(1) Subverting, therefore, in this manner the common absurd opinions concerning sacrifices, we shall introduce in their place true conceptions about them; omitting the particular discussion of each species of sacrifice, which the peculiar and distinct consideration of sacrifices requires, because this pertains to another inquiry, and because, at the same time, every one who is intelligent may be able to accomplish this from what has been already said, and from one thing may extend his reasoning power to many, and may easily know what is omitted from what has been discussed. And I, indeed, think that these things have been sufficiently explained, both in other respects and because the explanation pays attention in a becoming manner to the purity of the Gods. Because, however, it may perhaps appear to others to be incredible, and not sufficiently manifest, and the veracity of it may be suspected, as not exciting the discursive energy of reason, I wish to consider these things a little more fully; and, if possible, to add arguments more evident than those which have been adduced.

(12) (But Ahura will speak His rebuke, for) as to those doctrines which (such) men may be (basely) delivering (repelled) by the holiest action, (and galled by its sacred truth) God hath said: Evil (are they! Yea, unto these He hath said it) who have slain the Kine's life by a blessing (and have cursed her while they offered to help her ), men by whom Grehmas are loved above Righteousness, and the Karpans, and the Throne of those who have wished for the Demon of lies (as their deity and friend ).

(1) What people call sacrifice (yagña), that is really abstinence (brahmakarya). For he who knows, obtains that (world of Brahman, which others obtain by sacrifice), by means of abstinence. What people call sacrifice (ishta), that is really abstinence, for by abstinence, having searched (ishtvâ), he obtains the Self.

(4) We say, then, that it is characteristic of the same persons to vilify philosophy, and run down faith, and to praise iniquity and felicitate a libidinous life. But now faith, if it is the voluntary assent of the soul, is still the doer of good things, the foundation of right conduct; and if Aristotle defines strictly when he teaches that poiein is applied to the irrational creatures and to inanimate things, while prattein is applicable to men only, let him correct those who say that God is the maker (poihths) of the universe. And what is done (prakton), he says, is as good or as necessary. To do wrong, then, is not good, for no one does wrong except for some other thing; and nothing that is necessary is voluntary. To do wrong, then, is voluntary, so that it is not necessary. But the good differ especially from the bad in inclinations and good desires. For all depravity of soul is accompanied with want of restraint; and he who acts from passion, acts from want of restraint and from depravity.

(1) In order, therefore, that from an abundance of arguments we may contend against the objection which is now adduced, we will grant, if you please, the contrary to what we have asserted, viz. that certain unjust things are performed in this business of invocations. That the Gods, however, are not to be accused as the causes of these is immediately manifest. For those that are good are the causes of good; and the Gods possess good essentially. They do nothing, therefore, that is unjust. Hence other causes of guilty deeds must be investigated. And if we are not able to discover these causes, it is not proper to throw away the true conception respecting the Gods, nor on account of the doubts whether these unjust deeds are performed, and how they are effected, to depart from notions concerning the Gods which are truly clear. For it is much better to acknowledge the insufficiency of our power to explain how unjust actions are perpetrated, than to admit any thing impossible and false respecting the Gods; since all the Greeks and Barbarians truly opine the contrary to be the case with divine natures. After this manner, therefore, the truth respecting these particulars subsists.

(1) Now the sacrifice which is acceptable to God is unswerving abstraction from the body and its passions. This is the really true piety. And is not, on this account, philosophy rightly called by Socrates the practice of Death? For he who neither employs his eyes in the exercise of thought, nor draws aught from his other senses, but with pure mind itself applies to objects, practises the true philosophy. This is, then, the import of the silence of five years prescribed by Pythagoras, which he enjoined on his disciples; that, abstracting themselves from the objects of sense, they might with the mind alone contemplate the Deity.

(1) But the greatest thing in sacrifices, viz. their efficacious power, and why especially they are so very beneficial that without them we are neither liberated from pestilence, nor famine, nor sterility of fruits, nor obtain seasonable showers of rain, nor things of much greater consequence than these, I mean such as contribute to the purification of the soul, or an emancipation from generation; these are not at all indicated by such modes of sacrifices as you adduce. Hence no one can justly approve of them, because they assign a cause of the works performed in sacrifices unadapted to their dignity. And if some one should approve of them it will be only in a secondary way, and as suspended from primary, more ancient, and venerable causes.

(2) Yea, (he will act with justice but with vengeance, for) he who does evil to the wicked by word, or with thought (and plan), and (who therein does not dally, but toils labouring as) with both the hands, or he (again) who admonishes one for his good , such as these are offering (a gift) to their religious faith in the love (and with the approving view) of Ahura Mazda ; (they are offering to conscience.)

(6) The Perfections, Charity, and the rest, are of an ascending order of excellence; he will not forsake a more excellent for another, save in respect of the dyke of virtue. Thus minded, he will be always active for the welfare of others; even a forbidden deed is permitted to him in his kindliness, if he foresees a good result. He will give of his alms to the fallen, the masterless, and the religious, and eat himself but a moderate portion; he will surrender everything but his three robes. He will not for slight purpose afflict his body, which is in the service of the Good Law; for thus it will speedily fulfil the desires of living beings. And therefore he will not cast away his life for one whose spirit of mercy is impure, but only for one whose spirit is like his own; and thus naught is lost....

(1) We shall collect, therefore, what happens from these conclusions. For if certain invocators employ the physical or corporeal powers of the universe, an involuntary gift of energy [from these powers], and which is without vice, takes place. He, likewise, who uses this gift [sometimes] perverts it to things of a contrary nature, and to base purposes. And the gift, indeed, is moved contrarily together with the passions, and sympathetically through similitude; but he who uses the thing which is imparted, deliberately draws it, contrary to justice, to what is evil and base. And the gift, indeed, causes things which are most remote to cooperate through the one harmony of the world. But if some one understanding this to be the case should iniquitously endeavour to draw certain portions of the universe to other parts, these parts are not the cause of the evil that ensues; but the audacity of men, and the transgression of the order in the world, pervert things that are beautiful and legal. Hence neither do the Gods effect what appears to be base, but this is accomplished by the natures and bodies that proceed from them; nor do these very natures and bodies impart improbity from themselves, as it is thought they do; but they send their proper effluxions to places about the earth, for the salvation of wholes, and those who receive them transmute them by their commixture and perversion, and transfer what is given to a purpose different from that for which it was imparted. From all these particulars, therefore, it is demonstrated that a divine nature is not the cause of evils and unjust deeds.

(14) The use of all animals as food is indifferent, but it is more rational to abstain from them.

God is not the author of any evil.