stronger, ib. 338 ; 2. 367 [ cp. Gorg. 489; Laws 4. 714 A]; = honour among thieves, 1. 352 ; = the excellence of the soul, ib. 353 : —the art which gives good and evil to friends and enemies, ib. 332 foll., 336 ; is a thief, ib. 334 ; the proper virtue of man, ib. 335 ; ‘sublime simplicity,’ ib. 348 ; does not aim at excess, ib. 349 ; identical with wisdom and virtue, ib. 351 ; a principle of harmony, ibid. (cp. 9. 591 D ); in the highest class of goods, 2. 357 , 367 D [ cp. Laws 1. 631 C]; the union of wisdom, temperance, and courage, 4. 433 [ cp. Laws 1. 631 C]; a division of labour, ibid. foll. (cp. supra , 1. 332 , 349 , 350 , and 1 Alcib. 127): —nature and origin of (Glaucon), 2. 358 , 359 ; conventional, ib. 359 A [ cp. Theaet. 172 A, 177 C; Laws 10. 889, 890]; praised for its consequences only (Adeimantus), ib. 362 E , 366 ; a matter of appearance, ib. 365 : —useful alike in war and peace, 1. 333 ; can do no harm, ib. 335 ; more precious than gold, ib. 336 ; toilsome, 2. 364 : —compared to health, 4. 444 : —the poets on, 2. 363 , 364 , 365 E : —in perfection, ib. 361 : —more profitable than injustice, 4. 445 ; 9. 589 foll.; superior to injustice, 9. 589 ; final triumph of, ib. 580 ; 10. 612 , 613 : —in the state, 2. 369 ; 4. 431 ; the same in the individual and the state, 4. 435 foll., 441 foll.: —absolute justice, 5. 479 E ; 6. 501 B ; 7. 517 E . Justice. [ The search for justice is the groundwork or foundation of the Republic, which commences with an enquiry into its nature and ends with a triumphant demonstration of the superior happiness enjoyed by the just man. In the First Book several definitions of justice are attempted, all of which prove inadequate. Glaucon and Adeimantus then intervene:—mankind regard justice as a necessity, not as a good in itself, or at best as only to be practised because of the temporal benefits which flow from it: can Socrates prove that it belongs to a higher class of goods? Socrates in reply proposes to construct an ideal state in which justice will be more easily recognised than in the individual. Justice is thus discovered to be the essential virtue of the state, ( a thesis afterwards enlarged upon by Aristotle [Pol. i. 2, § 16; iii. 13, § 3]), the bond of the social organization, and, like temperance in the Laws [3. 696, 697; 4. 709 E], rather the accompaniment or condition of the virtues than a virtue in itself [ cp. Introduction, p. lxiii ]. Expressed in an outward or political form it becomes the great principle which has been already enunciated (i. 322), ‘that every man shall do his own work;’ on this Plato bases the necessity of the division into classes which underlies the whole fabric of the ideal state (4. 433 foll.; Tim. 17 C). Thus we are led to acknowledge the happiness of the just; for he alone reflects in himself this vital principle of the state (4. 445 ). The final proof is supplied by a comparison of the perfect state with actual forms of government. These, like the individuals who correspond to them, become more and more miserable as they recede further from the ideal, and the climax is reached (9. 587 ) when the tyrant is shown by the aid of arithmetic to have ‘729 times less pleasure than the king’ [ i.e. the perfectly just ruler ]. Lastly, the happiness of the just is proved to extend also into the next world, where men appear before the judgment seat of heaven and receive the due reward of their deeds in this life. ] K. King, the Great, 8. 553 D : —pleasure of the king and the tyrant compared, 9. 587 foll.; —kings and philosophers, 5. 473 (cp. 6. 487 E , 498 foll., 501 E foll.; 7. 540 ; 8. 543 ; 9. 592 ). Kisses, the reward of the brave warrior, 5. 468 C . Knowledge ( ἐπιστήμη, γιγνώσκειν ), = knowledge of ideas, 6. 484 ; —nature of, 5. 477 , 478 ; classed among faculties, ib. 477 ; 6. 511 E ; 7. 533 E ; —previous, to birth, 7. 518 C ; —how far given by sense, ib. 529 [ cp. Phaedo 75]; —should not be acquired under compulsion, ib. 536 E ; —the foundation of courage, 4. 429 [ cp. Laches 193, 197; Protag. 350, 360]; —knowledge and opinion, 5. 476 –478; 6. 508 , 510 A ; 7. 534 ; knowledge and pleasure, 6. 505 ; knowledge and wisdom, 4. 428 ; —the highest knowledge, 6. 504 ; 7. 514 foll.; —unity of knowledge, 5. 479 [ cp. Phaedo 101]; —the best knowledge, 10. 618 ; —knowledge of shadows, 6. 511 D ; 7. 534 A : —love of knowledge characteristic of the Hellenes, 4. 435 E ; peculiar to the rational element of the soul, 9. 581 B . L. Labour, division of, 2. 370 , 374 A ; 3. 394 E , 395 B , 397 E ; 4. 423 E , 433 A , 435 A , 441 E , 443 , 453 B [ cp. Laws 8. 846, 847]. Lacedaemon , owes its good order to Lycurgus, 10. 599 E ; —constitution of, commonly extolled, 8. 544 D ; a timocracy, ib. 545 B : —Lacedaemonians first after the Cretans to strip in the gymnasia, 5. 452 D . Lachesis, turns the spindle of Necessity together with Clotho and Atropos, 10. 617 C ; her speech, ib. D ; apportions a genius to each soul, ib. 620 D . Lamentation over the dead, to be checked, 3. 387 . Lands, partition of, proclaimed by the would-be tyrant, 8. 565 E , 566 E . Language, pliability of, 9. 588 D [ cp. Soph. 277 B]. Laughter not to be allowed in the guardians, 3. 388 [ cp. Laws 5. 732; 11. 935]; nor represented in the gods, ib. 389 . Laws , may be given in error, 1. 339 E ; supposed to arise from a convention among mankind, 2. 359 A ; cause of, 3. 405 ; on special subjects of little use, 4. 425 , 426 [ cp. Laws 7. 788]; treated with contempt in democracies, 8. 563 E ; bring help to all in the state, 9. 590 . Lawyers, increase when wealth abounds, 4. 405 A . Learning, pleasure of, 6. 486 C (cp. 9. 581 , 586 ). Legislation, cannot reach the minutiae of life, 4. 425 , 426 ; requires the help of God, ib. 425 E . Cp. Laws . Leontius, story of, 4. 439 E . Lethe, 10. 621 . Letters, image of the large and small, 2. 368 ; 3. 402 A . Liberality, one of the virtues of the philosopher, 6. 485 E . Liberty, characteristic of democracy, 8. 557 B , 561 –563. Licence, begins in music, 4. 424 E [ cp. Laws 3. 701 B]; in democracies, 8. 562 D . Licentiousness forbidden, 5. 458 . Lie, a, hateful to the philosopher, 6. 490 C (cp. supra 486 E ); —the true lie and the lie in words, 2. 382 ; —the royal lie ( γενναίον ψεῦδος ), 3. 414 ; —rulers of the state may lie, 2. 382 ; 3. 389 A , 414 C ; 5. 459 D ; —the Gods not to be represented as lying, 2. 382 ; —lies of the poets, ib. 377 foll.; 3. 386 , 408 B (cp. 10. 597 foll.). Life in the early state, 2. 372 ; —loses its zest in old age, 1. 329 A ; full of evils, 2. 379 C ; intolerable without virtue, 4. 445 ; shortness of, compared to eternity, 10. 608 D ; —the life of virtue toilsome, 2. 364 D ; —the just or the unjust, which is the more advantageous? ib. 347 foll.; —three kinds of lives among men, 9. 581 ; —life of women ought to resemble that of men, 5. 451 foll. [ cp. Laws 7. 804 E]; —the necessities of life, 2. 369 , 373 A ; —the prime of life, 5. 460 E . Light, 6. 507 E . Cp. Sight , Vision . Light and heavy, 5. 479 ; 7. 524 . Like to like, 4. 425 C . Literature ( λόγοι ), included under ‘music’ in education, 2. 376 E . Litigation, the love of, ignoble, 3. 405 . Logic ; method of residues, 4. 427 ; —accidents and essence distinguished, 5. 454 ; —nature of opposition, 4. 436 ; —categories, πρός τι , 4. 437 ; quality and relation, ibid. ; —fallacies, 6. 487 . For Plato’s method of definitions, see Knowledge , Temperance ; and cp. Dialectic , Metaphysic . Lotophagi, 8. 560 C . Lots, use of, 5. 460 A , 462 E ; election by, characteristic of democracy, 8. 557 A . Love of the beautiful, 3. 402 , 403 [ cp. 1 Alcib. 131]; bodily love and true love, ib. 403 ; love and the love of knowledge, 5. 474 foll.; is of the whole, not of the part, ib. C, 475 B ; 6. 485 B ; a tyrant, 9. 573 B , 574 E (cp. 1. 329 B ): —familiarities which may be allowed between the lover and the beloved, 3. 403 B : —lovers’ names, 5. 474 : —lovers of wine, ib. 475 A : —lovers of beautiful sights and sounds, ib. 476 B , 479 A , 480 . Luxury in the state, 2. 372 , 373 ; a cause of disease, 3. 405 E ; would not give happiness to the citizens, 4. 420 , 421 ; makes men cowards, 9. 590 B . Lycaean Zeus, temple of, 8. 565 D . Lycurgus, the author of the greatness of Lacedaemon, 10. 599 E . Lydia, kingdom of, obtained by Gyges, 2. 359 C : —Lydian harmonies, to be rejected, 3. 398 E foll. Lying, a privilege of the state, 3. 389 A , 414 C ; 5. 459 D . Lyre, the instrument of Apollo, and allowed in the best state, 3. 399 D . Lysanias, father of Cephalus, 1. 330 B . Lysias, the brother of Polemarchus, 1. 328 B . M. Madman, arms not to be returned to a, 1. 331 ; fancies of madmen, 8. 573 C . Magic, 10. 602 D . Magistrates, elected by lot in democracy, 8. 557 A . Magnanimity, ( μεγαλόπρεπεια ), one of the philosopher’s virtues, 6. 486 A , 490 E , 494 A . Maker, the, not so good a judge as the user, 10. 601 C [ cp. Crat. 390]. Man , ‘the master of himself,’ 4. 430 E [ cp. Laws 1. 626 E foll.]; ‘the form and likeness of God,’ 6. 501 B [ cp. Phaedr. 248 A; Theaet. 176 C; Laws 4. 716 D]; his unimportance, 10. 604 B (cp. 6. 486 A , and Laws 1. 644 E; 7. 803); has the power to choose his own destiny, 10. 617 E ; —the one best man, 6. 502 [ cp. Pol. 301]: —Men are not just of their own will, 2. 366 C ; unite in the state in order to supply each other’s wants, ib. 369 ; —the nature of men and women, 5. 453 –455; —analogy of men and animals, ib. 459 ; —three classes of, 9. 581 . Manners, influenced by education, 4. 424 , 425 ; cannot be made the subject of legislation, ibid. ; freedom of, in democracies, 8. 563 A . ‘Many,’ the term, as applied to the beautiful, the good, &c., 6. 507 . Many , the, flatter their leaders into thinking themselves statesmen, 4. 426 ; wrong in their notions about the honourable and the good, 6. 493 E ; would lose their harsh feeling towards philosophy if they could see the true philosopher, ib. 500 ; their pleasures and pains, 9. 586 ; —‘the great beast,’ 6. 493 . Cp. Multitude . Marionette players, 7. 514 B . Marriage , holiness of, 5. 458 E , 459 ; age for, ib. 460 ; prayers and sacrifices at, ibid. ; —marriage festivals, ib. 459 , 460 . Marsyas, Apollo to be preferred to, 3. 399 E . Mathematics , 7. 522 –532; use of hypotheses in, 6. 510 ; —mathematical notions perceived by a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 C : —the mathematician not usually a dialectician, 7. 531 E . Mean, happiness of the, 10. 619 A [ cp. Laws 3. 679 A; 5. 728 E; 7. 792 D]. Meanness, unknown to the philosopher, 6. 486 A ; characteristic of the oligarchs, 8. 554 . Measurement, art of, corrects the illusions of sight, 10. 602 D . Meat, roast, the best diet for soldiers, 3. 404 D . Medicine , cause of, 3. 405 ; not intended to preserve unhealthy and intemperate subjects, ib. 406 foll., 408 A ; 4. 426 A [ cp. Tim. 89 B]; the two kinds of, 5. 459 [ cp. Laws 4. 720]; use of incantations in, 4. 426 A ; —analogy of, employed in the definition of justice, 1. 332 C . Megara, battle of, 2. 368 A . Melody, in education, 3. 398 foll.; its influence, 10. 601 B . Memory, the philosopher should have a good, 6. 486 D , 490 E , 494 A ; 7. 535 B . Mendicant prophets, 2. 364 C . Menelaus, treatment of, when wounded, 3. 408 A . Menoetius, father of Patroclus, 3. 388 C . Mental blindness, causes of, 7. 518 . Merchants, necessary in the state, 2. 371 . Metaphysics ; absolute ideas, 5. 476 ; —abstract and relative ideas, 7. 524 ; —analysis of knowledge, 6. 510 ; —qualifications of relative and correlative, 4. 437 foll.; 7. 524 . Cp. Idea , Logic . Metempsychosis, 10. 617 . Cp. Soul . Midas, wealth of, 3. 408 B . Might and right, 1. 338 foll. [ cp. Gorg. 483, 489; Laws 1. 627; 3. 690; 10. 890]. Miletus, Thales of, 10. 600 A . Military profession, the, 2. 374 . Mimetic art, in education, 3. 394 foll.; the same person cannot succeed in tragedy and comedy, ib. 395 A ; imitations lead to habit, ib. D ; men acting women’s part, ib. E ; influence on character, ibid. foll. Cp. Imitation . ‘Mine and thine,’ a common cause of dispute, 5. 462 . Ministers of the state must be educated, 7. 519 . See Ruler . Miser, the, typical of the oligarchical state, 8. 555 A (cp. 559 D ). Misfortune, to be borne with patience, 3. 387 ; 10. 603 –606. Models (or types), by which the poets are to be guided in their compositions, 2. 379 A . Moderation, necessity of, 5. 466 B [ cp. Laws 3. 690 E; 5. 732, 736 E]. Momus (god of jealousy), 6. 487 A . Monarchy, distinguished from aristocracy as that form of the perfect state in which one rules, 4. 445 C (cp. 9. 576 D , and Pol. 301); the happiest form of government, 9. 576 E (cp. 580 C , 587 B ). Money, needed in the state, 2. 371 B [ cp. Laws 11. 918]; not necessary in order to carry on war, 4. 423 ; —love of, among the Egyptians and Phoenicians, ib. 435 E ; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, 8. 548 A , 553 , 562 A ; referred to the appetitive element of the soul, 9. 580 E ; despicable, ib. 589 E , 590 C (cp. 3. 390 E ). Money-lending, in oligarchies, 8. 555 , 556 . Money-making, art of, in Cephalus’ family, 1. 330 B ; evil of, 8. 556 ; pleasure of, 9. 581 C , 586 E . Money-qualifications in oligarchies, 8. 550 , 551 . Moon, reputed mother of Orpheus, 2. 364 E . Motherland, a Cretan word, 9. 575 E [ cp. Menex. 237]. Mothers in the state, 5. 460 . Motion and rest, 4. 436 ; —motion of the stars, 7. 529 , 530 ; 10. 616 E . Multitude , the, the great Sophist, 6. 492 ; their madness, ib. 496 C . Cp. Many . Musaeus, his pictures of a future life, 2. 363 D , E, 364 E . Muses, the, Musaeus and Orpheus the children of, 2. 364 E . Music , to be taught before gymnastic, 2. 376 E (cp. 3. 403 C ); includes literature ( λόγοι ), 2. 376 E ; —in education, ib. 377 foll.; 3. 398 foll.; 7. 522 A ( see Poetry , Poets , and cp. Protag. 326; Laws 2. 654, 660); complexity in, to be rejected, 3. 397 [ cp. Laws 7. 812]; the severe and the vulgar kind, ibid. [ cp. Laws 7. 802]; the end of, the love of beauty, ib. 403 C ; like gymnastic, should be studied throughout life, ibid. ; the simpler kinds of, foster temperance in the soul, ib. 404 A , 410 A ; effect of excessive, ib. 410 , 411 ; ancient forms of, not to be altered, 4. 424 [ cp. Laws 2. 657; 7. 799, 801]; must be taught to women, 5. 452 . Music. [ Music to the ancients had a far wider significance than to us. It was opposed to gymnastic as ‘mental’ to ‘bodily’ training, and included equally reading and writing, mathematics, harmony, poetry, and music strictly speaking: drawing, as Aristotle tells us (Pol. viii. 3, § 1), was sometimes made a separate division. I. Music ( in this wider sense ), Plato says, should precede gymnastic; and, according to a remarkable passage in the Protagoras (325 C), the pupils in a Greek school were actually instructed in reading and writing, made to learn poetry by heart, and taught to play on the lyre, before they went to the gymnasium. The ages at which children should commence these various studies are not stated in the Republic; but in the VIIth Book of the Laws, where the subject is treated more in detail, the children begin going to school at ten, and spend three years in learning to read and write, and another three years in music (Laws 7. 810). This agrees very fairly with the selection of the most promising youth at the age of twenty (Rep. 7. 537 ), as it would allow a corresponding period of three years for gymnastic training. II. Music, strictly so called, plays a great part in Plato’s scheme of education. He hopes by its aid to make the lives of his youthful scholars harmonious and gracious, and to implant in their souls true conceptions of good and evil. Music is a gift of the Gods to men, and was never intended, ‘as the many foolishly and blasphemously suppose,’ merely to give us an idle pleasure (Tim. 47 E; Laws 2. 654, 658 E; 7. 802 D). Neither should a freeman aim at attaining perfect execution [ cp. Arist. Pol. viii. 6, §§ 7, 15]: in the Laws (7. 810) we are told that every one must go through the three years course of music, ‘neither more nor less, whether he like or whether he dislike the study.’ Both instruments and music are to be of a simple character: in the Republic only the lyre, the pipe, and the flute are tolerated, and the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies. No change in the fashions of music is permitted; for where there is licence in music there will be anarchy in the state. In this desire for simplicity and fixity in music Plato was probably opposed to the tendencies of his own age. The severe harmony which had once characterized Hellenic art was passing out of favour: alike in architecture, sculpture, painting, literature, and music, richer and more ornate styles prevailed. We regard the change as inevitable, and not perhaps wholly to be regretted: to Plato it was a cause rather than a sign of the decline of Hellas. ] Musical amateurs, 5. 475 ; —education, 2. 377 ; 3. 398 foll.; 7. 522 A ; —instruments, the more complex kinds of, rejected, 3. 399 [ cp. Laws 7. 812 D]; —modes, ib. 397 –399; changes in, involve changes in the laws, 4. 424 C . Mysteries, 2. 365 A , 366 A , 378 A ; 8. 560 E . Mythology, misrepresentations of the gods in, 2. 378 foll.; 3. 388 foll., 408 C (cp. Gods ); like poetry, has an imitative character, 3. 392 D foll. N. Narration, styles of, 3. 392 , 393 , 396 . National qualities, 4. 435 . Natural gifts, 2. 370 A ; 5. 455 ; 6. 491 E , 495 A ; 7. 519 , 535 . Nature, recurrent cycles in, 8. 546 A (cp. Cycles ); divisions of, 9. 584 [ cp. Phil. 23]. Necessities, the, of life, 2. 368 , 373 A . Necessity, the mother of the Fates, 10. 616 , 617 , 621 A . Necessity, the, ‘which lovers know,’ 5. 458 E ; —the ‘necessity of Diomede,’ 6. 493 D . Nemesis, 5. 451 A . Niceratus, son of Nicias, 1. 327 C . Nicias, 1. 327 C . Nightingale, Thamyras changed into a, 10. 620 . Niobe, sufferings of, in tragic poetry, 2. 380 A . νόμος , strain and law, 7. 532 E [ cp. Laws 7. 800 A]. Not-being, 5. 477 . Novelties in music and gymnastic to be discouraged, 4. 424 . Number, said to have been invented by Palamedes, 7. 522 D ; —the number of the State, 8. 546 . O. Objects and ideas to be distinguished, 5. 476 ; 6. 507 . Odysseus and Alcinous, 10. 614 B ; chooses the lot of a private man, ib. 620 D . Odyssey , 3. 393 A . Cp. Iliad . Office, not desired by the good ruler, 7. 520 A . Old age, complaints against, 1. 329 ; Sophocles quoted in regard to, ibid. ; wealth a comforter of age, ibid. ; —old men think more of the future life, ib. 330 ; not students, 7. 536 [ cp. Laches 189]; —the older to bear rule in the state, 3. 412 [ cp. Laws 3. 690 A; 4. 714 E]; to be over the younger, 5. 465 A [ cp. Laws 4. 721 D; 9. 879 C; 11. 917 A]. Oligarchy, a form of government which has many evils, 8. 544 , 551 , 552 ; origin of, ib. 550 ; nature of, ibid. ; always divided against itself, ib. 551 D , 554 E —the oligarchical man, 8. 553 ; a miser, ib. 555 ; his place in regard to pleasure, 9. 587 . Olympian Zeus, the Saviour, 9. 583 B . Olympic victors, happiness and glory of, 5. 465 D , 466 A ( cp. 10. 618 A ). One, the, study of, draws the mind to the contemplation of true being, 7. 525 A . Opinion and knowledge, 5. 476 –478; 6. 508 D , 510 A ; 7. 534 ; the lovers of opinion, 5. 479 , 480 ; a blind guide, 6. 506 ; objects of opinion and intellect classified, 7. 534 (cp. 5. 476 ); —true opinion and courage, 4. 429 , 430 (cp. Courage ). Opposites, qualification of, 4. 436 ; in nature, 5. 454 , 475 E . Cp. Contradiction . Oppositions in the soul, 10. 603 D . Orpheus, child of the Moon and the Muses, 2. 364 E ; soul of, chooses a swan’s life, 10. 620 A ; —quoted, 2. 364 E . P. Paeanian, Charmantides the, 1. 328 B . Pain, cessation of, causes pleasure, 9. 583 D [ cp. Phaedo 60 A; Phil. 51 A]; a motion of the soul, ib. E . Painters, 10. 596 , 597 ; are imitators, ib. 597 [ cp. Soph. 234]; painters and poets, ib. 597 , 603 , 605 : —‘the painter of constitutions,’ 6. 501 . Painting, in light and shade, 10. 602 C . Palamedes and Agamemnon in the play, 7. 522 D . Pamphylia, Ardiaeus a tyrant of some city in, 10. 615 C . Pandarus, author of the violation of the oaths, 2. 379 E ; wounded Menelaus, 3. 408 A . Panharmonic scale, the, 3. 399 . Panopeus, father of Epeus, 10. 620 B . Pantomimic representations, not to be allowed, 3. 397 . Paradox about justice and injustice, the, 1. 348 . Parental anxieties, 5. 465 C [ cp. Euthyd. 306 E]. Parents, the oldest and most indispensable of friends, 8. 574 C ; parents and children in the state, 5. 461 . Part and whole, in regard to the happiness of the state, 4. 420 D ; 5. 466 ; 7. 519 E ; in love, 5. 474 C , 475 B ; 6. 485 B . Passionate element of the soul, 4. 440 ; 6. 504 A ; 8. 548 D ; 9. 571 E , 580 A . See Spirit . Passions, the, tyranny of, 1. 329 C ; fostered by poetry, 10. 606 . Patient and agent equally qualified, 4. 436 [ cp. Gorg. 476; Phil. 27 A]. Patroclus, cruel vengeance taken by Achilles for, 3. 391 B ; his treatment of the wounded Eurypylus, ib. 406 A . Pattern, the heavenly, 6. 500 E ; 7. 540 A ; 9. 592 [ cp. Laws 5. 739 D]. Paupers. See Poor . Payment, art of, 1. 346 . Peirithous, son of Zeus, the tale of, not to be repeated, 3. 391 D . Peleus, the gentlest of men, 3. 391 C . Perception, in the eye and in the soul, 6. 508 foll. Perdiccas [King of Macedonia], 1. 336 A . Perfect state, difficulty of, 5. 472 ; 6. 502 E [ cp. Laws 4. 711]; possible, 5. 471 , 473 ; 6. 499 ; 7. 540 [ cp. Laws 5. 739]; manner of its decline, 8. 546 [ cp. Crit. 120]. Periander, the tyrant, 1. 336 A . Personalities, avoided by the philosopher, 6. 500 B [ cp. Theaet. 174 C]. Personification ; the argument compared to a search or chase, 2. 368 C ; 4. 427 C , 432 ; to a stormy sea, 4. 441 B ; to an ocean, 5. 453 D ; to a game of draughts, 6. 487 B ; to a journey, 7. 532 E ; to a charm, 10. 608 A ; —‘has travelled a long way,’ 6. 484 A ; —‘veils her face,’ ib. 503 A ; —‘following in the footsteps of the argument,’ 2. 365 C ; —‘whither the argument may blow, thither we go,’ 3. 394 D ; —‘a swarm of words,’ 5. 450 B ; —the three waves, ib. 457 C , 472 A , 473 C . Persuasion [or Faith], one of the faculties of the soul, 6. 511 D ; 7. 533 E . Philosopher , the, has the quality of gentleness, 2. 375 , 376 ; 3. 410 ; 6. 486 C ; ‘the spectator of all time and all existence,’ 6. 486 A [ cp. Theaet. 173 E]; should have a good memory, ib. D, 490 E , 494 A ; 7. 535 ; has his mind fixed upon true being, 6. 484 , 485 , 486 E , 490 , 500 C , 501 D ; 7. 521 , 537 D ; 9. 581 , 582 C (cp. 5. 475 E ; 7. 520 B , 525 , and Phaedo 82; Phaedr. 249; Theaet. 173 E; Soph. 249 D, 254); his qualifications and excellences, 6. 485 foll., 490 D , 491 B , 494 B [ cp. Phaedo 68]; corruption of the philosopher, ib. 491 foll.; is apt to retire from the world, ib. 496 [ cp. Theaet. 173]; does not delight in personal conversation, ib. 500 B [ cp. Theaet. 174 C]; must be an arithmetician, 7. 525 B ; pleasures of the philosopher, 9. 581 E : —Philosophers are to be kings, 5. 473 (cp. 6. 487 E , 498 foll., 501 E foll.; 7. 540 ; 8. 543 ; 9. 592 ); are lovers of all knowledge, 5. 475 ; 6. 486 A , 490 ; true and false, 5. 475 foll.; 6. 484 , 491 , 494 , 496 A , 500 ; 7. 535 ; to be guardians, 2. 375 ( see Guardians ); why they are useless, 6. 487 foll.; few in number, ib. E, 496 , 499 B , 503 B [ cp. Phaedo 69 C]; will frame the state after the heavenly pattern, ib. 501 ; 7. 540 A ; 9. 592 ; education of, 6. 503 ; philosophers and poets, 10. 607 [ cp. Laws 12. 967]. Philosophic nature, the, rarity of, 6. 491 ; causes of the ruin of, ibid. Philosophy, every headache ascribed to, 3. 407 C ; = love of real knowledge, 6. 485 (cp. supra 5. 475 E ); the corruption of, 6. 491 ; philosophy and the world, ib. 494 ; the desolation of, ib. 495 ; philosophy and the arts, ib. E, 496 C (cp. supra 5. 475 D , 476 A ); true and false philosophy, 6. 496 E , 498 E ; philosophy and governments, ib. 497 ; time set apart for, ib. 498 ; 7. 539 ; commonly neglected in after life, 6. 498 ; prejudice against, ib. 500 , 501 ; why it is useless, 7. 517 , 535 , 539 ; the guardian and saviour of virtue, 8. 549 B ; philosophy and poetry, 10. 607 ; aids a man to make a wise choice in the next world, ib. 618 . Phocylides, his saying, ‘that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practise virtue,’ 3. 407 B . Phoenician tale, the, 3. 414 C foll. Phoenicians, their love of money, 4. 436 A . Phoenix, tutor of Achilles, 3. 390 E . Phrygian harmony, the, 3. 399 . Physician , the, not a mere money maker, 1. 341 C , 342 D ; the good physician, 3. 408 ; physicians find employment when luxury increases, 2. 373 C ; 3. 405 A . Cp. Medicine . Pigs, sacrificed at the Mysteries, 2. 378 A . Pilot, the, and the just man, 1. 332 (cp. 341 ); the true pilot, 6. 488 E . Pindar, on the hope of the righteous, 1. 331 A ; on Asclepius, 3. 408 B ; —quoted, 2. 365 B . Pipe, the, ( σύριγξ ), one of the musical instruments permitted to be used, 3. 399 D . Piraeus, 1. 327 A ; 4. 439 E ; Socrates seldom goes there, 1. 328 C . Pittacus of Mitylene, a sage, 1. 335 E . Plays of children should be made a means of instruction, 4. 425 A ; 7. 537 A [ cp. Laws 1. 643 B]. Pleasure , not akin to virtue, 3. 402 , 403 ; pleasure and love, ibid. ; defined as knowledge or good, 6. 505 B , 509 B ; the highest, 9. 583 ; caused by the cessation of pain, ib. D [ cp. Phaedo 60 A; Phil. 51]; a motion of the soul, ib. E ; —real pleasure unknown to the tyrant, ib. 587 ; —pleasure of learning, 6. 486 C (cp. 9. 581 , 586 , and Laws 2. 667); —sensual pleasure, 7. 519 ; 9. 586 ; a solvent of the soul, 4. 430 A [ cp. Laws 1. 633 E]; not desired by the philosopher, 6. 485 E : —Pleasures, division of, into necessary and unnecessary, 8. 558 , 559 , 561 A ; 9. 572 , 581 E ; honourable and dishonourable, 8. 561 C ; three classes of, 9. 581 ; criterion of, ib. 582 ; classification of, ib. 583 ; —pleasures of smell, ib. 584 B ; —pleasures of the many, 585 ; of the passionate, ib. 586 ; of the philosopher, ib. 586 , 587 . Pluto, 8. 554 B . Poetry , styles of, 3. 392 –394, 398 ; in the state, ib. 392 –394, 398 ; 8. 568 B ; 10. 595 foll., 605 A , 607 A [ cp. Laws 7. 817]; effect of, 10. 605 ; feeds the passions, ib. 606 ; poetry and philosophy, ib. 607 [ cp. Laws 12. 967]: —‘colours’ of poetry, ib. 601 A . Poetry. [ The Republic is the first of Plato’s works in which he seriously examines the value of poetry in education, and the place of the poets in the state. The question could hardly be neglected by the philosopher who proposed to construct an ideal polity or government of the best. For poetry played a great part in Hellenic life: the children learned whole poems by heart in their schools (Protag. 326 A; Laws 7. 810 C); the rhapsode delighted the crowds at the festivals (Ion 535); the theatres were free, or almost free, to all, ‘costing but a drachma at the most’ (Apol. 26 D); the intervals of a banquet were filled up by conversation about the poets (Protag. 347 C ). The quarrel between philosophy and poetry was an ancient one, which had found its first expression in the attacks of Xenophanes (538 B.C. ) and Heracleitus (508 B.C. ) upon the popular mythology. In the earlier dialogues of Plato the poets are treated with an ironical courtesy, through which an antagonistic spirit is allowed here and there to appear: they are ‘winged and holy beings’ (Ion 534) who sing by inspiration, but at the same time are the worst possible critics of their own writings and the most self-conceited of mortals (Apol. 22 D). In the Republic ( II and III ), Plato begins the trial of poetry by the enquiry whether the tales and legends related by the epic and tragic poets are true in themselves or likely to furnish good examples to his future citizens. They cannot be true, for they are contrary to the nature of God ( see s. v. God ), and they are certainly not proper lessons for youth. There must be a censorship of poetry, and all objectionable passages expunged; suitable rules and regulations will be laid down, and to these the poets must conform. In the Xth Book the argument takes a deeper tone. The Poet is proved to be an impostor thrice removed from the truth, a wizard who steals the hearts of the unwary by his spells and enchantments. Men easily fall into the habit of imitating what they admire; and the lamentations and woes of the tragic hero and the unseemly buffoonery of the comedian are equally bad models for the citizens of a free and noble state. The poets must therefore be banished, unless, Plato adds, the lovers of poetry can persuade us of her innocence of the charges laid against her. In the Laws a similar conclusion is reached:—‘The state is an imitation of the best life, and the noblest form of tragedy. The legislator and the poet are rivals, and the latter can only be tolerated if his words are in harmony with the laws of the state’ (vii. 817)]. Poets , the, love their poems as their own creation, 1. 330 C [ cp. Symp. 209]; speak in parables, ib. 332 B (cp. 3. 413 B ); on justice, 2. 363 , 364 , 365 E ; bad teachers of youth, ib. 377 ; 3. 391 , 392 , 408 C [ cp. Laws 10. 866 C, 890 A]; must be restrained by certain rules, 2. 379 foll.; 3. 398 A [ cp. Laws 2. 656, 660 A; 4. 719]; banished from the state, 3. 398 A ; 8. 568 B ; 10. 595 foll., 605 A , 607 A [ cp. Laws 7. 817]; poets and tyrants, 8. 568 ; thrice removed from the truth, 10. 596 , 597 , 598 E , 602 B , 605 C ; imitators only, ib. 600 , 601 (cp. 3. 393 , and Laws 4. 719 C); poets and painters, 10. 601 , 603 , 605 ; —‘the poets who were children and prophets of the gods’ (? Orpheus and Musaeus; cp. supra 364 E ), 2. 366 A . Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, 1. 327 B ; ‘the heir of the argument,’ ib. 331 ; intervenes in the discussion, ib. 340 ; wishes Socrates to speak in detail about the community of women and children, 5. 449 . Politicians, in democracies, 8. 564 . Polydamas, the pancratiast, 1. 338 C . Poor , the, have no time to be ill, 3. 406 E ; everywhere hostile to the rich, 4. 423 A ; 8. 551 E [ cp. Laws 5. 736 A]; very numerous in oligarchies, 8. 552 D ; not despised by the rich in time of danger, ib. 556 C . Population, to be regulated, 5. 460 . Poverty, prejudicial to the arts, 4. 421 ; poverty and crime, 8. 552 . Power, the struggle for, 7. 520 C [ cp. Laws 4. 715 A]. Pramnian wine, 3. 405 E , 408 A . Priam, Homer’s delineation of, condemned, 3. 388 B . Prisoners in war, 5. 468 –470. Private property, not allowed to the guardians, 3. 416 E ; 4. 420 A , 422 D ; 5. 464 C ; 8. 543 . Prizes of valour, 5. 468 . Prodicus, a popular teacher, 10. 600 C . Property, to be common, 3. 416 E ; 4. 420 A , 422 D ; 5. 464 C ; 8. 543 ; restrictions on the disposition of, 8. 556 A [ cp. Laws 11. 923]: —property qualifications in oligarchies, ib. 550 , 551 . Prophets, mendicant, 2. 364 C . Proportion, akin to truth, 6. 486 E . Prose writers on justice, 2. 364 A . Protagoras, his popularity as a teacher, 10. 600 C . Proteus, not to be slandered, 2. 381 D . Proverbs: ‘birds of a feather,’ 1. 329 A ; ‘shave a lion,’ ib. 341 C ; ‘let brother help brother,’ 2. 362 D ; ‘wolf and flock,’ 3. 415 D ; ‘one great thing,’4. 423 E ; ‘hard is the good,’ ib. 435 C ; ‘friends have all things in common,’ 5. 449 C ; ‘the useful is the noble,’ ib. 457 B ; ‘the wise must go to the doors of the rich,’ 6. 489 B (cp. 2. 364 B ); ‘what is more than human,’ 6. 492 E ; ‘the necessity of Diomede,’ ib. 493 D ; ‘the she-dog as good as her mistress,’ 8. 563 D ; ‘out of the smoke into the fire,’ ib. 569 B ; ‘does not come within a thousand miles’ ( οὐδ’ ἴκταρ βάλλει ), 9. 575 D . Public, the, the great Sophist, 6. 492 ; compared to a many-headed beast, ib. 493 ; cannot be philosophic, ib. 494 A [ cp. Pol. 292 D]. See Many , Multitude . Punishment, of the wicked, in the world below, 2. 363 ; 10. 614 . Cp. Hades , World below . Purgation of the luxurious state, 3. 399 E ; —of the city by the tyrant, 8. 567 D ; —of the soul, by the tyrannical man, ib. 573 A . Pythagoreans, the, authorities on the science of harmony, 7. 529 , 530 , 531 ; never reach the natural harmonies of number, ib. 531 C ; —the Pythagorean way of life, 10. 600 A . Pythian Oracle, the, 5. 461 E ; 7. 540 C . Q. Quacks, 5. 459 . Quarrels, dishonourable, 2. 378 ; 3. 395 E ; will be unknown in the best state, 2. 378 B ; 5. 464 E [ cp. Laws 5. 739]; —quarrels of the Gods and heroes, 2. 378 . R. Rational element of the soul, 4. 435 –442; 6. 504 A ; 8. 550 A ; 9. 571 , 580 E , 581 [ cp. Tim. 69 E–72]; ought to bear rule, and be assisted by the spirited element against the passions, 4. 441 E , 442 ; characterized by the love of knowledge, 9. 581 B ; the pleasures of, the truest, ib. 582 ; preserves the mind from the illusions of sense, 10. 602 . Rationalism among youth, 7. 538 [ cp. Laws 10. 886]. Reaction, 8. 564 A . Read, learning to, 3. 402 A . Reason, a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 D (cp. 7. 533 E ); reason and appetite, 9. 571 (cp. 4. 439 –442, and Tim. 69 E foll.); reason should be the guide of pleasure, 9. 585 –587. Reflections, 6. 510 A . Relations, slights inflicted by, in old age, 1. 329 . Relative and correlative, qualifications of, 4. 437 foll. [ cp. Gorg. 476]; how corrected, 7. 524 . Relativity of things and individuals, 5. 479 ; fallacies caused by, 9. 584 , 585 ; 10. 602 , 605 C . Religion, matters of, left to the god at Delphi, 4. 427 A (cp. 5. 461 E , 469 A ; 7. 540 B ). Residues, method of, 4. 427 E . Rest and motion, 4. 436 . Retail traders, necessary in the state, 2. 371 [ cp. Laws 11. 918]. Reverence in the young, 5. 465 A [ cp. Laws 5, 729; 9. 879; 11. 917 A]. Rhetoric, professors of, 2. 365 D . Rhythm, 3. 400 ; goes with the subject, ib. 398 D , 400 B ; its persuasive influence, ib. 401 E ; 10. 601 B . Riches. See Wealth . Riddle, the, of the eunuch and the bat, 5. 479 C . Ridicule, only to be directed against folly and vice, 5. 452 E ; danger of unrestrained ridicule, 10. 606 C [ cp. Laws 11. 935 A]. Riding, the children of the guardians to be taught, 5. 467 ; 7. 537 A [ cp. Laws 7. 794 D]. Right and might, 1. 338 foll. Ruler , the, in the strict and in the popular sense, 1. 341 B ; the true ruler does not ask, but claim obedience, 6. 489 C [ cp. Pol. 300, 301]; the ideal ruler, ib. 502 : —Rulers of states; do they study their own interests? 1. 338 D , 343 , 346 (cp. 7. 520 C ); are not infallible, 1. 339 ; how they are paid, ib. 347 ; good men do not desire office, ibid. ; 7. 520 D ; why they become rulers, 1. 347 ; present rulers dishonest, 6. 496 D : —[in the best state] must be tested by pleasures and pains, 3. 413 (cp. 6. 503 A ; 7. 539 E ); have the sole privilege of lying, 2. 382 ; 3. 389 A , 414 C ; 5. 459 D [ cp. Laws 2. 663]; must be taken from the older citizens, 3. 412 (cp. 6. 498 C ); will be called friends and saviours, 5. 463 ; 6. 502 E ; must be philosophers, 2. 376 ; 5. 473 ; 6. 484 , 497 foll., 501 , 503 B ; 7. 520 , 521 , 525 B , 540 ; 8. 543 ; the qualities which must be found in them, 6. 503 A ; 7. 535 ; must attain to the knowledge of the good, 6, 506 ; 7. 519 ; will accept office as a necessity, 7. 520 E , 540 A ; will be selected at twenty, and again at thirty, from the guardians, ib. 537 ; must learn arithmetic, ib. 522 –526; geometry, ib. 526 , 527 ; astronomy, ib. 527 –530; harmony, ib. 531 ; at thirty must be initiated into philosophy, ib. 537 –539; at thirty-five must enter on active life, ib. 539 E ; after fifty may return to philosophy, ib. 540 ; when they die, will be buried by the state and paid divine honours, 3. 414 A ; 5. 465 E , 469 A ; 7. 540 B . Cp. Guardians . S. Sacrifices, private, 1. 328 B , 331 D ; —in atonement, 2. 364 ; —human, in Arcadia, 8. 565 D . Sailors, necessary in the state, 2. 371 B . Sarpedon, 3. 388 C . Sauces, not mentioned in Homer, 3. 404 D . Scamander, beleaguered by Achilles, 3. 391 B . Scepticism, danger of, 7. 538 , 539 . Science ( ἐπιστήμη ), a division of the intellectual world, 7. 533 E (cp. 6. 511 ); —the sciences distinguished by their object, 4. 438 [ cp. Charm. 171]; not to be studied with a view to utility only, 7. 527 A , 529 , 530 ; their unity, ib. 531 ; use hypotheses, ib. 533 ; correlation of, ib. 537 . Sculpture, must only express the image of the good, 3. 401 B ; painting of, 4. 420 D [ cp. Laws 2. 668 E]. Scylla, 9. 588 C . Scythian, Anacharsis the, 10. 600 A ; —Scythians, the, characterized by spirit or passion, 4. 435 E . Self-indulgence in men and states, 4. 425 E , 426 ; —self-interest the natural guide of men, 2. 359 B ; —self-made men bad company, 1. 330 C ; —self-mastery, 4. 430 , 431 . Sense, objects of, twofold, 7. 523 ; knowledge given by, imperfect, ibid. ; 10. 602 ; sense and intellect, 7. 524 : —Senses, the, classed among faculties, 5. 477 C . Seriphian, story of Themistocles and the, 1. 329 E . Servants, old family, 8. 549 E . Sex in the world below, 10. 618 B ; —sexes to follow the same training, 5. 451 , 466 [ cp. Laws 7. 805]; equality of, advantageous, ib. 456 , 457 ; relation between, ib. 458 foll. [ cp. Laws 8. 835 E]; freedom of intercourse between, in a democracy, 8. 563 B . Cp. Women . Sexual desires, 5. 458 E [ cp. Laws 6. 783 A; 8. 835 E]. Shadows, 6. 510 A ; —knowledge of shadows ( εἰκασία ), one of the faculties of the soul, 6. 511 E ; 7. 533 E . Shepherd, the analogy of, with the ruler, 1. 343 , 345 [ cp. Pol. 275]. Shopkeepers, necessary in the state, 2. 371 [ cp. Laws 11. 918]. Short sight, 2. 368 D . Sicily, ‘can tell of Charondas,’ 10. 599 E ; —Sicilian cookery, 3. 404 D . Sight , placed in the class of faculties, 5. 477 C ; requires in addition to vision and colour, a third element, light, 6. 507 ; the most wonderful of the senses, ibid. ; compared to mind, ib. 508 ; 7. 532 A ; illusions of, 7. 523 ; 10. 602 , 603 D : —the world of sight, 7. 517 . Sign, the, of Socrates, 6. 496 C . Silver, mingled by the God in the auxiliaries, 3. 415 A (cp. 416 E ; 8. 547 A ); —[and gold] not allowed to the guardians, 3. 416 E ; 4. 419 , 422 D ; 5. 464 D (cp. 8. 543 ). Simonides, his definition of justice discussed, 1. 331 D –335 E; a sage, ib. 335 E . Simplicity, the first principle of education, 3. 397 foll., 400 E , 404 ; the two kinds of, ib. 400 E ; of the good man, ib. 409 A ; in diet, 8. 559 C (cp. 3. 404 D ). Sin, punishment of, 2. 363 ; 10. 614 foll. Cp. Hades , World below . Sirens, harmony of the, 10. 617 B . Skilled person, the, cannot err (Thrasymachus), 1. 340 D . Slavery, more to be feared than death, 3. 387 A ; of Hellenes condemned, 5. 469 B . Slaves, the uneducated man harsh towards, 8. 549 A ; enjoy great freedom in a democracy, ib. 563 B ; always inclined to rise against their masters, 9. 578 [ cp. Laws 6. 776, 777]. Smallness and greatness, 4. 438 B ; 5. 479 B ; 7. 523 , 524 ; 9. 575 C ; 10. 602 D , 605 C . Smell, pleasures of, 9. 584 B . Snake-charming, 1. 358 B . Socrates, goes down to the Peiraeus to see the feast of Bendis, 1. 327 ; detained by Polemarchus and Glaucon, ibid. ; converses with Cephalus, ib. 328 –332; trembles before Thrasymachus, ib. 336 D ; his irony, ib. 337 A ; his poverty, ib. D ; a sharper in argument, ib. 340 D ; ignorant of what justice is, ib. 354 C ; his powers of fascination, 2. 358 A ; requested by Glaucon and Adeimantus to praise justice per se , ib. 367 B ; cannot refuse to help justice, ib. 368 C ; 4. 427 D ; his oath ‘by the dog,’ 3. 399 E ; 8. 567 E ; 9. 592 A ; hoped to have evaded discussing the subject of women and children, 5. 449 , 472 , 473 (cp. 6. 502 E ); his love of truth, 5. 451 A ; 6. 504 ; his power in argument, 6. 487 B ; not unaccustomed to speak in parables, ib. E ; his sign, ib. 496 C ; his earnestness in behalf of philosophy, 7. 536 B ; his reverence for Homer, 10. 595 C , 607 (cp. 3. 391 A ). Soldiers, must form a separate class, 2. 374 ; the diet suited for, 3. 404 D (cp. Guardians ); —women to be soldiers, 5. 452 , 466 , 471 E ; —punishment of soldiers for cowardice, ib. 468 A . Cp. Warrior . Solon, famous at Athens, 10. 599 E ; —quoted, 7. 536 D . Son, the supposititious, parable of, 7. 537 E . Song, parts of, 3. 398 D . Sophists, the, their view of justice, 1. 338 foll.; verbal quibbles of, ib. 340 ; the public the great Sophist, 6. 492 ; the Sophists compared to feeders of a beast, ib. 493 . Sophocles, a remark of, quoted, 1. 329 B . Sorrow , not to be indulged, 3. 387 ; 10. 603 –606; has a relaxing effect on the soul, 4. 430 A ; 10. 606 . Soul , the, has ends and excellences, 1. 353 D ; beauty in the soul, 3. 401 ; the fair soul in the fair body, ib. 402 D ; sympathy of soul and body, 5. 462 D , 464 B ; conversion of the soul from darkness to light, 7. 518 , 521 , 525 [ cp. Laws 12. 957 E]; requires the aid of calculation and intelligence in order to interpret the intimations of sense, ib. 523 , 524 ; 10. 602 ; has more truth and essence than the body, 9. 585 D ; —better and worse principles in the soul, 4. 431 ; the soul divided into reason, spirit, appetite, ib. 435 –442; 6. 504 A ; 8. 550 A ; 9. 571 , 580 E , 581 [ cp. Tim. 69 E–72, 89 E; Laws 9. 863]; faculties of the soul, 6. 511 E ; 7. 533 E ; oppositions in the soul, 10. 603 D [ cp. Soph. 228 A; Laws 10. 896 D]; —the lame soul, 3. 401 ; 7. 535 [ cp. Tim. 44; Soph. 228]; —the soul marred by meanness, 6. 495 E [ cp. Gorg. 524 E ]; —immortality of the soul, 10. 608 foll., (cp. 6. 498 C ); —number of souls does not increase, 10. 611 A ; —the soul after death, ib. 614 foll.; —transmigration of souls, ib. 617 [ cp. Phaedr. 249; Tim. 90 E foll.]; —the soul impure and disfigured while in the body, ib. 611 [ cp. Phaedo 81]; —compared to a many-headed monster, 9. 588 ; to the images of the sea-god Glaucus, 10. 611 ; —like the eye, 6. 508 ; 7. 518 ; —harmony of the soul, produced by temperance, 4. 430 , 442 , 443 (cp. 9. 591 D , and Laws 2. 653 B); —eye of the soul, 7. 518 D , 527 E , 533 D , 540 A ; —five forms of the state and soul, 4. 445 ; 5. 449 ; 9. 577 . Soul. [ The psychology of the Republic, while agreeing generally with that of the other Dialogues, is in some respects a modification or developement of their conclusions. —The division of the soul into three elements, reason, spirit, appetite, here first assumes a precise form, and henceforward has a permanent place in the language of philosophy ( cp. Introd. p. lxvii ). On this division the distinction between forms of government is based ( see s. v. Government ). Virtue, again, is the harmony or accord of the different elements, when the dictates of reason are enforced by passion against the appetites, while vice is the anarchy or discord of the soul when passion and appetite join in rebellion against reason ( cp. 4. 444 ; 10. 609 foll.; Soph. 228; Pol. 296 D; Laws 10. 906 C]. — Regarded from the intellectual side the soul is analysed into four faculties, reason, understanding, faith, knowledge of shadows. These severally correspond to the four divisions of knowledge (6. 511 E ), two for intellect and two for opinion; and thus arises the Platonic ‘proportion,’ — being : becoming :: intellect : opinion, and science : belief :: understanding : knowledge of shadows. These divisions are partly real, partly formed by a logical process, which, as in so many distinctions of ancient philosophers, has outrun fact, and are further illustrated and explained by the allegory of the cave in Book VII ( see Introduction, p. xciv ). — The pre-existence and the immortality of the soul are assumed. The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις or ‘remembrance of a previous birth’ is not so much dwelt upon as in the Meno, Phaedo, or Phaedrus, neither is it made a proof of immortality (Meno 86; Phaedo 73). It is apparently alluded to in the story of Er, where we are told that ‘the pilgrims drank the waters of Unmindfulness; the foolish took too deep a draught, but the wise were more moderate’ (10. 621 A ). In the Xth Book Glaucon is supposed to receive with amazement Socrates’ confident assertion of immortality, although a previous allusion to another state of existence has passed unheeded (6. 498 D ); and in earlier parts of the discussion ( e.g. 2. 362 ; 3. 386 ), the censure which is passed on the common representations of Hades implies in itself some belief in a future life [ cp. Introduction to Phaedo, Vol. I]. The argument for the immortality of the soul is not drawn out at great length or with the emphasis of the Phaedo. It is chiefly of a verbal character:—All things which perish are destroyed by some inherent evil; but the soul is not destroyed by sin, which is the evil proper to her, and must therefore be immortal ( cp. Introd. p. clxvi ). — The condition of the soul after death is represented by Plato in his favourite form of a myth [ cp. Meno 81; Phaedo 88; Gorg. 522]. The Pamphylian warrior Er, who is supposed to have died in battle, revives when placed on the funeral pyre and relates his experiences in the other world. He tells how the just are rewarded and the wicked punished, and is privileged to describe the spectacle which he had witnessed of the choice of a new life by the pilgrim souls. The reward of release from bodily existence is not held out to the philosopher (Phaedo 114 C), but his wisdom, which has a deeper root than habit (10. 619 ), preserves him from overhaste in his choice and ensures him a happy destiny. —The transmigration of souls is represented in the myth much as in the Phaedrus and Timaeus. Plato in all likelihood derived the doctrine from an Oriental source, but through Pythagorean channels. It probably had a real hold on his mind, as it agreed, or could be made to agree, with the conviction, which he elsewhere expresses, of the remedial nature of punishment [ cp. Protag. 323; Gorg. 523–525]. Sounds in music, 7. 531 A . Sparta. See Lacedaemon . Spectator , the, unconsciously influenced by what he sees and hears, 10. 605 , 606 [ cp. Laws 2. 656 A, 659 C]; —the philosopher the spectator of all time and all existence, 6. 486 A [ cp. Theaet. 173 E]. Spendthrifts, in Greek states, 8. 564 . Spercheius, the river-god, 3. 391 B . Spirit , must be combined with gentleness in the guardians, 2. 375 ; 3. 410 ; 6. 503 [ cp. Laws 5. 731 B]; characteristic of northern nations, 4. 435 E ; found in quite young children, ib. 441 A [ cp. Laws; 12. 963]: —the spirited (or passionate) element in the soul, ib. 440 foll.; 6. 504 A ; 8. 550 A ; 9. 572 A , 580 E ; must be subject to the rational part, 4. 441 E [ cp. Tim. 30 C, 70, 89 D]; predominant in the timocratic state and man, 8. 548 , 550 B ; characterised by ambition, 9. 581 B ; its pleasures, ib. 586 D ; the favourite object of the poet’s imitation, 10. 604 , 605 . Stars, motion of the, 7. 529 , 530 ; 10. 616 E . State , relation of, to the individual, 2. 368 ; 4. 434 , 441 ; 5. 462 ; 8. 544 ; 9. 577 B [ cp. Laws 3. 689; 5. 739; 9. 875, 877 C; 11. 923]; origin of, 2. 369 foll. [ cp. Laws 3. 678 foll.]; should be in unity, 4. 422 ; 5. 463 [ cp. Laws 5. 739]; place of the virtues in, 4. 428 foll.; virtue of state and individual, ib. 441 ; 6. 498 E ; family life in, 5. 449 [ cp. Laws 5. 740]: —the luxurious state, 2. 372 D foll.: —[the best state]; classes must be kept distinct, ib. 374 ; 3. 379 E , 415 A ; 4. 421 , 433 A , 434 , 441 E , 443 ; 5. 453 (cp. 8. 552 A , and Laws 8. 846 E); the rulers must be philosophers, 2. 376 ; 5. 473 ; 6. 484 , 497 foll., 501 , 503 B ; 7. 520 , 521 , 525 B , 540 ; 8. 543 (cp. Rulers ); the government must have the monopoly of lying, 2. 382 ; 3. 389 A , 414 C ; 5. 459 D [ cp. Laws 2. 663 E]; the poets to be banished, 3. 398 A ; 8. 568 B ; 10. 595 foll., 605 A , 607 A [ cp. Laws 7. 817]; the older must bear rule, the younger obey, 3. 412 [ cp. Laws 3. 690 A; 4. 714 E]; women, children, and goods to be common, ib. 416 ; 5. 450 E , 457 foll., 462 , 464 ; 8. 543 A [ cp. Laws 5. 739; 7. 807 B]; must be happy as a whole, 4. 420 D ; 5. 466 A ; 7. 519 E ; will easily master other states in war, 4. 422 ; must be of a size which is not inconsistent with unity, ib. 423 [ cp. Laws 5. 737]; composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, ib. 441 A ; may be either a monarchy or an aristocracy, ib. 445 C (cp. 9. 576 D ); will form one family, 5. 463 [ cp. Pol. 259]; will be free from quarrels and law-suits, 2. 378 ; 5. 464 , 465 ; —is it possible? 5. 471 , 473 ; 6. 499 ; 7. 540 [ cp. 7. 520 and Laws 4. 711 E; 5. 739]; framed after the heavenly pattern, 6. 500 E ; 7. 540 A ; 9. 592 ; how to be commenced, 6. 501 ; 7. 540 ; manner of its decline, 8. 546 [ cp. Crit. 120]; —the best state that in which the rulers least desire office, 7. 520 , 521 : —the four imperfect forms of states, 4. 445 B ; 8. 544 [ cp. Pol. 291 foll., 391 foll.]; succession of states, 8. 545 foll. (cp. Government , forms of): —existing states not one but many, 4. 423 A ; nearly all corrupt, 6. 496 ; 7. 519 , 520 ; 9. 592 . State. [ The polity of which Plato ‘sketches the outline’ in the Republic may be analysed into two principal elements, I, an Hellenic state of the older or Spartan type, with some traits borrowed from Athens, II, an ideal city in which the citizens have all things in common, and the government is carried on by a class of philosopher rulers who are selected by merit. These two elements are not perfectly combined; and, as Aristotle complains (Pol. ii. 5, § 18), very much is left ill-defined and uncertain. —I. Like Hellenic cities in general, the number of the citizens is not to be great. The size of the state is limited by the requirement that ‘it shall not be larger or smaller than is consistent with unity.’ [ The ‘convenient number’ 5040, which is suggested in the Laws (v. 737), is regarded by Aristotle (Pol. ii. 6, § 6) as an ‘enormous multitude.’ ] Again, the individual is subordinate to the state. When Adeimantus complains of the hard life which the citizens will lead, ‘like mercenaries in a garrison’ (4. 419 ), he is answered by Socrates that if the happiness of the whole is secured, the happiness of the parts will inevitably follow. Once more, war is supposed to be the normal condition of the state, and military service is imposed upon all. The profession of arms is the only one in which the citizen may properly engage. Trade is regarded as dishonourable:—‘those who are good for nothing else sit in the Agora buying and selling’ (2. 371 D ); the warrior can spare no time for such an employment ( ib. 374 C ). [ In the Laws Plato’s ideas enlarge; he thinks that peace is to be preferred to war (1. 628); and he speculates on the possibility of redeeming trade from reproach by compelling some of the best citizens to open a shop or keep a tavern (11. 918).]— In these respects, as well as in the introduction of common meals, Plato was probably influenced by the traditional ideal of Sparta [ cp. Introd. p. clxx ]. The Athenian element appears in the intellectual training of the citizens, and generally in the atmosphere of grace and refinement which they are to breathe ( see s. v. Art ). The restless energy of the Athenian character is perhaps reflected in the discipline imposed upon the ruling class (7. 540 ), who when they have reached fifty are dispensed from continuous public service, but must then devote themselves to abstract study, and also be willing to take their turn when necessary at the helm of state [ cp. Laws 7. 807; Thucyd. i. 70; ii. 40]. —II. The most peculiar features of Plato’s state are (1) the community of property, (2) the position of women, (3) the government of philosophers. (1) The first ( see s. v. ), though suggested in some measure by the example of Sparta or Crete [ cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 5, § 6], is not known to have been actually practised anywhere in Hellas, unless possibly among such a body as the Pythagorean brotherhood. (2) Nothing in all the Republic was probably stranger to his contemporaries than the place which Plato assigns to women in the state. The community of wives and children, though carefully guarded by him from the charge of licentiousness (5. 458 E ), would appear worse in Athenian eyes than the traditional ‘licence’ of the Spartan women [Arist. Pol. ii. 9, § 5), which, so far as it really existed, no doubt arose out of an excessive regard to physical considerations in marriage. Again, the equal share in education, in war, and in administration which the women are supposed to enjoy in Plato’s state, was, if not so revolting, quite as contrary to common Hellenic sentiment [ cp. Thucyd. ii. 45]. The Spartan women exercised a great influence on public affairs, but this was mainly indirect [ cp. Laws 7. 806; Arist. Pol. ii. 9, § 8]; they did not hold office or learn the use of arms. At Athens, as is well known, the women, of the upper classes at least, lived in an almost Oriental seclusion, and were wholly absorbed in household duties (Laws 7. 805 E). (3) Finally, the government of philosophers had no analogy in the Hellenic world of Plato’s time. He may have taken the suggestion from the stories of the Pythagorean rule in Magna Graecia. But it is also possible that these accounts of the brotherhood of Pythagoras, some of which have reached us on very doubtful authority, may be themselves to a considerable extent coloured and distorted by features adapted from the Republic. Whether this is the case or not, we can hardly doubt that Plato was chiefly indebted to his own imagination for his kingdom of philosophers, or that it remained to himself an ideal, rather than a state which would ever ‘play her part in actual life’ (Tim. 19, 20). It is at least significant that he never finished the Critias, as though he were unable to embody, even in a mythical form, the ‘city of which the pattern is laid up in heaven.’ ] Statesmen in their own imagination, 4. 426 . Statues, polished for a decision, 2. 361 D ; painted, 4. 420 D . Steadiness of character, apt to be accompanied by stupidity, 6. 503 [ cp. Theaet. 144 B]. Stesichorus, says that Helen was never at Troy, 9. 586 C . Stories, improper, not to be told to children, 2. 377 ; 3. 391 . Cp. Children , Education . Strength, rule of, 1. 338 . Style of poetry, 3. 392 ; —styles, various, ib. 397 . Styx, 3. 387 B . Suits, will be unknown in the best state, 5. 464 E . Sumptuary laws, 4. 423 , 425 . Sun, the, compared with the idea of good, 6. 508 ; not sight, but the author of sight, ib. 509 ; —‘the sun of Heracleitus,’ ib. 498 A . Supposititious son, parable of the, 7. 538 . Sympathy, of soul and body, 5. 462 D , 464 B ; aroused by poetry, 10. 605 B . Syracusan dinners, 3. 404 D . T. Tactics, use of arithmetic in, 7. 522 E , 525 B . Tartarus ( = hell), 10. 616 A . Taste, good, importance of, 3. 401 , 402 . Taxes, heavy, imposed by the tyrant, 8. 567 A , 568 E . Teiresias, alone has understanding among the dead, 3. 386 E . Telamon, 10. 620 B . Temperance ( σωφροσύνη ), in the state, 3. 389 ; 4. 430 foll. [ cp. Laws 3. 696]; temperance and love, 3. 403 A ; fostered in the soul by the simple kind of music, ib. 404 E , 410 A ; a harmony of the soul, 4. 430 , 441 E , 442 D , 443 (cp. 9. 591 D , and Laws 2. 653 B); one of the philosopher’s virtues, 6. 485 E , 490 E , 491 B , 494 B [ cp. Phaedo 68]. Temple-robbing, 9. 574 D , 575 B . Territory, devastation of Hellenic, not to be allowed, 5. 470 ; —unlimited, not required by the good state, 4. 423 [ cp. Laws 5. 737]. Thales, inventions of, 10. 600 A . Thamyras, soul of, chooses the life of a nightingale, 10. 620 A . Theages, the bridle of, 6. 496 B . Themis, did not instigate the strife with the gods, 2. 379 E . Themistocles, answer of, to the Seriphian, 1. 330 A . Theology of Plato, 2. 379 foll. Cp. God . Thersites, puts on the form of a monkey, 10. 620 C . Theseus, the tale of, and Peirithous not permitted, 3. 391 C . Thetis, not to be slandered, 2. 381 D ; her accusation of Apollo, ib. 383 A . Thirst, 4. 437 E , 439 ; an inanition ( κένωσις ) of the body, 9. 585 A . Thracians, procession of, in honour of Bendis, 1. 327 A ; characterised by spirit or passion, 4. 435 E . Thrasymachus, the Chalcedonian, a person in the dialogue, 1. 328 B ; described, ib. 336 B ; will be paid, ib. 337 D ; defines justice, ib. 338 C foll.; his rudeness, ib. 343 A ; his views of government, ibid. (cp. 9. 590 D ); his encomium on injustice, 1. 343 A ; his manner of speech, ib. 345 B ; his paradox about justice and injustice, ib. 348 B foll.; he blushes, ib. 350 D ; is pacified, and retires from the argument, ib. 354 (cp. 6. 498 C ); would have Socrates discuss the subject of women and children, 5. 450 . Timocracy , 8. 545 foll.; origin of, ib. 547 : —the timocratical man, described, 8. 549 ; his origin, ibid. Tinker, the prosperous, 6. 495 , 496 . Tops, 4. 436 . Torch race, an equestrian, 1. 328 A . Touch, 7. 523 E . Traders, necessary in the state, 2. 371 . Traditions of ancient times, their truth not certainly known to us, 2. 382 C (cp. 3. 414 C , and Tim. 40 D; Crit. 107; Pol. 271 A; Laws 4. 713 E; 6. 782 D). Tragedy and comedy in the state, 3. 394 [ cp. Laws 7. 817]. Tragic poets, the, eulogizers of tyranny, 8. 568 A ; imitators, 10. 597 , 598 . Training, dangers of, 3. 404 A ; severity of, 6. 504 A (cp. 7. 535 B ). Transfer of children from one class to another, 3. 415 ; 4. 423 D . Transmigration of souls, 10. 617 . See Soul . Trochaic rhythms, 3. 400 B . Troy , 3. 393 E ; Helen never at, 9. 586 C : —Trojan War, 2. 380 A : treatment of the wounded in, 3. 405 E , 408 A ; the army numbered by Palamedes, 7. 522 D . Truth, is not lost by men of their own will, 3. 413 A ; the aim of the philosopher, 6. 484 , 485 , 486 E , 490 , 500 C , 501 D ; 7. 521 , 537 D ; 9. 581 , 582 C (cp. supra 5. 475 E ; 7. 520 , 525 ; and Phaedo 82; Phaedr. 249; Theaet. 173 E; Soph. 249 D, 254 A); akin to wisdom, 6. 485 D ; to proportion, ib. 486 E ; no partial measure of, sufficient, ib. 504 ; love of, essential in this world and the next, 10. 618 ; —truth and essence, 9. 585 D . Tyranny, 1. 338 D ; = injustice on the grand scale, ib. 344 [ cp. Gorg. 469]; the wretchedest form of government, 8. 544 C ; 9. 576 [ cp. Pol. 302 E]; origin of, 8. 562 , 564 : —the tyrannical man, 9. 571 foll.; life of, ib. 573 ; his treatment of his parents, ib. 574 ; most miserable, ib. 576 , 578 ; has the soul of a slave, ib. 577 . Tyrant , the, origin of, 8. 565 ; happiness of, ib. 566 foll.; 9. 576 foll. [ cp. Laws 2. 661 B]; his rise to power, 8. 566 ; his taxes, ib. 567 A , 568 E ; his army, ib. 567 A , 569 ; his purgation of the city, ib. 567 B ; misery of, 9. 579 ; has no real pleasure, ib. 587 ; how far distant from pleasure, ibid. : —Tyrants and poets, 8. 568 ; have no friends, ibid. ; 9. 576 [ cp. Gorg. 510 C ]; punishment of, in the world below, 10. 615 [ cp. Gorg. 525]. U. Understanding, a faculty of the soul, 6. 511 D ; = science, 7. 533 E . Union impossible among the bad, 1. 352 A [ cp. Lysis 214]. Unity of the state, 4. 422 , 423 ; 5. 462 , 463 [ cp. Laws 5. 739]; —absolute unity, 7. 524 E , 525 E ; unity and plurality, ibid. Unjust man, the, happy (Thrasymachus), 1. 343 , 344 [ cp. Gorg. 470 foll.]; his unhappiness finally proved, 9. 580 ; 10. 613 : —injustice = private profit, 1. 344 ( see Injustice ). Uranus, immoral stories about, 2. 377 E . User, the, a better judge than the maker, 10. 601 C [ cp. Crat. 390]. Usury, sometimes not protected by law, 8. 556 A [ cp. Laws 5. 742 C]. V. Valetudinarianism, 3. 406 ; 4. 426 A . Valour, prizes of, 5. 468 . Vice, the disease of the soul, 4. 444 ; 10. 609 foll. [ cp. Soph. 228; Pol. 296 D; Laws 10. 906 C]; is many, 4. 445 ; the proper object of ridicule, 5. 452 E ; —fine names for the vices, 8. 560 E . Cp. Injustice . Virtue and justice, 1. 350 [ cp. Meno 73 E, 79]; thought by mankind to be toilsome, 2. 364 A [ cp. Laws 807 D]; virtue and harmony, 3. 401 A ( cp. 7. 522 A ); virtue and pleasure, 3. 402 E (cp. Pleasure ); not promoted by excessive care of the body, ib. 407 ( cp. 9. 591 D ); makes men wise, 3. 409 E ; divided into parts, 4. 428 foll., 433 ; in the individual and the state, ib. 435 foll., 441 (cp. Justice ); the health of the soul, ib. 444 (cp. 10. 609 foll., and Soph. 228; Pol. 296 D); is one, ib. 445 ; may be a matter of habit, 7. 518 E ; 10. 619 D ; impeded by wealth, 8. 550 E [ cp. Laws 5. 728 A, 742; 8. 831, 836 A]; —virtues of the philosopher, 6. 485 foll., 490 D , 491 B , 494 B (cp. Philosopher ); place of the several virtues in the state, 4. 427 foll. Visible world, divisions of, 6. 510 foll.; 7. 517 ; compared to the intellectual, 6. 508 , 509 ; 7. 532 A . Vision , 5. 477 ; 6. 508 ; 7. 517 . See Sight . W. War, causes of, 2. 373 ; 4. 422 foll.; 8. 547 A ; an art, 2. 374 A (cp. 4. 422 , and Laws 11. 921 E); men, women, and children to go to, 5. 452 foll., 467 , 471 E ; 7. 537 A ; regulations concerning, 5. 467 –471; a matter of chance, ib. 467 E [ cp. Laws 1. 638 A]; distinction between internal and external, ib. 470 A [ cp. Laws 1. 628, 629]; the guilt of, always confined to a few persons, ib. 471 B ; love of, especially characteristic of timocracy, 8. 547 E ; cannot be easily waged by an oligarchy, ib. 551 E ; the rich and the poor in war, ib. 556 C ; a favourite resource of the tyrant, ib. 567 A . Warrior , the brave, rewards of, 5. 468 ; his burial, ib. E ; the warrior must know how to count, 7. 522 E , 525 ; must be a geometrician, ib. 526 . Waves, the three, 5. 457 C , 472 A , 473 C . Weak, the, by nature subject to the strong, 1. 338 [ cp. Gorg. 489; Laws 3. 690 B]; not capable of much, either for good or evil, 6. 491 E , 495 B . Wealth , the advantage of, in old age, 1. 329 , 330 ; the greatest blessing of, ib. 330 , 331 ; the destruction of the arts, 4. 421 ; influence of, on the state, ib. 422 A [ cp. Laws 4. 705; 5. 729 A]; the ‘sinews of war,’ ibid. ; all-powerful in oligarchies and timocracies, 8. 548 A , 551 B , 553 , 562 A ; an impediment to virtue, ib. 550 E [ cp. Laws 5. 728 A; 742 E; 8. 831, 836 A]; should only be acquired to a moderate amount, 9. 591 E [ cp. Laws 7. 801 B]: —the blind god of wealth (Pluto), 8. 554 B : —Wealthy, the, everywhere hostile to the poor, 4. 423 A ; 8. 551 E [ cp. Laws 5. 736 A]; flattered by them, 5. 465 C ; the wealthy and the wise, 6. 489 B ; plundered by the multitude in democracies, 8. 564 , 565 . Weaving, the art of, 3. 401 A ; 5. 455 D . Weep, the guardians not to, 3. 387 C (cp. 10. 603 E ). Weighing, art of, corrects the illusions of sight, 10. 602 D . Whole, the, in regard to the happiness of the state, 4. 420 D ; 5. 466 A ; 7. 519 E ; in love, 5. 474 C , 475 B ; 6. 485 B . Whorl, the great, 10. 616 . Wicked, the, punishment of, in the world below, 2. 363 ; 10. 614 ; thought by men to be happy, 1. 354 ; 2. 364 A ; 3. 392 B (cp. 8. 545 A , and Gorg. 470 foll.; Laws 2. 66 1; 10. 899 E, 905 A). Wine, lovers of, 5. 475 A . Wisdom ( σοφία, φρόνησις ) and injustice, 1. 349 , 350 ; in the state, 4. 428 ; akin to truth, 6. 485 D ; the power of, 7. 518 , 519 ; the only virtue which is innate in us, ib. 518 E . Wise man, the, = the good, 1. 350 [ cp. 1 Alcib. 124, 125]; definition of, 4. 442 C ; alone has true pleasure, 9. 583 B ; life of, ib. 591 ; —‘the wise to go to the doors of the rich,’ 6. 489 B ; —wise men said to be the friends of the tyrant, 8. 568 . Wives to be common in the state, 5. 457 foll.; 8. 543 . Wolves, men changed into, 8. 565 D ; ‘wolf and flock’ (proverb), 3. 415 D . Women , employments of, 5. 455 ; differences of taste in, ib. 456 ; fond of complaining, 8. 549 D ; supposed to differ in nature from men, 5. 453 ; inferior to men, ib. 455 [ cp. Tim. 42; Laws 6. 781]; ought to be trained like men, ib. 451 , 466 [ cp. Laws 7. 805; 8. 829 E]; in the gymnasia, ib. 452 , 457 [ cp. Laws 7. 813, 814; 8. 833]; in war, ib. 453 foll., 466 E , 471 E [ cp. Laws 6. 785; 7. 806, 814 A]; to be guardians, ib. 456 , 458 , 468 ; 7. 540 C ; (and children) to be common, 5. 450 E , 457 foll., 462 , 464 ; 8. 543 [ cp. Laws 5. 739]. See supra s. v. State , p. 374. World, the, cannot be a philosopher, 6. 494 A . World below , the, seems very near to the aged, 1. 330 E ; not to be reviled, 3. 386 foll. [ cp. Crat. 403; Laws 5. 727 E; 8. 828 D]; pleasure of discourse in, 6. 498 D [ cp. Apol. 41]; punishment of the wicked in, 2. 363 ; 10. 614 foll.; sex in, 10. 618 B ; —[heroes] who have ascended from the world below to the gods, 7. 521 C . X. Xerxes, perhaps author of the maxim that justice = paying one’s debts, 1. 336 A . Y. Young, the, how affected by the common praises of injustice, 2. 365 ; cannot understand allegory, ib. 378 E ; must be subject in the state, 3. 412 B [ cp. Laws 3. 690 A; 4. 714 E]; must submit to their elders, 5. 465 A [ cp. Laws 4. 721 D; 9. 879 C; 11. 917 A]. Cp. Children , Education . Youth, the corruption of, not to be attributed to the Sophists, but to public opinion, 6. 492 A ; —youthful enthusiasm for metaphysics, 7. 539 B [ cp. Phil. 15 E]; —youthful scepticism, not of long continuance, ib. D [ cp. Soph. 234 E; Laws 10. 888 B]. Z. Zeus, his treatment of his father, 2. 377 E ; throws Hephaestus from heaven, ib. 378 D ; —Achilles descended from, 3. 391 C ; —did not cause the violation of the treaty in the Trojan War, or the strife of the gods, 2. 379 E ; or send the lying dream to Agamemnon, ib. 383 A ; or lust for Herè, 3. 390 B ; ought not to have been described by Homer as lamenting for Achilles and Sarpedon, ib. 388 C ; —Lycaean Zeus, 8. 565 D ; —Olympian Zeus, 9. 583 B . THE END. Oxford PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS BY HORACE HART PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 55201 ***