Passages similar to: The Six Enneads — Problems of the Soul (2)
Source passage
Neoplatonic
The Six Enneads
Problems of the Soul (2) (37)
We must not rob the universe of any factor in its being. If any of our theorists of to-day seek to explain the action of fire- or of any other such form, thought of as an agent- they will find themselves in difficulties unless they recognize the act to be the object's function in the All, and give a like explanation of other natural forces in common use. We do not habitually examine or in any way question the normal: we set to doubting and working out identifications when we are confronted by any display of power outside everyday experience: we wonder at a novelty and we wonder at the customary when anyone brings forward some single object and explains to our ignorance the efficacy vested in it. Some such power, not necessarily accompanied by reason, every single item possesses; for each has been brought into being and into shape within a universe; each in its kind has partaken of soul through the medium of the ensouled All, as being embraced by that definitely constituted thing: each then is a member of an animate being which can include nothing that is less than a full member - though one thing is of mightier efficacy than another, and, especially members of the heavenly system than the objects of earth, since they draw upon a purer nature- and these powers are widely productive. But productivity does not comport intention in what appears to be the source of the thing accomplished: there is efficacy, too, where there is no will: even attention is not necessary to the communication of power; the very transmission of soul may proceed without either. A living being, we know, may spring from another without any intention, and as without loss so without consciousness in the begetter: in fact any intention the animal exercised could be a cause of propagation only on condition of being identical with the animal And, if intention is unnecessary to the propagation of life, much more so is attention.
We may, however, beginning from another hypothesis, demonstrate the same thing. We must admit that the corporeal parts of the universe are neither...
(1) We may, however, beginning from another hypothesis, demonstrate the same thing. We must admit that the corporeal parts of the universe are neither sluggish nor destitute of power, but as much as they excel our concerns in perfection, beauty, and magnitude, by so much also is the power which is present with them greater. Each, likewise, by itself is capable of effecting different things, and produces certain different energies. They are also capable of effecting things much more numerous on each other. And besides this, a certain multiform production extends to parts from wholes; partly from sympathy, through similitude of powers, and partly from the aptitude of the agent to the patient. If, therefore, certain evils and destructions happen to parts, they are salutary and good as with reference to wholes and the harmony of the universe, but to parts they introduce a necessary corruption, either from not being able to bear the energies of wholes, or from a certain other commixture and temperament of their own imbecility, or, in the third place, from the privation of symmetry in the parts to each other.
"Therefore, since neither all things are produced fortuitously, or by the unguided mechanism of matter, nor God himself may be reasonably thought to...
(8) "Therefore, since neither all things are produced fortuitously, or by the unguided mechanism of matter, nor God himself may be reasonably thought to do all things immediately and miraculously, it may well be concluded that there is a Plastic Nature under him, which, as an inferior end subordinate instrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence which consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter; yet so as there is also besides this a higher providence to be acknowledged, which, presiding over it, doth often supply the defects of it, and sometimes overrules it, forasmuch as the Plastic Nature cannot act electively nor with discretion." Other schools of philosophy, notably that founded by Schopenhauer, have postulated the presence of a Universal Spirit (whose chief attribute is Desire-Will) from whom the universe of creatures has proceeded. This Universal Spirit is held to be filled with a longing, craving, seeking, striving desire to express itself in phenomenal existence. Schopenhauer calls it "The Will to Live." It is described as instinctive rather than intellectual, and as creating intellect with which to better serve its purposes of self-expression. Other philosophers have proceeded along the main lines of the concept of Schopenhauer, with various modifications. The same idea is expressed by some of the old Buddhistic philosophers, the very term "The Will-to-Live" being used to express the essential nature of the Universal Spirit. But, it must be noted, in such philosophies the Universal Spirit is considered rather as the Eternal Parent than as its First Manifestation. In the same way a certain school of thinkers postulate the existence of a "Living Nature," which expresses itself in innumerable living creatures and things—all Things in the universe being held to possess Life in some form and degree, as, indeed, the Rosicrucian creatures also hold.
We, however, admit all these assertions; physical essences, indeed, being coexcited as in one animal, according to aptitude or sympathy, as in...
(1) We, however, admit all these assertions; physical essences, indeed, being coexcited as in one animal, according to aptitude or sympathy, as in another respect being subjects, and following and being subservient to the cause of the efficacy of sacrifices; but dæmons, and terrene or mundane divine powers, being primarily familiarized to our order; nevertheless, we must say, that the most perfect and leading cause of the efficacy of sacrifices is to be conjoined to demiurgic and the most perfect powers. But since these comprehend in themselves all the causes of sacrifice, we say that all the effective causes of it are at once coexcited together with these. And from all these a common utility is imparted to the whole of generation; sometimes through cities and people, or all various nations, or circumscriptions more or less extended than these; but at other times through houses, or an individual, these causes impart good with an unenvying and exuberant will, unaccompanied with passion; conferring their benefits with an impassive intellect, according to adaptation and alliance; one friendship at the same time which connectedly contains all things, producing this bond through a certain ineffable communion.
The discussion therefore requires that we should show what it is through which sacrifices are effective of things, and are suspended from the Gods,...
(1) The discussion therefore requires that we should show what it is through which sacrifices are effective of things, and are suspended from the Gods, the precedaneous causes of effects. If then we say that the communion of similar powers, or the dissension of contraries, or a certain aptitude of the agent to the patient in the universe, as in one animal, every where possessing one and the same life, coexcites adapted similars, pervading with invariable sameness according to one sympathy, and existing most near in things most remote: if we should say this, we should thus assert something of what is true, and which necessarily accompanies sacrifices, yet we should not demonstrate the true mode of their subsistence. For the essence of the Gods is not placed in nature and in physical necessities, so as to be coexcited by physical passions, or by the powers which extend through all nature; but independently of these, it is defined by itself, having nothing in common with them, neither according to essence, nor according to power, nor any thing else.