Passages similar to: Aurora — Chapter 10: Of the Sixth qualifying or fountain Spirit in the Divine Power.
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Christian Mysticism
Aurora
Chapter 10: Of the Sixth qualifying or fountain Spirit in the Divine Power. (4)
But why one is called the first, another the second, and so on, that is in respect to that which is the first in order to the imaging, framing and forming of a creature.
Chapter IV: To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition. (9)
And when he has answered this, let him be again asked, what, in his view, the foetus means, whether that which is in the womb, or things already forme...
(9) But if he choose to reply, let him first be asked, To what thing he applies the name, animal. And when he has answered this, let him be again asked, what, in his view, the foetus means, whether that which is in the womb, or things already formed and living; and again, if the foetus means the seed deposited, or if it is only when members and a shape are formed that the name of embryos is to be applied. And on his replying to this, it is proper that the point in hand be reasoned out to a conclusion, in due order, and taught.
Against Those That Affirm the Creator of the Kosmos and the Kosmos Itself to Be Evil (12)
By memory of what it has seen? But it was utterly non-existent, it could have no vision, either it or the Mother they bestow upon it. Another difficul...
(12) And how does this image set to its task immediately after it comes into being?
By memory of what it has seen?
But it was utterly non-existent, it could have no vision, either it or the Mother they bestow upon it.
Another difficulty: These people come upon earth not as Soul-Images but as veritable Souls; yet, by great stress and strain, one or two of them are able to stir beyond the limits of the world, and when they do attain Reminiscence barely carry with them some slight recollection of the Sphere they once knew: on the other hand, this Image, a new-comer into being, is able, they tell us- as also is its Mother- to form at least some dim representation of the celestial world. It is an Image, stamped in Matter, yet it not merely has the conception of the Supreme and adopts from that world the plan of this, but knows what elements serve the purpose. How, for instance, did it come to make fire before anything else? What made it judge fire a better first than some other object?
Again, if it created the fire of the Universe by thinking of fire, why did it not make the Universe at a stroke by thinking of the Universe? It must have conceived the product complete from the first; the constituent elements would be embraced in that general conception.
The creation must have been in all respects more according to the way of Nature than to that of the arts- for the arts are of later origin than Nature and the Universe, and even at the present stage the partial things brought into being by the natural Kinds do not follow any such order- first fire, then the several other elements, then the various blends of these- on the contrary the living organism entire is encompassed and rounded off within the uterine germ. Why should not the material of the Universe be similarly embraced in a Kosmic Type in which earth, fire and the rest would be included? We can only suppose that these people themselves, acting by their more authentic Soul, would have produced the world by such a process, but that the Creator had not wit to do so.
And yet to conceive the vast span of the Heavens- to be great in that degree- to devise the obliquity of the Zodiac and the circling path of all the celestial bodies beneath it, and this earth of ours- and all in such a way that reason can be given for the plan- this could never be the work of an Image; it tells of that Power next to the very Highest Beings.
Against their will, they themselves admit this: their "outshining upon the darkness," if the doctrine is sifted, makes it impossible to deny the true origins of the Kosmos.
Why should this down-shining take place unless such a process belonged to a universal law?
Either the process is in the order of Nature or against that order. If it is in the nature of things, it must have taken place from eternity; if it is against the nature of things, then the breach of natural right exists in the Supreme also; evil antedates this world; the cause of evil is not the world; on the contrary the Supreme is the evil to us; instead of the Soul's harm coming from this sphere, we have this Sphere harmed by the Soul.
In fine, the theory amounts to making the world one of the Primals, and with it the Matter from which it emerges.
The Soul that declined, they tell us, saw and illuminated the already existent Darkness. Now whence came that Darkness?
If they tell us that the Soul created the Darkness by its Decline, then, obviously, there was nowhere for the Soul to decline to; the cause of the decline was not the Darkness but the very nature of the Soul. The theory, therefore, refers the entire process to pre-existing compulsions: the guilt inheres in the Primal Beings.
Chapter IV: To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition. (14)
And then the name animal was reduced to definition, for the sake of perspicuity. But having discovered that it is distinguished from what is not an an...
(14) But the question was, whether the embryo is already an animal, or still a plant. And then the name animal was reduced to definition, for the sake of perspicuity. But having discovered that it is distinguished from what is not an animal by sensation and motion from appetency; we again separated this from its adjuncts; asserting that it was one thing for that to be such potentially, which is not yet possessed of the power of sensation and motion, but will some time be so, and another thing to be already so actually; and in the case of such, it is one thing to exert its powers, another to be able to exert them, but to be at rest or asleep. And this is the question.
Accordingly we must first take the genus, in which are the points that are nearest those above; and after this the next difference. And the...
(9) Accordingly we must first take the genus, in which are the points that are nearest those above; and after this the next difference. And the succession of differences, when cut and divided, completes the "What it is." There is no necessity for expressing all the differences of each thing, but those which form the species.
Chapter VIII: The Method of Classifying Things and Names. (6)
Equivocal terms have the same name, but not the same definition, as man -both the animal and the picture. Of Equivocal terms, some receive their...
(6) Equivocal terms have the same name, but not the same definition, as man -both the animal and the picture. Of Equivocal terms, some receive their Equivocal name fortuitously, as Ajax, the Locrian, and the Salaminian; and some from intention; and of these, some from resemblance, as man both the living and the painted; and some from analogy, as the foot of Mount Ida, and our foot, because they are beneath; some from action, as the foot of a vessel, by which the vessel soils, and our foot, by which we move. Equivocal terms are designated from the same and to the same; as the book and scalpel are called surgical, both from the surgeon who uses them and with reference to the surgical matter itself.
How the Secondaries Rise From the First: and on the One (1)
Anything existing after The First must necessarily arise from that First, whether immediately or as tracing back to it through intervenients; there...
(1) Anything existing after The First must necessarily arise from that First, whether immediately or as tracing back to it through intervenients; there must be an order of secondaries and tertiaries, in which any second is to be referred to The First, any third to the second.
Standing before all things, there must exist a Simplex, differing from all its sequel, self-gathered not inter-blended with the forms that rise from it, and yet able in some mode of its own to be present to those others: it must be authentically a unity, not merely something elaborated into unity and so in reality no more than unity's counterfeit; it will debar all telling and knowing except that it may be described as transcending Being- for if there were nothing outside all alliance and compromise, nothing authentically one, there would be no Source. Untouched by multiplicity, it will be wholly self-sufficing, an absolute First, whereas any not-first demands its earlier, and any non-simplex needs the simplicities within itself as the very foundations of its composite existence.
There can be only one such being: if there were another, the two would resolve into one, for we are not dealing with two corporal entities.
Our One-First is not a body: a body is not simplex and, as a thing of process cannot be a First, the Source cannot be a thing of generation: only a principle outside of body, and utterly untouched by multiplicity, could be The First.
Any unity, then, later than The First must be no longer simplex; it can be no more than a unity in diversity.
Whence must such a sequent arise?
It must be an offspring of The First; for suppose it the product of chance, that First ceases to be the Principle of All.
But how does it arise from The First?
If The First is perfect, utterly perfect above all, and is the beginning of all power, it must be the most powerful of all that is, and all other powers must act in some partial imitation of it. Now other beings, coming to perfection, are observed to generate; they are unable to remain self-closed; they produce: and this is true not merely of beings endowed with will, but of growing things where there is no will; even lifeless objects impart something of themselves, as far as they may; fire warms, snow chills, drugs have their own outgoing efficacy; all things to the utmost of their power imitate the Source in some operation tending to eternity and to service.
How then could the most perfect remain self-set- the First Good, the Power towards all, how could it grudge or be powerless to give of itself, and how at that would it still be the Source?
If things other than itself are to exist, things dependent upon it for their reality, it must produce since there is no other source. And further this engendering principle must be the very highest in worth; and its immediate offspring, its secondary, must be the best of all that follows.
'Of all living things there are indeed three origins only , that which springs from an egg (oviparous), that which springs from a living being...
(1) 'Of all living things there are indeed three origins only , that which springs from an egg (oviparous), that which springs from a living being (viviparous), and that which springs from a germ.
Chapter IV: To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition. (15)
But in the case of all conclusions alleged to be found out, demonstration is applied in common, which is discourse (logos), establishing one thing fro...
(15) For the embryo is not to be called an animal from the fact that it is nourished; which is the allegation of those who turn aside from the essence of the question, and apply their minds to what happens otherwise. But in the case of all conclusions alleged to be found out, demonstration is applied in common, which is discourse (logos), establishing one thing from others. But the grounds from which the point in question is to be established, must be admitted and known by the learner. And the foundation of all these is what is evident to sense and to intellect.
Another method of division is possible: substances may be classed as hot-dry, dry-cold, cold-moist, or however we choose to make the coupling. We may...
(10) Another method of division is possible: substances may be classed as hot-dry, dry-cold, cold-moist, or however we choose to make the coupling. We may then proceed to the combination and blending of these couples, either halting at that point and going no further than the compound, or else subdividing by habitation- on the earth, in the earth- or by form and by the differences exhibited by living beings, not qua living, but in their bodies viewed as instruments of life.
Differentiation by form or shape is no more out of place than a division based on qualities- heat, cold and the like. If it be objected that qualities go to make bodies what they are, then, we reply, so do blendings, colours, shapes. Since our discussion is concerned with Sensible Substance, it is not strange that it should turn upon distinctions related to sense-perception: this Substance is not Being pure and simple, but the Sensible Being which we call the Universe.
We have remarked that its apparent subsistence is in fact an assemblage of Sensibles, their existence guaranteed to us by sense-perception. But since their combination is unlimited, our division must be guided by the Form-Ideas of living beings, as for example the Form-Idea of Man implanted in Body; the particular Form acts as a qualification of Body, but there is nothing unreasonable in using qualities as a basis of division.
We may be told that we have distinguished between simple and composite bodies, even ranking them as opposites. But our distinction, we reply, was between material and organic bodies and raised no question of the composite. In fact, there exists no means of opposing the composite to the simple; it is necessary to determine the simples in the first stage of division, and then, combining them on the basis of a distinct underlying principle, to differentiate the composites in virtue of their places and shapes, distinguishing for example the heavenly from the earthly.
These observations will suffice for the Being , or rather the Becoming, which obtains in the Sensible realm.
Chapter IV: To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition. (2)
Such, then, is the method of the discovery [of truth]. For we must begin with the knowledge of the questions to be discussed. For often the form of...
(2) Such, then, is the method of the discovery [of truth]. For we must begin with the knowledge of the questions to be discussed. For often the form of the expression deceives and confuses and disturbs the mind, so that it is not easy to discover to what class the thing is to be referred; as, for example, whether the foetus be an animal. For, having a conception of an animal and a foetus, we inquire if it be the case that the foetus is an animal; that is, if the substance which is in the foetal state possesses the power of motion, and of sensation besides. So that the inquiry is regarding functions and sensations in a substance previously known. Consequently the man who proposes the question is to be first asked, what he calls an animal. Especially is this to be done whenever we find the same term applied to various purposes; and we must examine whether what is signified by the term is disputed, or admitted by all. For were one to say that he calls whatever grows and is fed an animal, we shall have again to ask further, whether he considered plants to be animals; and then, after declaring himself to this effect, he must show what it is which is in the foetal state, and is nourished.
In nearly all the sacred books of the world can be traced an anatomical analogy. This is most evident in their creation myths. Anyone familiar with...
(7) In nearly all the sacred books of the world can be traced an anatomical analogy. This is most evident in their creation myths. Anyone familiar with embryology and obstetrics will have no difficulty in recognizing the basis of the allegory concerning Adam and Eve and the Garden of Eden, the nine degrees of the Eleusinian Mysteries, and the Brahmanic legend of Vishnu's incarnations. The story of the Universal Egg, the Scandinavian myth of Ginnungagap (the dark cleft in space in which the seed of the world is sown), and the use of the fish as the emblem of the paternal generative power--all show the true origin of theological speculation. The philosophers of antiquity realized that man himself was the key to the riddle of life, for he was the living image of the Divine Plan, and in future ages humanity also will come to realize more fully the solemn import of those ancient words: "The proper study of mankind is man."
Chapter VIII: The Method of Classifying Things and Names. (5)
For those are Univocal terms, to both of which belongs the common name, animal; and the same principle, that is definition, that is animate essence. A...
(5) And, again, of the things contained under these ten Categories, some are Univocal, as ox and man, as far as each is an animal. For those are Univocal terms, to both of which belongs the common name, animal; and the same principle, that is definition, that is animate essence. And Heteronyms are those which relate to the same subject under different names, as ascent or descent; for the way is the same whether upwards or downwards. And the other species of Heteronyms, as horse and black, are those which have a different name and definition from each other, and do not possess the same subject. But they are to be called different, not Heteronyms. And Polyonyms are those which have the same definition, but a different name, as, hanger, sword, scimitar. And Paronyms are those which are named from something different, as "manly" from "manliness."
Our first observations must be directed to what passes in the Sensible realm for Substance. It is, we shall agree, only by analogy that the nature...
(2) Our first observations must be directed to what passes in the Sensible realm for Substance. It is, we shall agree, only by analogy that the nature manifested in bodies is designated as Substance, and by no means because such terms as Substance or Being tally with the notion of bodies in flux; the proper term would be Becoming.
But Becoming is not a uniform nature; bodies comprise under the single head simples and composites, together with accidentals or consequents, these last themselves capable of separate classification.
Alternatively, Becoming may be divided into Matter and the Form imposed upon Matter. These may be regarded each as a separate genus, or else both may be brought under a single category and receive alike the name of Substance.
But what, we may ask, have Matter and Form in common? In what sense can Matter be conceived as a genus, and what will be its species? What is the differentia of Matter? In which genus, Matter or Form, are we to rank the composite of both? It may be this very composite which constitutes the Substance manifested in bodies, neither of the components by itself answering to the conception of Body: how, then, can we rank them in one and the same genus as the composite? How can the elements of a thing be brought within the same genus as the thing itself? Yet if we begin with bodies, our first-principles will be compounds.
Why not resort to analogy? Admitted that the classification of the Sensible cannot proceed along the identical lines marked out for the Intellectual: is there any reason why we should not for Intellectual-Being substitute Matter, and for Intellectual Motion substitute Sensible Form, which is in a sense the life and consummation of Matter? The inertia of Matter would correspond with Stability, while the Identity and Difference of the Intellectual would find their counterparts in the similarity and diversity which obtain in the Sensible realm.
But, in the first place, Matter does not possess or acquire Form as its life or its Act; Form enters it from without, and remains foreign to its nature. Secondly, Form in the Intellectual is an Act and a motion; in the Sensible Motion is different from Form and accidental to it: Form in relation to Matter approximates rather to Stability than to Motion; for by determining Matter's indetermination it confers upon it a sort of repose.
In the higher realm Identity and Difference presuppose a unity at once identical and different: a thing in the lower is different only by participation in Difference and in relation to some other thing; Identity and Difference are here predicated of the particular, which is not, as in that realm, a posterior.
As for Stability, how can it belong to Matter, which is distorted into every variety of mass, receiving its forms from without, and even with the aid of these forms incapable of offspring.
This mode of division must accordingly be abandoned.
Chapter VI: Definitions, Genera, and Species. (12)
For, after dividing "the animal" into mortal and immortal, then into terrestrial and aquatic; and the terrestrial again into those who fly and those w...
(12) For, after dividing "the animal" into mortal and immortal, then into terrestrial and aquatic; and the terrestrial again into those who fly and those who walk; and so dividing the species which is nearest to what is sought, which also contains what is sought, we arrive by division at the simplest species, which contains nothing else, but what is sought alone.
Yaldabaoth said to the authorities with him, Come, let us create a human being after the image of god and with a likeness to ourselves, so that this...
Yaldabaoth said to the authorities with him, Come, let us create a human being after the image of god and with a likeness to ourselves, so that this human image may give us light. They created through their respective powers, according to the features that were given to them. Each of the authorities contributed a psychical feature corresponding to the figure of the image they had seen. They created a being like the perfect first human and said, Let us call it Adam, that its name may give us power of light. The powers began to create: The first one, goodness, created a soul of bone. The second, forethought, created a soul of sinew. The third, divinity, created a soul of flesh. The fourth, lordship, created a soul of marrow. The fifth, kingdom, created a soul of blood. The sixth, jealousy, created a soul of skin. The seventh, understanding, created a soul of hair. The throng of angels stood by and received these seven psychical substances from the authorities in order to create a network of limbs and trunk, with all the parts properly arranged. The first one, who is Raphao, began by creating the head, Abron created the skull, Meniggesstroeth created the brain, Asterechme the right eye, Thaspomocha the left eye, Yeronumos the right ear, Bissoum the left ear, Akioreim the nose, Banen-Ephroum the lips, Amen the teeth, Ibikan the molars, Basiliademe the tonsils, Achcha the uvula, Adaban the neck, Chaaman the vertebrae, Dearcho the throat, Tebar the right shoulder, N——the left shoulder, Mniarchon the right elbow, ——e the left elbow, Abitrion the right underarm, Euanthen the left underarm, Krus the right hand, Beluai the left hand, Treneu the fingers of the right hand, Balbel the fingers of the left hand, Krima the fingernails, Astrops the right breast, Barroph the left breast, Baoum the right shoulder joint, Ararim the left shoulder joint, Areche the belly, Phthaue the navel, Senaphim the abdomen, Arachethopi the right ribs, Zabedo the left ribs, Barias the right hip, Phnouth the left hip, Abenlenarchei the marrow, Chnoumeninorin the bones, Gesole the stomach, Agromauma the heart, Bano the lungs, Sostrapal the liver, Anesimalar the spleen, Thopithro the intestines, Biblo the kidneys, Roeror the sinews, Taphreo the backbone, Ipouspoboba the veins, Bineborin the arteries, Aatoimenpsephei the breaths in all the limbs, Entholleia all the flesh, Bedouk the right buttock, Arabeei the left buttock, . . . the penis, Eilo the testicles, Sorma the genitals, Gormakaiochlabar the right thigh, Nebrith the left thigh, Pserem the muscles of the right leg, Asaklas the muscle of the left, Ormaoth the right leg, Emenun the left leg, Knux the right shin, Tupelon the left shin, Achiel the right ankle, Phneme the left ankle, Phiouthrom the right foot, Boabel its toes, Trachoun the left foot, Phikna its toes, Miamai the toenails, Labernioum. . . . Those who are appointed over all these are seven in number: Athoth, Armas, Kalila, Yabel, Sabaoth, Cain, Abel. Those who activate the limbs are, part by part: the head, Diolimodraza, the neck, Yammeax, the right shoulder, Yakouib, the left shoulder, Ouerton, the right hand, Oudidi, the left one, Arbao, the fingers of the right hand, Lampno, the fingers of the left hand, Leekaphar, the right breast, Barbar, the left breast, Imae, the chest, Pisandraptes, the right shoulder joint, Koade, the left shoulder joint, Odeor, the right ribs, Asphixix, the left ribs, Sunogchouta, the abdomen, Arouph, the womb, Sabalo, the right thigh, Charcharb, the left thigh, Chthaon, all the genitals, Bathinoth, the right leg, Choux, the left leg, Charcha, the right shin, Aroer, the left shin, Toechtha, the right ankle, Aol, the left ankle, Charaner, the right foot, Bastan, its toes, Archentechtha, the left foot, Marephnounth, its toes, Abrana. Seven have been empowered over all these: Michael, Uriel, Asmenedas, Saphasatoel, Aarmouriam, Richram, Amiorps. Those who are over the senses are Archendekta, the one who is over perception is Deitharbathas, the one who is over imagination is Oummaa, the one who is over arrangement is Aachiaram, the one who is over all impulse to action is Riaramnacho. The source of the demons that are in the entire body is divided into four: heat, cold, wetness, dryness. The mother of them all is matter. The one who is lord over heat is Phloxopha, the one who is lord over cold is Oroorrothos, the one who is lord over what is dry is Erimacho, the one who is lord over wetness is Athuro. The mother of all these, Onorthochras, stands in the midst of them, for she is unlimited and mingles with them all. She is matter, and by her they are nourished. The four principal demons are: Ephememphi, the demon of pleasure, Yoko, the demon of desire, Nenentophni, the demon of grief, Blaomen, the demon of fear. The mother of them all is Esthesis-Ouch-Epi-Ptoe. From the four demons have come passions: From grief come jealousy, envy, pain, trouble, distress, hardheartedness, anxiety, sorrow, and others. From pleasure comes an abundance of evil, vain conceit, and the like. From desire come anger, wrath, bitterness, intense lust, greed, and the like. From fear come terror, servility, anguish, and shame. All these are like virtues and vices. The insight into their true nature is Anaro, who is head of the material soul, and it dwells with Esthesis-Z-Ouch-Epi-Ptoe. This is the number of angels. In all they number 365. They all worked together until, limb by limb, the psychical and material body was completed. Now, there are others over the remaining passions, and I have not told you about them. If you want to know about them, the information is recorded in the Book of Zoroaster.
And we must suppose that the difference of the manifold shapes of Almighty God, during the multiform visions, signifies that certain things are differ...
(5) But the different, since Almighty God is present to all providentially, and becomes all in all, for the sake of the preservation of all, resting upon Himself, and His own identity within Himself, standing, as beseems an energy, one and ceaseless, and imparting Himself with an unbending power, for deification of those turned to Him. And we must suppose that the difference of the manifold shapes of Almighty God, during the multiform visions, signifies that certain things are different from the phenomena under which they appear. For, as when language depicts the soul itself, under a bodily form, and fashions bodily members around the memberless, we think differently of the members attributed to it, as befits the soul's memberless condition; and we call the mind head, and opinion neck,--as intermediate between rational and irrational--and anger, breast; and lust, belly; and the constitution, legs and feet; using the names of the members as symbols of the powers. Much more then, as respects Him, Who is beyond all, is it necessary to make clear the difference of forms and shapes by reverent and God-becoming, and mystic explanations. And if you wish to apply the threefold shapes of bodies to the impalpable and shapeless God, you must say, that the Progression of Almighty God, which spreads out to all things, is a Divine extension; and length, the power extending itself over the whole; and depth, the hiddenness and imperception incomprehensible to all creatures. But, that we may not forget ourselves, in our explanation, of the different shapes and forms, by confounding the incorporeal Divine Names with those given through symbols of objects of sense, we have for this reason spoken concerning these things in the Symbolic Theology. But now, let us suppose the Divine difference, as really not a sort of change from the super-immovable identity, but as the single multiplication of itself, and the uniform progressions of its fecundity to all.
Ra: The answer is to redirect your thought processes from any mechanical view of evolution. The will of the Logos posits the potentials available to the evolving entity.…
Next in the rising scale of animal life we find the Amoeba. This creature also is a one-celled animal. It progresses by a continuous projection of...
(35) Next in the rising scale of animal life we find the Amoeba. This creature also is a one-celled animal. It progresses by a continuous projection of "false feet" and a subsequent drawing-in of the same, which gives it the appearance of a many-fingered, or many-footed thing. This creature has the beginning of "parts" and "organs." In the first place it has a "nucleus" at its centre, and also an expanding and contracting cavity within itself which it uses for holding, digesting, and distributing its food—a rudimentary stomach, so to speak. It also has something like a "skin" on its surface, and it cannot be turned "inside out" like its brother the Moneron without disturbing its life.
Now that is all very well as long as the two souls stand apart; but, when they are at one in us, what becomes of the two faculties, and in which of th...
(31) But if each of the two phases of the soul, as we have said, possesses memory, and memory is vested in the imaging faculty, there must be two such faculties. Now that is all very well as long as the two souls stand apart; but, when they are at one in us, what becomes of the two faculties, and in which of them is the imaging faculty vested?
If each soul has its own imaging faculty the images must in all cases be duplicated, since we cannot think that one faculty deals only with intellectual objects, and the other with objects of sense, a distinction which inevitably implies the co-existence in man of two life-principles utterly unrelated.
And if both orders of image act upon both orders of soul, what difference is there in the souls; and how does the fact escape our knowledge?
The answer is that, when the two souls chime each with each, the two imaging faculties no longer stand apart; the union is dominated by the more powerful of the faculties of the soul, and thus the image perceived is as one: the less powerful is like a shadow attending upon the dominant, like a minor light merging into a greater: when they are in conflict, in discord, the minor is distinctly apart, a self-standing thing- though its isolation is not perceived, for the simple reason that the separate being of the two souls escapes observation.
The two have run into a unity in which, yet, one is the loftier: this loftier knows all; when it breaks from the union, it retains some of the experiences of its companion, but dismisses others; thus we accept the talk of our less valued associates, but, on a change of company, we remember little from the first set and more from those in whom we recognize a higher quality.