Passages similar to: Stromata (Miscellanies) — Chapter VII: On the Causes of Doubt or Assent.
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Christian Mysticism
Stromata (Miscellanies)
Chapter VII: On the Causes of Doubt or Assent. (3)
But among the principal causes of scepticism is the instability of the mind, which is productive of dissent. And dissent is the proximate cause of doubt.
In the first place, therefore, we shall divide the genera of the proposed problems, in order that we may know the quantity and quality of them. And,...
(2) In the first place, therefore, we shall divide the genera of the proposed problems, in order that we may know the quantity and quality of them. And, in the next place, we shall show from what theologies the doubts are assumed, and according to what sciences they are investigated. For some things that are badly confused, require a certain distinction; others are conversant with the cause through which they subsist, and are apprehended; others, which we propose according to a certain contrariety, draw our decision on both sides; and some things require from us the whole development of mystic doctrines. Such, therefore, being the nature of the subjects of discussion, they are assumed from many places, and from different sciences. For some things introduce animadversions from what the wise men of the Chaldeans have delivered; others produce objections from what the prophets of the Egyptians teach; and there are some that, adhering to the theory of philosophers, make inquiries conformably to them. There are now likewise some, that from other opinions, which do not deserve to be mentioned, elicite a certain dubitation; and others originate from the common conceptions of mankind. These things, therefore, are of themselves variously disposed, and are multiformly connected with each other. Hence, through all these causes, a certain discussion is requisite for the management of them in a becoming manner.
Is it because in us the governing and the answering principles are many and there is no sovereign unity? That condition; and, further, the fact that o...
(17) But how comes it that the intuitions and the Reason-Principles of the soul are not in the same timeless fashion within ourselves, but that here the later of order is converted into a later of time- bringing in all these doubts?
Is it because in us the governing and the answering principles are many and there is no sovereign unity?
That condition; and, further, the fact that our mental acts fall into a series according to the succession of our needs, being not self-determined but guided by the variations of the external: thus the will changes to meet every incident as each fresh need arises and as the external impinges in its successive things and events.
A variety of governing principles must mean variety in the images formed upon the representative faculty, images not issuing from one internal centre, but, by difference of origin and of acting- point, strange to each other, and so bringing compulsion to bear upon the movements and efficiencies of the self.
When the desiring faculty is stirred, there is a presentment of the object- a sort of sensation, in announcement and in picture, of the experience- calling us to follow and to attain: the personality, whether it resists or follows and procures, is necessarily thrown out of equilibrium. The same disturbance is caused by passion urging revenge and by the needs of the body; every other sensation or experience effects its own change upon our mental attitude; then there is the ignorance of what is good and the indecision of a soul thus pulled in every direction; and, again, the interaction of all these perplexities gives rise to yet others.
But do variations of judgement affect that very highest in us?
No: the doubt and the change of standard are of the Conjoint ; still, the right reason of that highest is weaker by being given over to inhabit this mingled mass: not that it sinks in its own nature: it is much as amid the tumult of a public meeting the best adviser speaks but fails to dominate; assent goes to the roughest of the brawlers and roarers, while the man of good counsel sits silent, ineffectual, overwhelmed by the uproar of his inferiors.
The lowest human type exhibits the baser nature; the man is a compost calling to mind inferior political organization: in the mid-type we have a citizenship in which some better section sways a demotic constitution not out of control: in the superior type the life is aristocratic; it is the career of one emancipated from what is a base in humanity and tractable to the better; in the finest type, where the man has brought himself to detachment, the ruler is one only, and from this master principle order is imposed upon the rest, so that we may think of a municipality in two sections, the superior city and, kept in hand by it, the city of the lower elements.
Of Skepticism as propounded by Pyrrho of Elis (365-275 B.C.) and by Timon, Sextus Empiricus said that those who seek must find or deny they have...
(33) Of Skepticism as propounded by Pyrrho of Elis (365-275 B.C.) and by Timon, Sextus Empiricus said that those who seek must find or deny they have found or can find, or persevere in the inquiry. Those who suppose they have found truth are called Dogmatists; those who think it incomprehensible are the Academics; those who still seek are the Skeptics. The attitude of Skepticism towards the knowable is summed up by Sextus Empiricus in the following words: "But the chief ground of Skepticism is that to every reason there is an opposite reason equivalent, which makes us forbear to dogmatize." The Skeptics were strongly opposed to the Dogmatists and were agnostic in that they held the accepted theories regarding Deity to be self-contradictory and undemonstrable. "How," asked the Skeptic, "can we have indubitate knowledge of God, knowing not His substance, form or place; for, while philosophers disagree irreconcilably on these points, their conclusions cannot be considered as undoubtedly true?" Since absolute knowledge was considered unattainable, the Skeptics declared the end of their discipline to be: "In opinionatives, indisturbance; in impulsives, moderation; and in disquietives, suspension."
Omitting, therefore, these things, we may reasonably adduce a second cause, assigned by you, of the above mentioned particulars: viz. “ that the soul...
(1) Omitting, therefore, these things, we may reasonably adduce a second cause, assigned by you, of the above mentioned particulars: viz. “ that the soul says and imagines these things, and that they are the passions of it, excited from small incentives .” Neither, however, does nature possess these passions, nor does reason admit them. For every thing which is generated is generated from a certain cause, and that which is of a kindred nature derives its completion from a kindred nature. But a divine work is neither casual, for a thing of this kind is without a cause, and is not entirely arranged, nor is it produced by a human cause. For this is a thing foreign and subordinate; but that which is more perfect cannot be produced from the imperfect. All works, therefore, which have a similitude to divinity germinate from a divine cause. For the human soul is contained by one form, and is on all sides darkened by body, which he who denominates the river of Negligence, or the water of Oblivion, or ignorance and delirium, or a bond through passions, or the privation of life, or some other evil, will not by such appellations sufficiently express its turpitude.
Let us, therefore, now discuss another species of doubts, the cause of which is occult, and which, as you say, is accompanied with “ violent threats...
(1) Let us, therefore, now discuss another species of doubts, the cause of which is occult, and which, as you say, is accompanied with “ violent threats .” But it is variously divided about the multitude of threats. “ For it threatens either to burst the heavens, or to unfold the secrets of Isis, or to point out the arcanum in the adytum, or to stop Baris, or to scatter the members of Osiris to Typhon, or to do something else of the like kind. ” Men do not, however, as you think, threaten by such words as these the sun or the moon, or any of the celestial Gods; for if they did, more dire absurdities would ensue than those which you lament. But, as we before observed, there is a certain genus of powers in the world which is partible, inconsiderate, and most irrational, and which receives reason from another, and is obedient to it; neither itself employing a proper intelligence, nor distinguishing what is true and false, or what is possible or impossible. A genus, therefore, of this kind, when threatenings are extended, is immediately coexcited and astonished, because, as it appears to me, it is naturally adapted to be led by representations, and to allure other things, through an astounded and unstable phantasy.
Instil many vain fancies into men's minds. But, on the contrary, 'tis his perverseness and want of faith The philosopher denies the existence of the...
(11) Instil many vain fancies into men's minds. But, on the contrary, 'tis his perverseness and want of faith The philosopher denies the existence of the Devil; At the same time he is the Devil's laughing-stock. If thou hast not seen the Devil, look at thyself, Without demon's aid how came that blue turban on thy brow? Whosoever has a doubt or disquietude in his heart Now and then he displays firm belief, Beware, O believers! That lurks in you too; All the seventy and two heresies lurk in you;
The barriers to interior consciousness, which drive the psychic nature this way and that, are these: sickness, inertia, doubt, lightmindedness,...
(30) The barriers to interior consciousness, which drive the psychic nature this way and that, are these: sickness, inertia, doubt, lightmindedness, laziness, intemperance, false notions, inability to reach a stage of meditation, or to hold it when reached.
There are many other contentious innovations also, which may be the subject of wonder. But some one may justly be astonished at the contrariety of...
(1) There are many other contentious innovations also, which may be the subject of wonder. But some one may justly be astonished at the contrariety of opinions produced by admitting either that the truth of divination is with enchanters, the whole of which subsists in mere appearances alone, but has no real existence; or that it is with those who are incited by passion or disease, since every thing which they have the boldness to utter is fraudulently asserted. For what principle of truth, or what auxiliary of intelligence, either smaller or greater, can there be in those who are thus insane? It is necessary, however, not to receive truth of such a kind as that which may be fortuitous; for this, it is said, may happen to those that are rashly borne along. Nor must such truth be admitted as that which subsists between agents and patients, when they are concordantly homologous with each other; for truth of this kind is present with the senses and imaginations of animals.
Hence you in vain doubt, “ that it is not proper to look to human opinions .” For what leisure can he have whose intellect is directed to the Gods to...
(1) Hence you in vain doubt, “ that it is not proper to look to human opinions .” For what leisure can he have whose intellect is directed to the Gods to look downward to the praises of men? Nor do you rightly doubt in what follows, viz. “ that the soul devises great things from casual circumstances .” For what principle of fictions can there be in truly existing beings? Is it not the phantastic power in us which is the maker of images? But the phantasy is never excited when the intellectual life energizes perfectly. And is not truth essentially coexistent with the Gods? Is it not, likewise, concordantly established in intelligibles? It is in vain, therefore, that things of this kind are disseminated by you and others. But neither do those things for which certain futile and arrogant men calumniate the worshipers of the Gods, the like to which have been asserted by you, at all pertain to true theology and theurgy. And if certain things of this kind germinate in the sciences of divine concerns, as in other arts evil arts blossom forth; these are doubtless more contrary to such sciences than to any thing else. For evil is more hostile to good than to that which is not good.
If a man is tossed about by doubts, full of strong passions, and yearning only for what is delightful, his thirst will grow more and more, and he...
(349) If a man is tossed about by doubts, full of strong passions, and yearning only for what is delightful, his thirst will grow more and more, and he will indeed make his fetters strong.
Why, therefore, does your assertion so much wander from the proposed hypothesis, as to decline from things primary and good to the last evils of...
(2) Why, therefore, does your assertion so much wander from the proposed hypothesis, as to decline from things primary and good to the last evils of insanity? For in what is enthusiasm similar to melancholy, or intoxication, or any other delirium excited by the body? Or what prediction can ever be produced from diseases of the body? Is not a derivation of this kind a perfect corruption, but divine inspiration the perfection and salvation of the soul? And does not depraved enthusiasm take place through imbecility, but the enthusiasm which is more excellent through a plenitude of power? In short, the latter being quiescent, according to its own proper life and intelligence, gives itself to be used by another [power which is superior to itself]; but the former, energizing according to its proper energies, renders these most depraved and turbulent. This, therefore, is a difference the most manifest of all others, because all the works of divine natures differ [in a transcendent degree] from the works of other beings.
If, however, it be necessary, dismissing these particulars, to speak what appears to me to be the truth, you do not rightly infer “ that a knowledge...
(1) If, however, it be necessary, dismissing these particulars, to speak what appears to me to be the truth, you do not rightly infer “ that a knowledge of this mathematical science cannot be obtained, because there is much dissonance concerning it, or because Chæremon, or some other, has written against it .” For if this reason were admitted, all things will be incomprehensible. For all sciences have ten thousand controvertists, and the doubts with which they are attended are innumerable. As, therefore, we are accustomed to say in opposition to the contentious, that contraries in things that are true are naturally discordant, and that it is not falsities alone that are hostile to each other; thus, also, we say respecting this mathematical science, that it is indeed true; but that those who wander from the scope of it, being ignorant of the truth, contradict it. This, however happens not in this science alone, but likewise in all the sciences, which are imparted by the Gods to men.
The greatest remedy, therefore, for all such doubts is this, to know the principle of divination, that it neither originates from bodies, nor from...
(2) The greatest remedy, therefore, for all such doubts is this, to know the principle of divination, that it neither originates from bodies, nor from the passions about bodies, nor from a certain nature, and the powers about nature, nor from any human apparatus, or the habits pertaining to it. But neither does it originate from a certain art, externally acquired, about a certain part of such things as are subservient to life. For the whole authority of it pertains to the Gods, and is imparted by them; it is also effected by divine works, or signs; and it possesses divine spectacles, and scientific theorems. All other things, however, are subjected as instruments to the gift of foreknowledge transmitted from the Gods; viz. such things as pertain to our soul and body, and such as are in the nature of the universe, or are inexistent in particular natures. But some things are previously subjacent, as in the order of matter, such as places, or certain other things of the like kind.
Let us, however, consider your arguments in support of this opinion. That “ the senses are occupied ,” therefore tends to the contrary to what you...
(2) Let us, however, consider your arguments in support of this opinion. That “ the senses are occupied ,” therefore tends to the contrary to what you say; for it is an indication that no human phantasm is then excited. But “ the fumigations which are introduced ,” have an alliance to divinity, but not to the soul of the spectator. And “ the invocations ” do not excite the inspiration of the reasoning power, or corporeal passions in the recipient; for they are perfectly unknown and arcane, and are alone known to the God whom they invoke. But that “ not all men, but those that are more simple and young are more adapted to divination ,” manifests that such as these are more prepared for the reception of the externally acceding and inspiring spirit. From these indications, however, you do not truly conjecture that enthusiasm is a passion. For it follows from these signs, that the influx of it, in the same manner as the inspiration, is externally derived. In this way, therefore, these things subsist.
From the agitation of doubt, and is firm in the faith. Till the foam has landed on the shore and dry land, Which is its home, it is ever tossed to...
(22) From the agitation of doubt, and is firm in the faith. Till the foam has landed on the shore and dry land, Which is its home, it is ever tossed to and fro. 'Tis at home on the land, but a stranger on the water. While it remains a stranger, it must be tossed about. When its eyes are opened, and it sees the vision of land, Although the ass repeated verities to the fox, He praised the water, but was not eager to drink; He rent his garments and his hair, but was no real lover. The excuse of a hypocrite is rejected, not approved,