Passages similar to: The Six Enneads — On Free-will and the Will of the One
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Neoplatonic
The Six Enneads
On Free-will and the Will of the One (1)
Can there be question as to whether the gods have voluntary action? Or are we to take it that, while we may well enquire in the case of men with their combination of powerlessness and hesitating power, the gods must be declared omnipotent, not merely some things but all lying at their nod? Or is power entire, freedom of action in all things, to be reserved to one alone, of the rest some being powerful, others powerless, others again a blend of power and impotence? All this must come to the test: we must dare it even of the Firsts and of the All-Transcendent and, if we find omnipotence possible, work out how far freedom extends. The very notion of power must be scrutinized lest in this ascription we be really making power identical with Essential Act, and even with Act not yet achieved. But for the moment we may pass over these questions to deal with the traditional problem of freedom of action in ourselves. To begin with, what must be intended when we assert that something is in our power; what is the conception here? To establish this will help to show whether we are to ascribe freedom to the gods and still more to God, or to refuse it, or again, while asserting it, to question still, in regard both to the higher and lower- the mode of its presence. What then do we mean when we speak of freedom in ourselves and why do we question it? My own reading is that, moving as we do amid adverse fortunes, compulsions, violent assaults of passion crushing the soul, feeling ourselves mastered by these experiences, playing slave to them, going where they lead, we have been brought by all this to doubt whether we are anything at all and dispose of ourselves in any particular. This would indicate that we think of our free act as one which we execute of our own choice, in no servitude to chance or necessity or overmastering passion, nothing thwarting our will; the voluntary is conceived as an event amenable to will and occurring or not as our will dictates. Everything will be voluntary that is produced under no compulsion and with knowledge; our free act is what we are masters to perform. Differing conceptually, the two conditions will often coincide but sometimes will clash. Thus a man would be master to kill, but the act will not be voluntary if in the victim he had failed to recognise his own father. Perhaps however that ignorance is not compatible with real freedom: for the knowledge necessary to a voluntary act cannot be limited to certain particulars but must cover the entire field. Why, for example, should killing be involuntary in the failure to recognise a father and not so in the failure to recognise the wickedness of murder? If because the killer ought to have learned, still ignorance of the duty of learning and the cause of that ignorance remain alike involuntary.
What then, is it not possible for a man to liberate himself [from fate] through the Gods that revolve in the heavens, and to consider the same as the...
(1) What then, is it not possible for a man to liberate himself [from fate] through the Gods that revolve in the heavens, and to consider the same as the leaders of fate, and yet as those that bind our lives with indissoluble bonds? Perhaps nothing prevents this from being the case. For if the Gods comprehend in themselves many essences and powers, there are also in them other immense differences and contrarieties. Moreover, this also may be said, that in each of the Gods, though such as are visible, there are certain intelligible principles through which a liberation to souls from mundane generation is effected. But if some one leaves only two genera of Gods, viz. the mundane and supermundane, the liberation to souls will be effected through the supermundane Gods. These things, therefore, are more accurately discussed in our treatise Concerning the Gods , in which it is shown who are the anagogic Gods, and according to what kind of powers they are so; how they liberate from fate, and through what sacred regressions; and what the order is of mundane nature, and how the most perfect intellectual energy rules over this.
Chapter III: The Gnostic Aims At the Nearest Likeness Possible to God and His Son. (4)
On a par with these in opinion, are they who, falling into licentiousness in pleasures, and grievous pains, and unlooked-for accidents, and bidding de...
(4) But those who have not seen the self-determination of the human soul, and its incapability of being treated as a slave in what respects the choice of life, being disgusted at what is done through rude injustice, do not think that there is a God. On a par with these in opinion, are they who, falling into licentiousness in pleasures, and grievous pains, and unlooked-for accidents, and bidding defiance to events, say that there is no God, or that, though existing, He does not oversee all things. And others there are, who are persuaded that those they reckon gods are capable of being prevailed upon by sacrifices and gifts, favouring, so to speak, their prof-ligacies; and will not believe that He is the only true God, who exists in the invariablehess of righteous goodness.
THE time, then, is come for our discourse, to sing the God of many Names, as "Sovereign Lord," and as "Ancient of days." For He is called the former,...
(1) THE time, then, is come for our discourse, to sing the God of many Names, as "Sovereign Lord," and as "Ancient of days." For He is called the former, by reason that He is an all-controlling basis, binding and embracing the whole, and establishing and supporting, and tightening, and completing the whole. Continuous in itself, and from itself, producing the whole, as it were from a Sovereign root, and turning to itself the whole, as to a sovereign parent stock, and holding them together as an all-embracing basis of all, securing all the things embraced, within one grasp superior to all, and not permitting them, when fallen from itself to be destroyed, as moved from an all-perfect sanctuary. But the Godhead is called Sovereign, both as controlling and governing the members of His household, purely, and as being desired and beloved by all, and as placing upon all the voluntary yokes, and the sweet pangs of the Divine and Sovereign, and in dissolvable love of the Goodness itself,
By the assistance also of this reasoning, we may discover another difference between Gods and dæmons. For both the visible and invisible Gods,...
(3) By the assistance also of this reasoning, we may discover another difference between Gods and dæmons. For both the visible and invisible Gods, indeed, comprehend in themselves the whole government of whatever is contained in all heaven and the world, and in the total invisible powers in the universe. But those powers that are allotted a dæmoniacal prefecture, distributing certain divisible portions of the world, govern these, and have themselves a partible form of essence and power. They are, likewise, in a certain respect, connascent with, and inseparable from, the subjects of their government. But the Gods, though they may ride in bodies, are entirely separated from them. The providential attention, therefore, to bodies, produces no diminution in those to whom body is subservient: for it is connectedly contained by a more excellent nature, is converted to it, and is not the cause of any impediment to it. But the adhering to a genesiurgic nature, and the being divided about it, necessarily give to dæmons a more subordinate condition. In short, that which is divine is of a ruling nature, and presides over the different orders of beings; but that which is dæmoniacal is of a ministrant nature, and receives whatever the Gods may announce, promptly employing manual operation, as it were, in things which the Gods intellectually perceive, wish, and command. The Gods, therefore, are liberated from the powers which verge to generation; but dæmons are not entirely purified from these. And thus much concerning this distinction; and we trust, that from the former and the present exposition, the difference between Gods and dæmons will become more known.
Let us then, in the next place, consider the opposing arguments, what they are, and what reason they possess. And if we should discuss some things a...
(1) Let us then, in the next place, consider the opposing arguments, what they are, and what reason they possess. And if we should discuss some things a little more abundantly, in consequence of speaking freely and at leisure, it is requisite that you should promptly attend to, and endure what, we say. For it is necessary that great labour should be bestowed on the greatest disciplines, and that they should be accurately explored for a long time, if you intend to know them perfectly. Do you, therefore, conformably to the present hypothesis, propose the arguments which occasion the doubt, and I will answer you. Say then, “ it very much perplexes me to understand how superior beings, when invoked, are commanded by those that invoke them, as if they were their inferiors .” But I will unfold to you the whole division, which is worthy of regard, concerning the powers that are invoked; from which you will be able clearly to define what is possible and what is impossible, in the subjects of your investigation. For the Gods, indeed, and the natures that are more excellent than we, through the wish of what is beautiful, and from an unenvying and exuberant fulness of good, benevolently impart to those that are worthy, such things as are fit for them, commiserating the labours of sacerdotal men, but being delighted with those that they have begotten, nourished, and instructed. But the middle genera are the inspective guardians of judgment.
If tongue discourses of hidden mysteries, Behold, then, God's action and man's action; Know, action does belong to us ; this is evident. If no...
(59) If tongue discourses of hidden mysteries, Behold, then, God's action and man's action; Know, action does belong to us ; this is evident. If no actions proceeded from men, How could you say, 'Why act ye thus?' The agency of God is the cause of our action, Our actions are the signs of God's agency; Nevertheless our actions are freely willed by us, Whence our recompense is either hell or 'The Friend.'"
For since it is not possible to speak rightly about the Gods without the Gods, much less can any one perform works which are of an equal dignity with ...
(2) But the right performance of actions which are effected in a divine manner, is entirely to be ascribed to some one of the more excellent natures. For since it is not possible to speak rightly about the Gods without the Gods, much less can any one perform works which are of an equal dignity with divinity, and obtain the foreknowledge of every thing without [the inspiring influence of] the Gods. For the human race is imbecile, and of small estimation, sees but a little, and possesses a connascent nothingness; and the only remedy of its inherent error, perturbation, and unstable mutation, is its participation, as much as possible, of a certain portion of divine light. But he who excludes this, does the same thing as those who attempt to produce soul from things inanimate, or to generate intellect from things unintelligent. For without the cooperation of a cause, he constitutes divine works from things which are not divine.
These assertions, therefore, are unworthy of the conceptions which we should frame of the Gods, and foreign from the works which are effected in...
(2) These assertions, therefore, are unworthy of the conceptions which we should frame of the Gods, and foreign from the works which are effected in theurgy. But an investigation of this kind suffers the same thing as the multitude suffer, about the fabrication of the universe and providence. For not being able to learn what the mode is in which these are effected, and refusing to ascribe human cares and reasonings to the Gods, they wholly abolish the providential and fabricative energy of divinity. As, therefore, we are accustomed to answer these, that the divine mode of production and providential inspection is very different from that which is human, and which it is not proper wholly to reject through ignorance, as if it had not from the first any subsistence; thus, also, it may be justly contended against you, that all prediction, and the performance of divine works, are the works of the Gods, as they are not effected through other and these human causes, but through such as are alone known to the Gods.
What then shall we say concerning the next inquiry to this, viz. “ why the powers who are invoked think it requisite that he who worships them should...
(1) What then shall we say concerning the next inquiry to this, viz. “ why the powers who are invoked think it requisite that he who worships them should be just, but they when called upon to act unjustly do not refuse so to act ?” To this I reply, that I am dubious with respect to what you call acting justly, and am of opinion that what appears to us to be an accurate definition of justice does not also appear to be so to the Gods. For we, looking to that which is most brief, direct our attention to things present, and to this momentary life, and the manner in which it subsists. But the powers that are superior to us know the whole life of the soul, and all its former lives; and, in consequence of this, if they inflict a certain punishment from the prayer of those that invoke them, they do not inflict it without justice, but looking to the offences committed by souls in former lives; which men not perceiving think that they unjustly fall into the calamities which they suffer.
In order, therefore, that from an abundance of arguments we may contend against the objection which is now adduced, we will grant, if you please, the...
(1) In order, therefore, that from an abundance of arguments we may contend against the objection which is now adduced, we will grant, if you please, the contrary to what we have asserted, viz. that certain unjust things are performed in this business of invocations. That the Gods, however, are not to be accused as the causes of these is immediately manifest. For those that are good are the causes of good; and the Gods possess good essentially. They do nothing, therefore, that is unjust. Hence other causes of guilty deeds must be investigated. And if we are not able to discover these causes, it is not proper to throw away the true conception respecting the Gods, nor on account of the doubts whether these unjust deeds are performed, and how they are effected, to depart from notions concerning the Gods which are truly clear. For it is much better to acknowledge the insufficiency of our power to explain how unjust actions are perpetrated, than to admit any thing impossible and false respecting the Gods; since all the Greeks and Barbarians truly opine the contrary to be the case with divine natures. After this manner, therefore, the truth respecting these particulars subsists.
What, therefore, shall we derive from the Gods who are entirely exempt from all human generation, with respect to sterility, or abundance or any...
(1) What, therefore, shall we derive from the Gods who are entirely exempt from all human generation, with respect to sterility, or abundance or any thing else pertaining to [the mortal] life? Nothing whatever. For it is not the province of those who are liberated from all things to meddle with gifts of this kind. But if some one should say that the perfectly immaterial comprehend in themselves the material Gods, and that through this they also contain in themselves their gifts according to one first cause; such a one will also say, that in consequence of this an abundance of divine gifts descend from the immaterial Gods. It must not, however, be granted to any one to say that the immaterial Gods bestow these gifts by proximately interfering with the actions of human life. For such an administration of our affairs is partible, is accomplished with a certain conversion [to the subjects of its care], is not entirely separate from bodies, and is incapable of receiving a pure and undefiled domination. Will not, therefore, that mode of sacrifice in works of this kind be most appropriate which is mingled with bodies, and adheres to generation; and not that which is entirely immaterial and incorporeal? For the pure mode of sacrifice is perfectly transcendent and incommensurate [with our concerns]. But the mode which employs bodies, and the powers that subsist through bodies, is in the most eminent degree allied to human affairs. It is also capable of producing a certain prosperous condition of things, and of imparting symmetry and temperament to the mortal race.
For a conception of the mind does not conjoin theurgists with the Gods; since, if this were the case, what would hinder those who philosophize theoret...
(2) For, let “ ignorance and deception be error and impiety ,” yet it does not follow that, on this account, things which are offered to the Gods, and divine works, are false. For a conception of the mind does not conjoin theurgists with the Gods; since, if this were the case, what would hinder those who philosophize theoretically, from having a theurgic union with the Gods? Now, however, in reality, this is not the case. For the perfect efficacy of ineffable works, which are divinely performed in a way surpassing all intelligence, and the power of inexplicable symbols, which are known only to the Gods, impart theurgic union. Hence, we do not perform these things through intellectual perception; since, if this were the case, the intellectual energy of them would be imparted by us; neither of which is true. For when we do not energize intellectually, the synthemata themselves perform by themselves their proper work, and the ineffable power of the Gods itself knows, by itself, its own images. It does not, however, know them, as if excited by our intelligence; for neither is it natural that things which comprehend should be excited by those that are comprehended, nor perfect by imperfect natures, nor wholes by parts. Hence, neither are divine causes precedaneously called into energy by our intellections; but it is requisite to consider these, and all the best dispositions of the soul, and also the purity pertaining to us, as certain concauses; the things which properly excite the divine will being divine synthemata themselves. And thus, things pertaining to the Gods, are moved by themselves, and do not receive from any inferior nature a certain principle in themselves of their own proper energy.
God's agency reconciled with man's freewill. The ambassador said, "O Commander of the faithful, How comes the soul down from above to earth? How can...
(1) God's agency reconciled with man's freewill. The ambassador said, "O Commander of the faithful, How comes the soul down from above to earth? How can so noble a bird be confined in a cage?" He said, "God speaks words of power to souls, To things of naught, without eyes or ears, And at these words they all spring into motion; At His words of power these nothings arise quickly, Again, He speaks other spells to these creatures, He speaks to the rose's ear, and causes it to bloom;
Afterwards, also, you say, “ that many, through enthusiasm and divine inspiration, predict future events, and that they are then in so wakeful a...
(1) Afterwards, also, you say, “ that many, through enthusiasm and divine inspiration, predict future events, and that they are then in so wakeful a state, as even to energize according to sense, and yet they are not conscious of the state they are in, or at least, not so much as they were before .” I wish, therefore, here to point out to you the signs by which those who are rightly possessed by the Gods may be known. For they either subject the whole of their life, as a vehicle or instrument to the inspiring Gods; or they exchange the human for the divine life; or they energize with their own proper life about divinity. But they neither energize according to sense, nor are in such a vigilant state as those who have their senses excited from sleep (for neither do they apprehend future events); nor are they moved as those are who energize according to impulse. Nor, again, are they conscious of the state they are in, neither as they were before, nor in any other way; nor, in short, do they convert to themselves their own intelligence, or exert any knowledge which is peculiarly their own.
But he calumniates the Divine Paul, who said, "that Almighty God is not able to deny Himself." Now in advancing this, I very much fear lest I should i...
(6) Yet Elymas, the Magician, says, "if Almighty God is All-powerful, how is He said by your theologian, not to be able to do some thing "? But he calumniates the Divine Paul, who said, "that Almighty God is not able to deny Himself." Now in advancing this, I very much fear lest I should incur ridicule for folly, as undertaking to pull down frail houses, built upon the sand by little boys at play; and as being eager to aim at the theological intelligence of this, as if it were some inaccessible mark. For, the denial of Himself, is a falling from truth, but the truth is an existent, and the falling from the truth is a falling from the existent. If, then, the truth is an existent, and the denial of the truth a falling from the existent, Almighty God cannot fall from the existent, and non-existence is not; as any one might say, the powerless is not powerful; and ignorance, by privation, does not know. The wise man, not having understood this, imitates those inexperienced wrestlers, who, very often, by assuming that their adversaries are weak, according to their own opinion, and manfully making a show of fight with them, when absent, and courageously beating the air with empty blows, think that they have overcome their antagonists, and proclaim themselves victors (though) not yet having experienced their rivals' strength. But we, conjecturing the meaning of the Theologian to the best of our ability, celebrate the Super-powerful God, as Omnipotent, as blessed, and only Lord; as reigning in the kingdom of Eternity itself; as in no respect fallen from things existing;--but rather, as both super-having and pre-having all existing things, as beseems Power superessential; and as having bequeathed to all things being, the power to be, and this their being in an ungrudging stream, as beseems abundance of surpassing power.
Chapter XIV: Greek Plagiarism From the Hebrews. (109)
Plato in what follows gives an exhibition of free-will: "Virtue owns not a master; and in proportion as each one honours or dishonours it, in that...
(109) Plato in what follows gives an exhibition of free-will: "Virtue owns not a master; and in proportion as each one honours or dishonours it, in that proportion he will be a partaker of it. The blame lies in the exercise of free choice." But God is blameless. For He is never the author of evil.
Farther still, with respect to “ what are called the necessities of the Gods ,” the whole truth of this is, that necessities are peculiar to, and...
(1) Farther still, with respect to “ what are called the necessities of the Gods ,” the whole truth of this is, that necessities are peculiar to, and subsist in such a way as accords with the nature of, the Gods. Hence they do not subsist as if they were externally derived, or were the effect of violence, but after such a manner as the good ought to be from necessity, so the Gods entirely exist, and are by no means otherwise disposed. This necessity, therefore, is mingled with beneficent will, and is the friend of love; through an order adapted to the Gods, possesses identity and immutability; and because it is contained in one boundary, abides in this, and never departs from it. Hence, through all these particulars, the contrary to what you infer takes place. For it happens that a divine nature is incapable of being allured, is impassive and uncompelled, if there are in reality such powers in theurgy, as we have demonstrated there are.
And for my part, I am utterly incapable of conceiving such an animal as has its appetencies, which are moved by external causes, under the dominion of...
(4) And if we are pulled like inanimate things by the puppet-strings of natural powers, willingness and unwillingness, and impulse, which is the antecedent of both, are mere redundancies. And for my part, I am utterly incapable of conceiving such an animal as has its appetencies, which are moved by external causes, under the dominion of necessity. And what place is there any longer for the repentance of him who was once an unbeliever, through which comes forgiveness of sins? So that neither is baptism rational, nor the blessed seal, nor the Son, nor the Father. But God, as I think, turns out to be the distribution to men of natural powers, which has not as the foundation of salvation voluntary faith.