(10) The third genus is that of the five-dividing paw, of which the dog is the largest, and the civet-cat the least.

(8) As for the genera (khadûînak), the first genus is that which has the foot cloven in two, and is suitable for grazing; of which a camel larger than a horse is small and new-born.

(9) The second genus is ass-footed, of which the swift horse is the largest, and the ass the least.

(12) The fifth genus is that of the water, of which the Kar fish is the largest, and the Nemadu the least. 13, These five genera are apportioned out into two hundred and eighty-two species (sardak). 14. First are five species of goat, the ass-goat, the milch-goat, the mountain-goat, the fawn, and the common goat. 15. Second, five species of sheep, that with a tail, that which has no tail, the dog-sheep, the wether, and the Kûrisk sheep, a sheep whose horn is great; it possesses a grandeur like unto a horse, and they use it mostly for a steed (bâra), as it is said that Mânûskîhar kept a Kûrisk as a steed. 16. Third, two species of camel, the mountain one and that suitable for grazing; for one is fit to keep in the mountain, and one in the plain; they are one-humped and two-humped. 17. Fourth, fifteen species of ox, the white, mud-coloured, red, yellow, black, and dappled, the elk, the buffalo, the camel-leopard ox, the fish-chewing ox, the Fars ox, the Kagau, and other species of ox. 18. Fifth, eight species of horse, the Arab, the Persian, the mule, the ass, the wild ass (gôr), the hippopotamus (asp-i âvî), and other species of horse. 19. Sixth, ten species of dog, the shepherd's dog, the village-dog which is the house-protector, the blood-hound, the slender hound, the water-beaver which they call the water-dog, the fox, the ichneumon (râsu), the hedgehog which they call 'thorny-back,' the porcupine, and the civet-cat; of which, two species are those accustomed to burrows, one the fox and one the ichneumon; and those accustomed to jungle are such as the porcupine which has spines on its back, and the hedgehog which is similar. 20. Seventh, five species of the black hare; two are wild species, one dwelling in a burrow and one dwelling in the jungle. 21. Eighth, eight species of weasel; one the marten, one the black marten, the squirrel, the Bez ermine, the white ermine, and other species of weasel. 22. Ninth, eight species of musk animals; one is that which is recognised by its musk, one the musk animal with a bag in which is their pleasant scent, the Bis-musk which eats the Bis-herb, the black musk which is the enemy of the serpent that is numerous in rivers, and other species of musk animals. 23. Tenth, one hundred and ten species of birds; flying creatures (vey = vâî) such as the griffon bird, the Karsipt, the eagle, the Kahrkâs which they call the vulture, the crow, the Ardâ, the crane, and the tenth is the bat. 24. There are two of them which have milk in the teat and suckle their young, the griffon bird and the bat which flies in the night; as they say that the bat is created of three races (sardak), the race (âyina) of the dog, the bird, and the musk animal; for it flies like a bird, has many teeth like a dog, and is dwelling in holes like a musk-rat. 25. These hundred and ten species of birds are distributed into eight groups (khadûînak), mostly as scattered about as when a man scatters seed, and drops the seed in his fingers to the ground, large, middling, and small. 26. Eleventh, fish were created of ten species; first, the fish Ariz, the Arzuvâ, the Arzukâ, the Marzukâ, and other Avesta names. 27. Afterwards, within each species, species within species are created, so the total is two hundred and eighty-two species. 28. Of the dog they say that out of the star station, that is, away from the direction of the constellation Haptôk-rîng, was given to him further by a stage (yôgist) than to men, on account of his protection of sheep, and as associating with sheep and men; for this the dog is purposely adapted, as three more kinds of advantage are given to him than to man, he has his own boots, his own clothing, and may wander about without self-exertion. 29. The twelfth is the sharp-toothed beast of which the leader of the flock is in such great fear, for that flock of sheep is very badly maintained which has no dog. 30. Aûharmazd said when the bird Vâresha was created by him, which is a bird of prey, thus: 'Thou art created by me, O bird Vâresha! so that my vexation may be greater than my satisfaction with thee, for thou doest the will of the evil spirit more than that of me; like the wicked man who did not become satiated with wealth, thou also dost not become satiated with the slaughter of birds; but if thou be not created by me, O bird Vâresha! thou wouldst be created by him, the evil spirit, as a kite with the body of a Varpa, by which no creature would be left alive.' 31. Many animals are created in all these species for this reason, that when one shall be perishing through the evil spirit, one shall remain.

(11) The fourth genus is the flying, of which the griffon of three natures is the largest, and the chaffinch the least.

(1) With respect to your inquiry, “ what the peculiarities are in each of the more excellent genera, by which they are separated from each other? ” if you understand by peculiarities the specific differences under the same genus, which are distinguished by opposite qualities, as the rational and irrational under animal; we by no means admit peculiarities of this kind, in things which neither have one common essence, nor an equal contradistinction, nor receive a composition from something common, which is indefinite, and defines the peculiarity. But if you apprehend the peculiarity to be, as in prior and secondary natures, differing in their whole essence and whole genus, a certain simple condition of being, definite in itself; in this case, your conception of peculiarities will be reasonable. For these peculiarities of things, which have an eternal subsistence, are simple, and entirely exempt. The inquiry, however, proceeds imperfectly. For it was necessary, in the first place, to inquire what the peculiarities are of the more excellent genera, according to essence; in the next place, what they are according to power; and thus afterwards, what they are according to energy.

(19) Having established our four primary genera, it remains for us to enquire whether each of them of itself alone produces species. And especially, can Being be divided independently, that is without drawing upon the other genera? Surely not: the differentiae must come from outside the genus differentiated: they must be differentiae of Being proper, but cannot be identical with it.

Where then is it to find them? Obviously not in non-beings. If then in beings, and the three genera are all that is left, clearly it must find them in these, by conjunction and couplement with these, which will come into existence simultaneously with itself.

But if all come into existence simultaneously, what else is produced but that amalgam of all Existents which we have just considered ? How can other things exist over and above this all-including amalgam? And if all the constituents of this amalgam are genera, how do they produce species? How does Motion produce species of Motion? Similarly with Stability and the other genera.

A word of warning must here be given against sinking the various genera in their species; and also against reducing the genus to a mere predicate, something merely seen in the species. The genus must exist at once in itself and in its species; it blends, but it must also be pure; in contributing along with other genera to form Substance, it must not destroy itself. There are problems here that demand investigation.

But since we identified the amalgam of the Existents with the particular intellect, Intellect as such being found identical with Being or Substance, and therefore prior to all the Existents, which may be regarded as its species or members, we may infer that the intellect, considered as completely unfolded, is a subsequent.

Our treatment of this problem may serve to promote our investigation; we will take it as a kind of example, and with it embark upon our enquiry.

(9) So much for one of the genera- the "Substance," so called, of the Sensible realm.

But what are we to posit as its species? how divide this genus?

The genus as a whole must be identified with body. Bodies may be divided into the characteristically material and the organic: the material bodies comprise fire, earth, water, air; the organic the bodies of plants and animals, these in turn admitting of formal differentiation.

The next step is to find the species of earth and of the other elements, and in the case of organic bodies to distinguish plants according to their forms, and the bodies of animals either by their habitations- on the earth, in the earth, and similarly for the other elements- or else as light, heavy and intermediate. Some bodies, we shall observe, stand in the middle of the universe, others circumscribe it from above, others occupy the middle sphere: in each case we shall find bodies different in shape, so that the bodies of the living beings of the heavens may be differentiated from those of the other elements.

Once we have classified bodies into the four species, we are ready to combine them on a different principle, at the same time intermingling their differences of place, form and constitution; the resultant combinations will be known as fiery or earthy on the basis of the excess or predominance of some one element.

The distinction between First and Second Substances, between Fire and a given example of fire, entails a difference of a peculiar kind- the difference between universal and particular. This however is not a difference characteristic of Substance; there is also in Quality the distinction between whiteness and the white object, between grammar and some particular grammar.

The question may here be asked: "What deficiency has grammar compared with a particular grammar, and science as a whole in comparison with a science?" Grammar is certainly not posterior to the particular grammar: on the contrary, the grammar as in you depends upon the prior existence of grammar as such: the grammar as in you becomes a particular by the fact of being in you; it is otherwise identical with grammar the universal.

Turn to the case of Socrates: it is not Socrates who bestows manhood upon what previously was not Man, but Man upon Socrates; the individual man exists by participation in the universal.

Besides, Socrates is merely a particular instance of Man; this particularity can have no effect whatever in adding to his essential manhood.

We may be told that Man is Form alone, Socrates Form in Matter. But on this very ground Socrates will be less fully Man than the universal; for the Reason-Principle will be less effectual in Matter. If, on the contrary, Man is not determined by Form alone, but presupposes Matter, what deficiency has Man in comparison with the material manifestation of Man, or the Reason-Principle in isolation as compared with its embodiment in a unit of Matter?

Besides, the more general is by nature prior; hence, the Form-Idea is prior to the individual: but what is prior by nature is prior unconditionally. How then can the Form take a lower rank? The individual, it is true, is prior in the sense of being more readily accessible to our cognisance; this fact, however, entails no objective difference.

Moreover, such a difference, if established, would be incompatible with a single Reason-Principle of Substance; First and Second Substance could not have the same Principle, nor be brought under a single genus.

(9) The above considerations- to which others, doubtless, might be added- suffice to show that these five are primary genera. But that they are the only primary genera, that there are no others, how can we be confident of this? Why do we not add unity to them? Quantity? Quality? Relation, and all else included by our various forerunners?

As for unity: If the term is to mean a unity in which nothing else is present, neither Soul nor Intellect nor anything else, this can be predicated of nothing, and therefore cannot be a genus. If it denotes the unity present in Being, in which case we predicate Being of unity, this unity is not primal.

Besides, unity, containing no differences, cannot produce species, and not producing species, cannot be a genus. You cannot so much as divide unity: to divide it would be to make it many. Unity, aspiring to be a genus, becomes a plurality and annuls itself.

Again, you must add to it to divide it into species; for there can be no differentiae in unity as there are in Substance. The mind accepts differences of Being, but differences within unity there cannot be. Every differentia introduces a duality destroying the unity; for the addition of any one thing always does away with the previous quantity.

It may be contended that the unity which is implicit in Being and in Motion is common to all other things, and that therefore Being and unity are inseparable. But we rejected the idea that Being is a genus comprising all things, on the ground that these things are not beings in the sense of the Absolute Being, but beings in another mode: in the same way, we assert, unity is not a genus, the Primary Unity having a character distinct from all other unities.

Admitted that not everything suffices to produce a genus, it may yet be urged that there is an Absolute or Primary Unity corresponding to the other primaries. But if Being and unity are identified, then since Being has already been included among the genera, it is but a name that is introduced in unity: if, however, they are both unity, some principle is implied: if there is anything in addition , unity is predicated of this added thing; if there is nothing added, the reference is again to that unity predicated of nothing. If however the unity referred to is that which accompanies Being, we have already decided that it is not unity in the primary sense.

But is there any reason why this less complete unity should not still possess Primary Being, seeing that even its posterior we rank as Being, and "Being" in the sense of the Primary Being? The reason is that the prior of this Being cannot itself be Being- or else, if the prior is Being, this is not Primary Being: but the prior is unity; .

Furthermore, unity, abstracted from Being, has no differentiae.

Again, even taking it as bound up with Being: If it is a consequent of Being, then it is a consequent of everything, and therefore the latest of things: but the genus takes priority. If it is simultaneous with Being, it is simultaneous with everything: but a genus is not thus simultaneous. If it is prior to Being, it is of the nature of a Principle, and therefore will belong only to Being; but if it serves as Principle to Being, it is not its genus: if it is not genus to Being, it is equally not a genus of anything else; for that would make Being a genus of all other things.

In sum, the unity exhibited in Being on the one hand approximates to Unity-Absolute and on the other tends to identify itself with Being: Being is a unity in relation to the Absolute, is Being by virtue of its sequence upon that Absolute: it is indeed potentially a plurality, and yet it remains a unity and rejecting division refuses thereby to become a genus.

(53) Hence comes discernment between things which are of like nature, not distinguished by difference of kind, character or position.

(2) But are we really obliged to posit the existence of such genera?

Take Substance, for Substance must certainly be our starting-point: what are the grounds for regarding Substance as one single genus?

It has been remarked that Substance cannot be a single entity common to both the Intellectual and the Sensible worlds. We may add that such community would entail the existence of something prior to Intellectual and Sensible Substances alike, something distinct from both as predicated of both; and this prior would be neither body nor unembodied; for it were one or the other, body would be unembodied, or the unembodied would be the body.

This conclusion must not however prevent our seeking in the actual substance of the Sensible world an element held in common by Matter, by Form and by their Composite, all of which are designated as substances, though it is not maintained that they are Substance in an equal degree; Form is usually held to be Substance in a higher degree than Matter, and rightly so, in spite of those who would have Matter to be the more truly real.

There is further the distinction drawn between what are known as First and Second Substances. But what is their common basis, seeing that the First are the source from which the Second derive their right to be called substances?

But, in sum, it is impossible to define Substance: determine its property, and still you have not attained to its essence. Even the definition, "That which, numerically one and the same, is receptive of contraries," will hardly be applicable to all substances alike.

(1) And all dependent from Above are subdivided into species in the fashion which I am to tell. The genera of all things company with their own species; so that the genus is a class in its entirety, the species is part of a genus. The genus of the Gods will, therefore, make the species of the Gods out of itself. In like way, too, the genus of the daimons, and of men, likewise of birds, and of all [animals] the Cosmos doth contain within itself, brings into being species like itself. There is besides a genus other than the animal,—a genus, or indeed a soul, in that it’s not without sensation,—in consequence of which it both finds happiness in suitable conditions, and pines and spoils in adverse ones;—I mean [the class] of all things on the earth which owe their life to the sound state of roots and shoots, of which the various kinds are scattered through the length and breadth of Earth.

(18) The other kind or species is fierceness; for where this getteth power it suppresseth all, and spoils all, even as the heat does; no life could subsist in it if the heat did not hinder that. The fierceness of cold is a destruction to every life, and the house of death, even as the hot fierceness also is. Of the Qualification of the Air and the Water.